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Abstract 
The phenomenon of the 2007/8 post-election violence in Kenya is complex and has numerous facets. 
This is because of the historical and socio-political dimensions connected with it, some of which the 
present study has attempted to discuss. The main objective of this research is to develop a missiological 
model of reconciliation by understanding and addressing the underlying causes of the 2007/8 post-
election violence through an interpretive and missiological reading of the 2008 report of the Kenya 
National Commission on Human Rights. The concepts of politics, ethnicity, human rights and violence 
are chosen as analytical units for this study and through an integrated approach to their 
interconnectedness, a more adequate framework to identify and analyze the causes of violence is 
created. The churches in Kenya have played ambiguous roles in the social-political arena and this study 
surveys these roles and suggests different missional approaches through which the churches in Kenya 
can participate in the mission of reconciliation. 
 
Key Words 
Missio Dei, politics, ethnicity, human rights, violence, reconciliation, 2007/8 post-election violence, 
truth, justice, forgiveness. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
The present study addresses the violence in Kenya that was sparked by the 2007 general elections from 
a missiological perspective. The phenomenon of post-election violence is complex and has numerous 
facets but the present study focuses on the report of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 
(KNCHR) which is subjected to a missiological analysis, reflecting on what it is saying to the churches in 
Kenya. The main objective of this research is to develop a missiological model of reconciliation by 
understanding and addressing the underlying causes of the 2007/8 post-election violence through an 
interpretive and missiological reading of the 2008 KNCHR report that addresses the 2007/8 post-election 
violence.  
Four key words are identified from the report: politics, ethnicity, human rights and violence, 
which are chosen as analytical units for this study. This research suggests that the interconnectedness of 
politics, ethnicity, human rights, and violence creates a more adequate framework to identify and 
analyze the causes of violence. By developing a missiological model of reconciliation, this study reflects 
on how churches in Kenya could meet the challenges posed by bad politics, negative ethnicity, violations 
of human rights and violence. 
 
1.2 PERSONAL STANCE 
Dealing with the 2007/8 post-election violence calls for a clarification regarding the position of the 
researcher. The researcher is a Kenyan, a Kikuyu, a theological practitioner and a member of the 
Presbyterian Church of East Africa. As such he was actively involved in pastoral ministry and theological 
reflection during and after the violence. As a Kenyan, the researcher grew up in the reality of a multi-
ethnic society and as a Kikuyu the researcher belongs to the antagonizing ethnic group of the president 
that was entangled in the controversy about the election results. This ethnic belonging demanded 
allegiance and commitment in terms of politics. As a Christian belonging to the Kikuyu ethnic group, the 
researcher experienced internal tensions between these different identities. On the one hand, inspired 
by the ethno-political nature of politics in Kenya, Kikuyu identity demanded strict allegiance to the 
Kikuyu political opinion and also adherence to the collective Kikuyu siege mentality which called for 
hatred and retaliation towards those who were raping, maiming, displacing and killing the Kikuyu people 
during the violence. On the other hand, Christian identity demanded a different approach, an approach 
of love which called for a multi-ethnic unity and love for perceived enemies. It is in this context of 
 2 
 
“battle of identities” that the researcher embarked on this study and is committed to finding a 
missiological model of reconciliation for the Kenyan situation.  
 
1.3 LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
Kenya had experienced relative peace until the disputed general election of 2007, which was followed 
by sporadic violence that led to the deaths of approximately a thousand Kenyans, the displacement of 
thousands, physical, sexual and psychological abuse and wanton destruction of property and animals. 
Various researches have been carried out from different perspectives to determine findings related to 
the violence. Firstly, there are various researches carried out by institutions. Soon after the cessation of 
the violence the government of Kenya in March 2008 formed two commissions to investigate matters 
relating to the violence: the Independent Review Commission (IRC) and the Commission of Inquiry into 
Post-Election Violence (CIPEV). The former was to investigate all aspects of the 2007 presidential 
elections and make findings and recommendations to improve the electoral process (Office of Public 
Communications 2008a). The later was to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
violence, the conduct of state security agencies in their handling of it and to make 
recommendations concerning these and other matters (Office of Public Communications 2008b). 
From a religious perspective, the Inter-Religious Forum (IRF), a body that brings together Christian, 
Muslim and Hindu leaders in Kenya, also carried out research on the violence (Inter-Religious Forum 
2009). From a human rights perspective, the KNCHR also carried out a research about the violence 
(KNCHR 2008). From all this research and all these respective reports, the report of KNCHR was chosen 
for this study1.  
Secondly, various books have been written by different authors about the conflict. Most notably 
is Koigi wa Wamwere, a vocal voice in the fight against “negative ethnicity” in Kenya, a term that is now 
closely associated with him. In Towards Genocide in Kenya (2008), Wa-Wamwere has discussed ethnic 
polarization in Kenya in depth and named it as the major challenge in Kenya today. Kimani Njogu has 
edited two books: Healing the Wound (2009), with narratives of violent conflict in Kenya – which he 
argues must be told so that the multiple voices from the citizens are heard – and Defining Moment 
(2011), which points at hotspots, the mediation process and ways of ending impunity in Kenya. Mbugua 
wa Mungai and George Gona have edited (Re)membering Kenya (2011), a collection of articles 
                                                          
1 The reasons that informed this choice are discussed in the next chapter. 
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discussing the surroundings of the violence under three topics: identity, culture and freedom. Most 
notably, one of the contributors to this book, Betty Caplan, has done a comparative analysis of 
strategies of dealing with past violence in Northern Ireland and South Africa and has made 
recommendations to efforts of healing and reconciliation in Kenya. 
Thirdly, there are various articles written from perspectives of different academic disciplines. 
Joseph Kahiga (2009) discusses the role of education in transforming society to a better quality 
interrelationship of multi-ethnic community. From theological perspectives, the article of Philomena 
Mwaura and Constansia Martinon focuses on the actions of local churches after the violence and argues 
that, despite the Church’s shortcomings it is still perceived as the national institution capable of 
transcending ethnic boundaries, seeking reconciliation, and developing long term solutions (Mwaura & 
Martinon 2010). Elias Opongo’s article is a challenge to the churches in Kenya to be prophetic by guiding 
Kenyans to peace, reconciliation, and justice by being vigilant, analyzing social trends and advocating 
social transformation (Opongo 2010) 
Fourthly, there has been some academic research carried out by postgraduate students. Isaack 
Kubai Kaberia has written a doctor of Philosophy (PhD) thesis entitled “Just Reconciliation: The Church’s 
Response to Ethno-political Violence in Kenya.” Kaberia (2013) argues that lack of inclusive justice has 
made reconciliation difficult among conflicting communities in Kenya and as such the Church needs to 
embark on integrating justice and reconciliation as a holistic process of establishing a just society 
(Kaberia 2013). Another PhD thesis was written in 2011 by Nguchie Gathogo, entitled: “Ethnicity, peace, 
and violence: The voices of Kenyan church leaders.” Gathogo (2011) building his argument on ground of 
the complacency of Church leaders in Kenya, argues that the Church leaders have the potential to 
restore their status as the conscience of the nation and play an active role in peace building, justice, but 
that this restoration requires a paradigm shift from their ethnically biased lived reality to a lived reality 
of Christian identity and national (Kenyan) identity, so that their prophetic voice can be heard and 
respected on a national platform. 
Reading the signs of the times, even after relative peace has returned to Kenya, some scholars 
have indicated that there is a lot that needs to be done to prevent the country from slipping back into 
anarchy. Peter Kagwanja (2008:367, 384) uses the term “courting genocide” to argue that Kenya’s 
democracy is at risk of negative ethnicity, populism and manipulation of informal violence, unless 
relevant measures are put in place to counter these factors. Susanne D. Mueller (2011:99) notes that, 
“the root causes of the violence still persist, have not been addressed, and easily could be reignited. 
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Faced with a situation where institutions and the rule of law have been weakened deliberately and 
where diffused violence is widespread, both Kenya’s transition to democracy and the fate of the nation 
remain vulnerable.” Though some structural reforms were put in place, like the promulgation of a new 
constitution and judicial reforms – which perhaps contributed to a relatively peaceful transition in 2013 
– the country remains vulnerable. From the above review of literature, not much seems to have been 
written from a missiological/theological perspective and this research is an addition to the missiological 
discourse on violence in Kenya. 
 
1.4 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
In the light of the aforementioned background, the research question of this present study is “What is 
the mission of the churches in Kenya, in relation to the 2007/8 post-election violence with regard to the 
interconnectedness of politics, ethnicity, human rights and violence?” To unpack this research question, 
there are four sub-questions that are asked: Firstly, what were the nature and underlying causes of the 
2007/8 post-election violence according to the KNCHR report? Secondly, what is the missiological 
interpretation of these interrelated concepts of politics, ethnicity, human rights and violence? Thirdly, 
how do the concepts of politics, ethnicity, human rights and violence relate to the churches in Kenya? 
Fourthly, what could be an appropriate model for reconciliation2 which could address the issues of bad 
politics, negative ethnicity, violations of human rights and violence in Kenya? 
 
1.5 VALUE OF THE STUDY 
The value of the current study is derived from its significance and relevance. It is significant because it 
addresses current and real issues that affect all Kenyans and it is relevant because of its transformative 
teleology and practicality in missiology as an academic discourse and in mission as a practical strategy of 
transformation. This value is discussed here under missiological value and missional value. 
 
                                                          
2 The other alternative that could have been used here is “to avoid violence in the future” but violence is the end 
result of other underlying issues hence the term “reconciliation” is deliberately used here, because it addresses 
these underlying issues. In other words, the absence of violence doesn’t necessarily mean that there are no 
divisions and tension among the people. 
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1.5.1 Missiological value  
The missiological value of this study is to offer a missiological perspective on the events connected to 
the 2007/8 post-election violence, which are also discussed from the perspectives of other academic 
disciplines like law, political science and sociology. By doing this, the study sets the topic on the agenda 
of theological/missiological thinking. The research will elaborate dimensions of contextual missiology, 
especially with regard to the interrelatedness of ethnicity, politics, human rights, and violence in the 
Kenyan context, dimensions which have hitherto been neglected. The research will contribute to the 
broader discussions about the role of missiology as a discipline in offering models of preventing violence 
and building peace and reconciliation in both conflict and post-conflict societies. By doing this, it 
adventures into some inter-disciplinary dialogues with political and public theology. 
 
1.5.2 Missional value 
The missional value3 of this study is based on an agency approach. To the researcher the study provides 
an academic framework to address the tensions between ethnicity and Christianity as described in the 
personal stance. To missiologists, the study can help in broadening the research interest especially 
connected to ethnicity, politics human rights, and violence. To the churches in Kenya, the research will 
assist in improving existing models and developing new initiatives of justice, peace and reconciliation 
within the Church and the society. The research will also contribute to the evaluation of processes 
through which churches in Kenya attempts at (re)defining their role in the public sphere and also gives 
churches a basis of reflexivity with regard to the four concepts mentioned above. To the society, the 
study by working with a transformative missiological model serves national interest. This underpins the 
importance of a theology/missiology that addresses societal issues and therefore the outcome of the 
research can contribute to the initiatives of justice, peace and reconciliation processes in Kenya. 
 
1.6 DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
Due to the wide scope of the area of study (2007/8 post-election violence), the current study is limited 
to the 2008 KNCHR report. The conceptual criterion is used to limit the study to four concepts drawn 
from the report ethnicity, politics human rights and violence. Delimitation of this study is also done in 
                                                          
3 Missional value is used here to refer to practical value. It is inspired by missional church discourses as mentioned 
in section 1.8.4, where mission can be understood as practical ways through which the church participates in God’s 
work in the world. 
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the area of agency, with attention being given to only four mainline missionary church groups in Kenya: 
the Catholic Church, the Anglican Church in Kenya (ACK), the Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA) 
and the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK). To avoid confusion of terms, the word 
“churches” is used to refer to the churches in focus. The word “Church” is a theological term, used to 
refer to the body of Christ. The word “Roman Catholic Church” is used to refer to the body of Christ in 
the Roman Catholic Church and the word “Catholic Church” is used to refer to the members of the 
Roman Catholic Church in Kenya. 
 
1.7 DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
It is important to give relevant demographic information at the beginning of this study. The 
demographic information given here is firstly ethnic affiliation and a map of Kenya that shows how 
ethnic groups are distributed. Secondly there is religious affiliation and thirdly youth statistics.  
 
1.7.1 Ethnic Affiliation        
     
   
Figure one (taken from Google) 
 
Table one (KNBS, Kenya population and housing 
census, 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ETHNIC GROUP TOTAL % 
   Kikuyu 17.2 
  Luhya 13.8 
 Kalenjin 12.9 
 Luo 10.5 
 Kamba 10.1 
 Kenya Somali 6.2 
 Kisii 5.8 
 Mijikenda 5.1 
 Meru 4.3 
 Turkana 2.6 
 Maasai 2.2 
 Others 9.3 
 7 
 
1.7.2 Religious Affiliation 
 
 RELIGION TOTAL 
 Protestant 47.5 
 Catholic 23.4 
 Other Christian 11.9 
 Muslim 11.1 
 Hindu 0.2 
 Traditionalists 1.7 
 Other religions 1.5 
 No religion 2.5 
 Do not know 0.2 
 
Table two (KNBS, Kenya population and housing census, 2011) 
 
1.7.3 Youth Statistics 
The demographic definition of youth as used in this present study refers to any individual between the 
age of 15 and 35 years. According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), based on the 2009 
Kenya Population and Housing Census, the total population is 38,610,097 million, with those aged less 
than 34 years constituting about 78% of Kenya’s population, with majority of the total population under 
age 25. The youth aged between 15 and 34 years account for about 35% of the total population (KNBS, 
2011). Research has established that unemployment rate in Kenya is approximately 40%, with about 
21% being unemployed youth (UNDP 2013: 7, UNICEF 2012:30).   
  
1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section focuses on the research methodology that is applied in this current study, which is a 
threefold methodological approach. Firstly, there is the theoretical framework as inspired by the praxis 
matrix. Secondly there is a missiological framework as encompassed by the concepts of church-with-
others and missio Dei, and finally there are research methods that are used in every chapter of this 
study. 
 
1.8.1 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework that is used in this study is critical theory in the form of the praxis matrix. 
According to Max Horkheimer, one of the fathers of critical theory, a critical theory is adequate only if it 
meets the criterion that is threefold: explanatory, practical and normative, all at the same time (Johnson 
 8 
 
1995:67). The praxis matrix satisfies this criterion; hence its choice. The praxis matrix is concerned with 
understanding a particular situation for the sake of contributing to transformation within it (UNISA 
Tutorial letter, 13). Agreeing with this is Colin Graham Smith4 who points that, “the relationship to 
critical theory is most evident in the concept of praxis. Praxis describes the dialectical relationship 
between reflection and action which results in the transformation of society” (Smith 2007:11).  
The choice of the praxis matrix was informed by the nature and teleology of this study which is 
contextual and transformative. It is contextual because it integrates the analysis of the Kenyan socio-
political context with regard to the 2007/8 post-election violence into a missiological reflection, and it is 
transformative because it suggests practical actions through which the churches in Kenya can “preach, 
serve and witness to the reign of God” (Bevans & Schroeder 2011:396, 397). This reign of God is 
transformative both at personal and community levels. In this regard, therefore, the praxis matrix is 
used to unmask and reveal the underlying causes of post-election violence in Kenya according to the 
KNCHR report. 
The praxis matrix as developed by University of South Africa (UNISA) has seven dimensions 
which shape the concepts of contextualizing the gospel (Kritzinger 2013:38) and was developed under 
the influence of Joe Holland and Peter Henriot’s pastoral cycle (Kritzinger & Saayman 2011:3). There are 
several questions attached to each dimension, which are meant to help in understanding the 
dimensions. The dimensions and their respective questions are: Agency – who are the actors? How do 
they position themselves in and identify with a community? Who are their interlocutors? Contextual 
understanding – How do they view their prevailing religious, economic, political, cultural and social 
circumstances? How do they read the signs of the times? Ecclesial scrutiny –how do they relate to 
churches around them and what did these churches do in the past? Interpreting the tradition – How do 
they read the Bible and their theological tradition? Discernment for action – What actions and projects 
do they plan and pursue? Reflexivity – Do they learn from their experiences? Spirituality – How do they 
experience God’s presence and guidance? How does that motivate and direct their mission? (Kritzinger 
& Saayman 2011:4-5). 
According to Kritzinger & Saayman (2011:4), the praxis matrix can be used both as a mobilizing 
and analytical tool. It is mobilizing because, “it can be used to mobilize a group of Christians to work 
                                                          
4 Although Smith is in reference to the pastoral cycle as developed by Holland and Henriot (1983), as it will be 
noted later, the praxis matrix was actually further developed  from the approach of the pastoral cycle (Kritzinger 
2011:3). 
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together for transformation in their context (:4). It is an analytical tool because it can be used as a 
research method to explore the transformational praxis (theory-and-practice) of another person and 
group” (:4), which means that “mission is studied through the matrix (as lens)” (Kritzinger 2013:38). 
However, “it is important to realize that it is in the first place a mobilizing instrument, rather than 
analyzing (research) instrument” (UNISA Tutorial letter:13). Below is a diagram that represents all the 
dimension of the praxis matrix (Kritzinger & Saayman 2011:4). 
 
1.8.2 Missiological framework 
Since this is a missiological study, it is important to state the missiological approach used. Mission is 
understood as God calling and sending the church to preach, serve and witness to his reign through 
active participation in his work in the world (Guder 1998). This means that God is actively working in his 
world to redeem and transform it through his reign and he is calling and sending the church to 
participate in this work. It is when the Church therefore discerns this call and duly responds to it, that it 
becomes a missional church (Hirsch 2006:82, Niemandt 2011:398), a term whose roots can be traced 
from Lesslie Newbigin (Van Gelder 2007, Guder 1998). In this light, one can argue that a missional 
church is always contextual and transformative. From this understanding of mission, missiology can be 
understood as “a theological discipline that seeks to understand and define both creating and 
redeeming works of God in the world” (Van Gelder & Zscheile 2011: 23).  
The understanding of mission defines mission praxis. The churches in Kenya, building on the 
missionary legacy of the nineteenth century, understand mission as evangelism and church planting, and 
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this limited understanding has given shape to their mission praxis. The work of God in his world does not 
only involve conversion and church planting, as displayed by the mission praxis of the churches in 
Kenya,5 but it should also be considered in its multi-dimensional interrelatedness. Philip Wickeri 
(2004:187) argues that “missio Dei sees all the ways in which God is involved in the world and not just 
the evangelistic mission of the church.” Tormod Engelsviken (2003:487) notes that: “The old church-
centred missiology was theologically deficient in that it did not fully realize the broadness of the 
missionary task as modelled, for example, by Jesus' own ministry to the poor, the suffering and 
marginalized.”  
Affirming this multi-dimensional nature of mission, Bosch (1991) discusses what he calls 
elements of an emerging ecumenical missionary paradigm, under which there are thirteen dimensions 
which he describes with the terminology of “mission as…” Bevans and Schroeder (2011) see this multi-
dimensional nature of mission as “prophetic dialogue,” which is manifested in six components of God’s 
mission in which the church is called to share and witness.  
To avoid taking a generalized approach with regard to the multi-dimensionality of mission, 
Kritzinger (2013:36-37) argues that there are three ways that it can be applied. First, there is an 
approach informed by Stephen Neill’s statement, “If everything is mission, nothing is mission” (:37), 
which finds the definition of mission too broad and therefore the scope of mission is narrowed in some 
way. Secondly, there is an approach embodied in a particular context through a process of 
contextualization:6 “Since a Christian understanding of truth is dynamic, relational and time bound, 
particular congregations and groups discern their contextual priorities in the light of the challenges 
facing them” (:37). Finally there is an approach that “emphasizes context analysis and reading the signs 
of the times but suggests that the present global context requires all Christians to identify one particular 
dimension of mission as a priority” (:37). In the light of these approaches, the preference for this study is 
the second approach because this study through contextual analysis discerns the main issues affecting 
the Kenyan context against the backdrop of the 2007/8 post-election violence and from this it seeks to 
determine missiological priorities and actions for the churches in Kenya. 
 
                                                          
5 This kind of praxis by churches in Kenya can be compared to mission practice informed by the view of Gisbertius 
Voetius that the aim of mission was conversio gentilium (conversion of the nations), plantatio ecclesiae (planting of 
church) and gloria et manifestatio gratiae divinae (glory and manifestation of divine grace) (see Smith 2002:6). 
6 Nico Botha (2010) uses the same approach to discourage a broad application of contextualization. Inspired by 
Stephen Neill, he argues: “If everything is contextualization nothing is contextualization.”  
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1.8.3 Missiological approach 
The missiological approach of this study can be characterised by explaining its ontology and 
epistemology. The ontology of this study is theistic and it is properly encompassed in the missiological 
concept of missio Dei. The epistemology of this study is communal and it is inspired by a hermeneutic of 
humility understood as “knowing with others” and is properly embraced in the missiological concept of 
church-with-others. These two dimensions of the missiological approach are interrelated and are drawn 
from elements of the “emerging ecumenical missionary paradigm” proposed by David Bosch (1991) and 
are compatible with the theoretical framework of this study. Through an integrated approach they 
enhance the task of analyzing and understanding the Kenyan context with regard to the 2007/8 post-
election violence, with the deliberate goal of seeking a missiological approach that is both contextual 
and transformative.  
 
1.8.3.1 Missio Dei 
The concept of missio Dei as integrated in this study is based on the discussion of the Willingen 
Conference of 1952. Although the expression itself was not used during the conference, Wilhelm 
Richebächer (2003a:589) points out that the term missio Dei arose following the Willingen conference 
through the report of Karl Hartenstein. The main inspiration of this dimension is drawn from the 
Trinitarian understanding of the concept and how that relates to the church and the world. Thus, “The 
classical doctrine of missio Dei as God the Father sending the Son, and God the Father and the Son 
sending the Spirit was expanded to include yet another “movement”: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit 
sending the church into the world” (Bosch 1991:390). It can be argued that it is in this context of sending 
that the church preaches, serves and witnesses to the reign of God that creates and transforms the 
world. This is better understood by the words from the conference as quoted from the official 
International Missionary Council minutes by Richebächer (2003b:464): 
The missionary movement, of which we are part, has its source in the Triune God Himself. Out of the 
depths of his love for us, the Father has sent forth His own beloved son to reconcile all things to Himself, 
that we and all men might, through the Spirit, be made one in Him with the Father in that perfect love 
which is the very nature of God…We who have been chosen in Christ,…are by these very facts committed 
to full participation in His redeeming mission. There is no participation in Christ without participation in 
His mission to the world. That by which the church receives its existence is that by which it is also given its 
world-mission.  
In missiological circles, there have been many debates and critique of the concept of missio Dei, a 
discussion that falls outside the scope of this study. However, and generally speaking, many of these 
discussions evolve around the etymology of the phrase, the position of the church in the scheme of 
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things, and the goal of mission. Consequently, there are many approaches to missio Dei that emerge but 
for the interest of this study a pluralistic and relativistic approach is preferred, solely because of the 
comprehensiveness of the approach. The approach is pluralistic and relativistic because as both 
Engelsviken and Wickeri argue, missio Dei was supposed to interrupt the traditional church-centred 
missiology. To Engelsviken (2003:367), “The primary focus of missio Dei is therefore the world… The 
order is therefore not God-church-world, but God-world-church.” According to Wickeri (2004:187),  
Indeed, missio Dei became a way of criticizing the whole missionary enterprise as it was then 
understood in the churches. God had been working in the world all the time, and in all places, 
creating and redeeming, liberating and saving, whether the churches in the West realized this or 
not ….Missio Dei called the triumphalism of the missionary movement all over the world to a 
prophetic judgement. 
 
This view was also expressed by Lesslie Newbigin (2003:96):  
We are more conscious of the fact that God is already at work in the world outside long 
before the missionary arrives…God is already working in the world far beyond our little 
ecclesiastical ghettos. Our business is to go outside the church walls, become aware of 
what God is doing, and cooperate with Him.  
 
Flowing from this discussion, the Church cannot be viewed as the only or the main institution that God 
uses in the world to fulfil his will. God is actively at work in his world, and if the church does not 
participate in God’s mission in the world, it does not mean that God is not doing anything in the world. 
By implication therefore, there is a need for a communal epistemology discussed under the umbrella of 
the missiological concept of church with others. 
 
1.8.3.2 Church-with-others 
This dimension of church-with-others was coined by Theo Sundermeier (1986) and adopted by David 
Bosch. However, the phrase is ambiguous and therefore three dimensions can be drawn from it. First, it 
is the sense in which Sundemeier and Bosch use the phrase with regard to the patronage of the sending 
churches over the receiving churches, what Sundemeier calls “helper syndrome of pro-existence” (in 
Bosch 1991:375). Here, the term was used to counter the philosophy of church for others, which had 
been promoted by Dietrich Bonhoeffer7 (:375) and was negated due to the negative connotation it 
                                                          
7 However, it is important to note that Bonheoffer did not use church for others to mean a dominating church but 
rather a self-emptying and sacrificing church. The objection arises from the negative implications that can be 
drawn from the term “church for others.” 
 13 
 
carries. Apparently, this is echoed by Nyerere8 who argued that, “The members of the church must work 
with the people…It is important that we should stress the working with, not working for. For it is not the 
task of religious leaders to try and tell people what they should do” (Nyerere 1973:115).   
Secondly, the phrase can be used to imply ecumenism, partnership and cooperation. This is the 
dimension we get through a pluralistic approach to the concept of missio Dei. To this end, Wickeri 
(2004:187) connects the concept church-with-others with the concept of missio Dei and captures the 
relationship this way: 
Missio Dei implied a shift from a church-centered mission to a mission-centered church…There 
were different interpretations of how the church stood in relationship to other movements for 
humanization, but there was general agreement that missio Dei was about the renewal of the 
world, not just the renewal of the church. The church came to be understood as the "church with 
others" not the "church for others," and the Christian community became known through the 
rhythm of its relationship with the whole human community. 
 
This means that the church needs to work with other institutions that participate in the mission of God. 
Engelsviken (2003:489) argues that the church should, “…Join in the sense of working with the 
movements in the world that further shalom, whether or not these movements have any Christian 
basis.” To Wickeri (2004:187), “The church should be active alongside other movements which 
anticipate God's reign” and according to Julius Nyerere (1973:114), the church “…must itself become a 
force of social justice and it must work with other forces of justice wherever they are, and whatever 
they are called.” David Bosch (1991:387) warns against an exclusive Christian approach, when he argues 
that, “When Christians work towards transforming the world, they run the risk of exceeding the 
competence of the church, of talking and acting pretentiously on matters about which Christians have 
no more expertise than the world outside have.” This understanding therefore calls the church to 
ecumenism, partnership and co-operation, even as it participates in God’s mission in the world.  
Finally, the phrase can be used in an incarnational sense, where the church empathetically 
identifies with human beings and the society in which they live. This can also be referred as “insertion” 
as used by Henriot and Holland (1984:8) in the “pastoral cycle” to express the view that the basis of any 
pastoral action is involvement in the life of a community. This incarnational perspective corresponds 
with the conviction of the World Council of Churches (WCC), Vancouver assembly of 1983 which 
declared that, “…There will never be a time when the world, with all its political, social and economic 
issues, ceases to be the agenda of the church” (in Bosch 1991:386). Sharing these sentiments is Nyerere 
                                                          
8 Important to note, Julius Nyerere who was the first president of Tanzania, used this concept in a lecture to 
Maryknoll sisters in New York, which was first published in 1973. 
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(1973:114): “If the church is interested in man as an individual, it must express this interest in the 
society of which those individuals are members.” As such, one can argue that this interest and 
involvement of the church with the world should not be superficial, sympathetic or distant. Nyerere 
(1973:115) captures this argument in the following words, 
What is necessary is sharing, on the basis of equality and common humanity. Only by sharing 
work, hardships, knowledge, persecution, and progress, can the church contribute to our growth. 
And this means sharing in every sense as ‘members one of another’. For if the church is not part 
of our poverty, and part of our struggle against poverty and injustice, then it is not part of us.  
 
In the light of the three dimensions discussed, the concept of church-with-others in this study will be 
used in the second and the third senses – partnership and ecumenism as well as incarnational. As such, 
this study analytically identifies political, social, cultural and economic factors in Kenya with regard to 
the 2007/8 post-election violence, it investigates what God is saying and doing about these factors and 
also mobilizes the churches in Kenya towards missiologically participating in what God is doing. In 
conclusion therefore, by making these political, social, cultural and economic factors the agenda and 
interest of the church, it can be said that the churches in Kenya will be participating in the Missio Dei.  
 
1.8.4 Missional ecclesiology 
In the light of the foregoing discussion, a suitable example of how the missiological concepts of missio 
Dei and church-with-others can be integrated to produce a missional church is the South African 
Partnership for Missional Churches (SAPMC). Cornelius Niemandt (2010:397) notes that SAPMC was 
formed in 2004 by a number of congregations in Southern Africa on a journey of spiritual discernment 
that empowers them to respond to God’s mission. The vision statement of SAPMC is “To listen to God’s 
specific call to us, to let God send us and, through the Holy Spirit, empower us to participate in God’s 
mission in the world, so that both our outreach and our life together as a church as a witness to Jesus 
Christ” (:397-398). This vision is unpacked through five guideline questions that guide the missional 
congregations: Where are we? Whose are we? What is God doing? How is God sending us? How are we 
as a church currently living according to the pattern of God’s future? (:398). 
Looking closely at these questions through the lens of the praxis matrix, “Where are we?” is 
contextual understanding, “Whose are we?” is spirituality, “What is God doing?” is interpreting 
tradition, “How is God sending us?” is discernment for action, and “How are we as a church currently 
living according to the pattern of God’s future?” is reflexivity. With an addition of one more question to 
the SAPMC list – “Who are we?” – the dimensions of agency and ecclesial scrutiny can also be taken 
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care of. In conclusion, this example of the SAPMC corresponds closely to the missiological model on 
which the theoretical and missiological frameworks of this study are based. 
 
1.8.5 Research methods 
The present study is a literature study which involves a case study of the report by KNCHR titled: On the 
brink of the precipice: a human rights account of Kenya's 2007/8 post-election violence (2008). Chapter 
two is a description of the KNCHR report, which discusses the nature of the report through descriptive 
and analytical research methods by applying the analytical tool of textual/content analysis. This is done 
through systematic identification of the key issues (referred in this study as concepts) highlighted in the 
report and they were determined by the frequency with which they were used and repeated as well as 
the depth and emphasis with which they were discussed in the report. The data that is used in this 
chapter is the report by KNCHR.  
Chapters three to six all have a similar three three-fold structure, following the logic of: a) 
KNCHR report; b) missiological reflection; c) churches in Kenya. Dialogical, polemical and analytical 
research methods are used to interpret the concepts of politics, ethnicity, human rights and violence by 
asking what the KNCHR report says about them (contextual understanding), what is God saying about 
them (missiological interpretation/interpreting tradition) and how the churches in Kenya relate with 
these concepts (ecclesial scrutiny & discernment for action). The data required in these chapters is 
drawn from academic journals, books, official websites, public documents (specifically newspaper 
articles), official Church documents (pastoral letters, websites, press releases and legal documents) and 
personal experience and involvement of the researcher.  
Chapter seven develops a missiological model of reconciliation for the churches in Kenya 
discussed through four models. Due to the inter-relatedness of the concepts of politics, ethnicity, human 
rights and violence, an integrated approach is necessary hence a synthetic research method is used with 
an intention of developing a missiological model of reconciliation for churches in Kenya that is both 
contextual and transformative. The “discernment for action” dimension of the praxis matrix is used as a 
mobilizing instrument for a renewed ministry of reconciliation by the churches in Kenya. The model of 
reconciliation proposed here arises out of the discussion of the preceding chapters. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DESCRIPTION OF THE KNCHR REPORT 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter seeks to describe the report of KNCHR entitled, On the brink of the precipice: a human 
rights account of Kenya's 2007/8 post-election violence. The chapter has four sections: justification of 
the choice of the report, the background of the report, the structure of the report and the underlying 
issues drawn from the report, and how they synoptically fall under the interconnectedness of politics, 
ethnicity, human rights and violence.   
 
2.2 BACKGROUND OF THE REPORT 
KNCHR is an autonomous national human rights institution established by the constitution of Kenya in 
2002 with the core mandate of promoting and protecting human rights in Kenya. The operations of 
KNCHR are guided by the United Nations approved principles on the establishment of independent 
national human rights institutions. In Kenya, the commission has two broad mandates: acting as a 
watchdog over the government in the area of human rights and providing key leadership in moving the 
country towards a human rights state (KNCHR 2003).  
After the eruption of 2007/8 post-election violence, KNCHR initiated investigations on the 
character and scope of human rights violations between December 2007 and the end of February 2008, 
with the overall aim of documenting the violence to ensure that there “would be a comprehensive 
record of the violations committed during that period of time as a basis for enabling redress of such 
violations” (KNCHR 2008:6), to analyze the criminal responsibility of alleged perpetrators and to make 
general recommendations on governance that would enable Kenya to undertake an effective truth, 
justice and reconciliation process. To carry out these investigations, the commission trained and 
deployed teams of investigators to collect data from seven regions in Kenya which they refer to as 
principle theatres of the violence (:6). These teams comprised of commissioners and staff and they 
undertook thirty six missions with an average duration of eight days per mission. The data of the report 
was informed by interviews done by these teams, media stories, reports of organizations such as the 
Red Cross, and internet materials gathered from credible sources. A total of 1102 statements were 
collected, narrating over 7500 episodes of violence – or incitement to violence (:14). 
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The KNCHR had eight commissioners9 (KNCHR, Former Commissioners, 2013) and there are two 
dimensions of agency drawn from these commissioners which largely shaped their approach and 
commitment. Firstly, there is professional qualifications, with most of them having a legal background 
and extensive interest in the field of human rights. Secondly, there is inclusivity, with the commissioners 
being largely representative in terms of gender, special groups, ethnic group and religion. Gender 
inclusivity is manifested by the fact that there are five women and three men. Special groups inclusivity 
is manifested by the fact that two of the commissioners are physically challenged and as such they have 
vigorously advocated for the rights of the physically challenged. Ethnic diversity is evident by having all 
the commissioners from different ethnic groups in Kenya and religious inclusivity with three of the 
commissioners being Muslims. This diversity is important because the credibility of a report like this in 
Kenya depends on inclusive representation, especially seen through the lens of the widespread 
perception of nepotism and discrimination in public offices.   
 
2.3 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT 
The report is divided into eight chapters. Chapter one (KNCHR 2008: 6-19) discusses the background of 
the investigations, the structure of the report and the methodology applied. Here also the terms of 
reference and a summary of the key findings and recommendations10 are highlighted. The findings can 
be summarized in seven ways. Firstly, the violence was widespread, immediate and systematic. 
Secondly, politicians instigated the violence before and during the violence through incitement and 
together with business people financed and sustained the infrastructure of the violence. Thirdly, there 
was gross violation of human rights and crimes against humanity were committed. These violations 
were committed through murder, arson attacks, massive displacement, sexual offences, and wanton 
destruction of property and bodily harm which were selectively committed on the basis ethno-political 
considerations. Fourthly, the response of the government was slow and ineffectual, which saw a near 
collapse of the rule of law. Fifthly, the law enforcers used excessive force and some were ethnically 
partisan in their operations. Sixthly, some faith based organizations (FBOs) were ethnically and politically 
partisan and as such they played a negative role by not counteracting the violence. Seventhly, FBOs and 
                                                          
9 More information about the commissioners can be found at: 
http://www.knchr.org/Aboutus/Structrure/Commissioners/FormerCommissioners.aspx. (Accessed on 4t April 
2013). 
10 The recommendations are highlighted later in this chapter. 
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humanitarian organizations like the Red Cross performed exemplarily to ameliorate the suffering of the 
victims, especially the internally displaced persons. Chapter two discusses the triggers, catalysts and 
root causes of the violence. This takes a historical analytical approach with the argument that the post-
election violence was a consequence of both the mismanaged tallying process as well as underlying 
issues predating the 2007 elections. These past realities include historical land injustices and grievances, 
politics of ethnic mobilization and divisive campaigns, a culture of impunity, contending citizenship 
narratives, and stalled constitutional and institutional reforms (KNCHR 2008:20-30).  
Chapter three focuses on the chronology of the events of the violence from the process of 
voting and tallying, to the announcement of results, to protests, to violence and finally dialogue. The 
events can be summarized this way: Word spread that there was rigging of the presidential votes. This 
caused suspicion and anxiety among the opposition, mainly Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) who 
vainly made some demands to the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK). In the midst of this discontent, 
confusion and anxiety, all the people in the national tallying centre were forcibly driven out and ECK 
announced on the state-owned National television that Mwai Kibaki, the flag bearer of Party of National 
Union (PNU), had been re-elected. ODM declared their refusal to acknowledge the results and therefore 
they did not recognize Kibaki as the president. They then called for mass action in the form of 
countrywide demonstrations to pressurize for a re-run of the election. It is in the context of these 
demonstrations that violence erupted, which was characterized by looting, destruction of property, 
physical attacks, sexual violations, displacements and murder. This raised tension and anxiety in the 
country, with the aggrieved ethnic communities organizing reprisal attacks. The international 
community initiated mediation efforts which were started by the then African Union chairman John 
Kuffuor and taken on by the panel of prominent African leaders led by former United Nations Secretary 
General Kofi Annan. Despite the hard line positions taken by both sides (PNU and ODM), the Annan-led 
team managed to get a breakthrough that saw the formation of a coalition government with Kibaki as 
president and Odinga as prime minister. Both sides agreed to a number of reforms, which included an 
overhaul of the electoral system, the enactment of a new constitution, judicial reforms and formation of 
a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission [TJRC](KNCHR 2008:31-36 ). All these reforms have since 
been implemented. There was an overhaul of ECK, which saw the formation of the Independent 
Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), promulgation of a new constitution, judicial reforms and 
establishment of the TJRC, which submitted it findings in 2013. However, even with these significant 
reforms, there is still disgruntlement among some Kenyans. This was exhibited in the 2013 general 
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elections where the conduct of IEBC was questioned by the opposition, an act that led to a legal battle in 
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled against the opposition and the conduct of the Supreme 
Court has been questioned by a section of Kenyans. The public discourses around these issues may be 
politicized but it excites the emotions of some Kenyans and as such it is a recipe for violence. 
In chapter four, the report identifies the main theatres of conflict: Nairobi, central, coast, North 
Rift, Nyanza and Western regions. Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, has a multiethnic population of about 
four million people. Violence in Nairobi was only rampant in about seven informal and low income 
settlements (Kibera, Mathare, Korogocho, Kangemi, Mukuru, Dandora and Huruma). The internal 
boundaries of these areas are marked ethnically according to the dominant ethnic group living in a 
particular settlement. The patterns of violence in Nairobi were spontaneous and systematic and were 
shaped by interruptions of the tallying process in some centres, killings, forced circumcision, physical 
attacks by organized illegal gangs operated by politicians, arson, looting, destruction of property, gender 
based violence, forced displacement and evictions (KNCHR 2008:37-48).  
The South and the North Rift11 region are areas perceived to belong originally to the Kalenjin 
ethnic group, who largely supported ODM in the 2007 elections. The Rift Valley is host to other ethnic 
communities especially those who had worked on white settlers’ farms and had bought land there. The 
violence in that area was carried out by organized raiders and it was characterized by murder, physical 
attack, gender-based violence, destruction of property and massive displacement of persons. Perhaps 
the most tragic form of violence that was carried out in this region was in Eldoret, where the Kenya 
Assemblies of God Church (which had hosted a number of Kikuyu people) was burnt down with about 
thirty five people burning to death and about fifty seriously injured. Leaflets, vernacular radio stations 
and short messaging service were the common tools used to propagate hate speech in this region 
(KNCHR 2008:49-69).  
The central Rift Region was different from other regions in that most of its parts are ethnically 
heterogeneous and the region is strategically positioned geographically, economically and politically. 
Unlike the other regions, in the Rift Valley a lot of violence took place in urban areas, specifically Nakuru, 
Molo, Kuresoi and Naivasha. The region is an economic hub and for this reason there was rampant 
looting and destruction of business premises. Geographically, the region is strategically placed as a 
connecting region and for this reason many illegal roadblocks were set up by armed gangs in order to 
intercept targeted people who were trying to mov to other regions. It is in Naivasha that another 
                                                          
11 The Central, North and South Rift form the larger Rift Valley province which was the main theatre of violence. 
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horrifying incident occurred, where some people from one ethnic community were burnt to death in a 
house. Violence in this region took the shape of gender-based violence, physical attack, murder, looting, 
and destruction of property, forced circumcision and displacements (KNCHR 2008:70-85).  
Nyanza region is predominately occupied by the Luo community and largely supported ODM. It 
experienced violence in three phases. The first phase was precipitated by the delay in the 
announcements of the presidential results. The second phase was the period in which mass actions 
were called for. In the third phase the region received an influx of members of their community 
displaced from other areas. Violence in this region took the shape of massive looting and wanton 
destruction of property, physical attack, gender-based violence and displacement (KNCHR 2008:86-96).  
The Western region is predominately occupied by the Luhya community, which largely 
supported ODM. Violence in this region took the form of destruction of property, looting and 
displacement. The Coast region is situated along the Indian Ocean and largely supported ODM. The 
region is characterized by land disputes, landlessness and large numbers of squatters and therefore 
political contests are mobilized around these grievances. The general assumption here is that outsiders 
have taken up land belonging to the natives of this region. Ethnic hatred against the perceived enemies 
was propagated using leaflets and spray paint to mark properties to be vandalized. Violence took the 
shape of arson attacks, looting, gender-based violence, physical attack, murder and displacement 
(KNCHR 2008:97-108). 
The Central region is predominately occupied by the Kikuyu community, which largely 
supported PNU. The region experienced relative calm, even after the violence broke out. However, 
tension started to build after the burning of the Assemblies of God Church in Eldoret and the influx of 
displaced Kikuyus from other regions. The violence took the form of demonstrations which targeted the 
government for its perceived failure to protect the Kikuyu community and its slowness to evacuate the 
victims trapped in violence hot spots. The Central province is strategically placed because it borders 
Nairobi and it has a strong economic capacity and also a host of many non-Kikuyu communities working 
in tea and coffee plantations, industries and institutions in the region. Violence in this region took the 
shape of dehumanization, humiliation, forced circumcision, physical attack, gender-based violence, 
looting and displacement. The tools used to propagate hatred were leaflets, short messaging services, 
vernacular radio stations and e-mail messages (KNCHR 2008:109:115) 
 Chapter five (KNCHR 2008:116-125) is an analysis of the national trends and patterns of the 
violence. To begin with there are indicators of pre-planning and coordination of the violence. Prominent 
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features that suggest that the 2007-post-election violence was spontaneous are discussed. One of the 
features is the immediacy with which the violence broke out. Most of the violence broke out 
immediately after the announcement of the presidential results, meaning there had been some kind of 
preparation beforehand. Attached to this, is the fact that there were also warning leaflets dispatched in 
some areas and open threats given before the election. Another feature is the exclusivity and selectivity 
in which destruction, looting, physical and arson attacks were carried out. This kind of violence carefully 
targeted specific ethnic communities. Another feature is the agents of the violence. In many places, the 
violence was carried by well organized and coordinated youth groups. Connected to this are the 
simultaneous and parallel attacks in other regions that seemed to leave a trace of uniformity in the 
nature of attacks. 
Another trend was demonstrations and the barricading of roads. In most theatres of violence, 
demonstrations were characterized by roadblocks that were set up, among other reasons, to identify 
“outsiders” for attack. There was also the trend of killing, looting and destruction of property. In all the 
places where the violence was widespread, there were killings, extensive looting and wanton 
destruction of property, especially homes and business premises of outsiders. Related to this is sexual 
and gender-based violence where women, young girls, boys and men were raped and men from certain 
ethnic communities circumcised by force. There was also the trend of massive displacement of non-
indigenous communities who sought refuge at churches and monasteries, police stations, provincial 
administration grounds, Red Cross facilitates and public facilities like stadiums.  
Under this chapter, there is also an evaluation of the role of various key players in the whole 
event of the violence. The media is blamed for fanning tension and anxiety by the way they reported the 
election event and also for painting the picture of an extremely tight “two horse race” for the 
presidency. Some vernacular radio stations are particularly singled out as vehicles through which hatred 
was propagated and in some instances attacks planned by using coded language. The FBO’s played 
ambiguous roles in the events of the violence. On the one hand, many religious leaders preached peace 
in mosques and churches and many displaced people were hosted in church compounds. Religious 
organizations and institutions provided humanitarian intervention to many desperate, needy, harassed 
and troubled internally displaced persons. On the other hand, leaders and elders of indigenous faiths 
presided over ceremonies that involved cleansings and oath administration to the groups of attackers. 
Some Christian preachers propagated hatred from pulpits, even as the religious organizations were 
perceived as partisan by openly supporting certain political parties. The security service is accused of 
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complacency and partisanship. Finally there is the role that the government played, especially its failure 
to prevent the violence and the violations of human rights. 
Chapter six (KNCHR 2008:126-143) is about the findings of responsibility for violations under 
domestic and international criminal law frameworks. Under the domestic criminal law framework, the 
offences committed during the violence can be categorized in five ways. First, there are offences that 
violate the right to life and the security of a person, like murder, manslaughter and grievous bodily 
harm. Secondly, there are offences that violate right to property, like arson, malicious damage to 
property and robbery with violence. Thirdly, there is incitement to violence and offences to public order. 
Particular crimes in this group include hate speech, forceful eviction campaigns, illegal oathing, riots, 
possession of illegal firearms and abetting the commission of an offence. Fourthly, there is neglect of 
official duty by security agencies through siding with attackers, inactivity and bias in the administration 
of law and order. Finally, there is sexual and gender-based violence, crimes that were committed 
through rape, sexual exploitation, defilement of minors and forceful circumcision.  
Under the international criminal law framework, there are basically two types of crimes 
committed during the violence. Firstly, there is the crime of genocide which was committed through 
intentional killing and elimination of members of a particular ethnic community. Secondly, there are 
crimes against humanity which include murder, extermination, forcible transfer of population, torture, 
sexual offenses and inhumane acts that caused great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or 
physical health.  
Chapter seven (KNCHR 2008:144-151) deals with the findings on the impact of the violence on 
Kenya’s international and national human rights obligations as well as findings on governance failures. 
Under the violence the following rights were contravened: the right to life, the right not to be forcibly 
evicted from one’s home, the right to equality and against discrimination, the right to hold opinions 
without interference, the right to take part in public affairs and to vote in periodic elections, the right to 
property, the right to education, the prohibition not to engage in incitement to discrimination, hostility 
or violence and finally the right to freedom of movement. The report points out the failure of the 
government and its machinery to curb the violence and stop violations of rights as well as initiating 
governance policies that could have mitigated historical injustices. 
Finally, chapter eight (KNCHR 2008:152-159) contains conclusions and recommendations. These 
recommendations are made in respect of domestic and international culpability where there were 
recommendations of: a) a comprehensive investigation into the violence across the board; b) the 
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prosecution of culprits, and c) that those who bear the greatest criminal responsibility in the commission 
of crimes against humanity should be tried before the International Criminal Court. In respect of human 
rights violations and governance issues, the commissioners recommended various steps. Firstly, steps 
that would fast-track investigations and prosecution of sexual crimes, steps that would enhance national 
healing and coexistence. Secondly, steps to enact legislation that would address hate speech and stop 
the appointments to public positions of persons found liable for perpetrating gross human rights 
violations. Thirdly, steps to a more concerted and sustained programme of human rights education by 
public institutions and FBOs. Fourthly, steps toward a new constitutional dispensation, and fifthly steps 
to resettle, compensate, rehabilitate and give psychological support to the victims of the violence.  
 
2.4 THE IMPACT OF THE KNCHR REPORT 
The main reason for using the KNCHR report is because it was extensively relied upon by CIPEV, whose 
findings and recommendations were the foundation on which the cases in the ICC were based (Njogu 
2009:2). However, the choice of the report does not in any way suggest that it was infallible. There are 
some criticisms that have been levelled against the report but due to the limited nature of this present 
study, these criticisms have not been pursued in depth. Some of these criticisms can be mentioned. 
First, many factors contributed to the violence and the report does not highlight all of them. An 
example of this omission of the international dimension of the violence (Wa Mungai & Gona 2010:199, 
Darehshori 2009:77, Njogu 2009:158). Secondly, some of the people who were adversely mentioned in 
the report sought legal redress (Machuka 2009) One of the people who did this is William Ruto, one of 
the suspects indicted by the ICC for crimes committed in the violence, who went to court to have his 
name expunged from the record and to have the court declare the report null and void. Neither of the 
requests was granted by the court (Ogemba 2012). Thirdly, there have been allegations that some of the 
commissioners of KNCHR coached witnesses who are testifying in the ongoing cases at the ICC (Leftie 
2010).  
 
2.5 INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF POLITICS, ETHNICITY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND VIOLENCE 
There is a close connection between the concept of politics, ethnicity, human rights and violence 
through a cause-effect relationship. A close scrutiny of the key findings of the report suggests that there 
are two sets of major themes, which characterize the whole event of the violence. The first theme is the 
underlying causes of the violence which can be summed up under the concepts of politics and ethnicity. 
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The other set is the effect of manipulation of politics and ethnicity, which can be summed up under the 
concept of human rights and violence. In other words, one traces a deep and causal connection as well 
as interplay between the four concepts. It seems that it is not possible to talk of one concept without 
talking of the other. Politics is manipulative and ethnicized, ethnicity is manipulated by politics, and 
negative ethnicity facilitates dehumanization and undue hatred towards others through negative tags, 
stereotypes and deception. This dehumanization and hatred leads to violence, which happens through 
gross violations of human rights and was selectively visited on people, depending on their ethnic 
affiliation. That subsequently helped to identify with ease their political orientation because of the 
ethno-political nature of politics in Kenya. Consequently, the violence happened in a political context 
after a political contest.  
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described the event of the 2007/8 post-election violence from the perspective of the 
KNCHR report. The contested election’s results were just a trigger for the violence, which means there 
were deep seated issues in Kenya that facilitated the sparking of the violence. These underlying issues 
can be condensed under the theme of politics and ethnicity and through their manipulation there was 
violation of human rights and subsequently eruption of violence. This cause-effect relationship informs 
the inter-connectedness between these four concepts. As a result the four broad categories: politics, 
ethnicity, human rights and violence in the KNCHR report offer the basis on which the following chapters 
are developed. Through the discussion of the subsequent chapters, some underlying causes are 
established through corresponding quotes from the KNCHR12.  
                                                          
12 There is less interaction with other voices that may have academically looked at the report in this chapter. This is 
because to the best of the knowledge of the author of the current study, there are only a few sources that have 
engaged the report and they have been mentioned them in section 2:4. These sources have not engaged the 
report academically because they are judicial and political reactions. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
POLITICS IN KENYA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is on the platform of politics that the 2007 post-election violence occurred and as such this chapter 
focuses on the political dimension of violence as reflected by the KNCHR report. One cannot concretely 
understand the events of the violence without generally interrogating the nature of politics in Kenya and 
how this nature contributed to the violence. The approach of this chapter is three-fold: it first describes 
the nature of politics in Kenya through some corresponding quotes from the KNCHR report, with 
identification of three political trends that are not mutually exclusive; secondly, it reflects missiologically 
on politics in the light of this nature; and thirdly, it analyzes the approaches of churches in Kenya in 
regard to politics.  
 
3.2 POLITICS OF DOMINANCE  
Kenya’s political system that allows for an overwhelmingly powerful presidency contributed to 
the reduction of political competition into an ethnic zero-sum game. Until the post-election 
constitutional amendment providing for a Prime Minister, in the past, winning the Kenyan 
presidency has meant taking it all. Moreover, the clientelist nature of politics meant that many 
Kenyans have come to view the ascendancy of “one of their own” ethnic kin to the presidency as 
the best assurance of “benefiting” as individuals and as communities (KNCHR 2008:18). 
 
The politics of dominance, which gives way to a “winner take all” approach, has been the foundation of 
most of the political problems in Kenya (cf. Lonsdale 2009, Sesi 2009:7). The former Constitution of 
Kenya, which was in operation until 2010, facilitated a centralized form of government and gave 
executive powers to the president. While by these provisions the Constitution meant good for all 
Kenyans, successive presidents abused these powers through political patronage and favouritism, 
exhibited through unequal distribution of resources and public appointments. The three successive 
governments since independence, between 1963 and 2007, were seen as favouring the ethnic 
communities to which the president belonged. From independence to 1979, Jomo Kenyatta (a Kikuyu) 
was the first president and hence the Kikuyu were seen by other communities as beneficiaries of his 
presidency. Daniel arap Moi (a Kalenjin) took over from Kenyatta in 1979 and ruled until 2002 and he 
was seen to favour the Kalenjin community. Mwai Kibaki (another Kikuyu) succeeded Moi and ruled until 
2013; being a Kikuyu, his government was perceived to be pro-Kikuyu. There was a power sharing deal 
known as the National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008 after the violence, which gave way to a 
coalition government between Kibaki and Raila Odinga, who is from the Luo community. The fifty-fifty 
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power-sharing deal saw both the principals favour individuals from their ethnic communities and other 
loyal communities, especially in the distribution of public appointments. 
With the promulgation of a new Constitution in 2010 (Article 241:4), the executive powers of 
the president were curtailed and henceforth any appointment or resource allocation by the president 
had to be ethnically and regionally representative and approved by parliament. The current constitution 
also facilitated a change from centralized government to devolved government with the vision of equity 
and equality. However, this has not helped much because when the government side is the majority in 
parliament, the president’s decisions prevail, their constitutional inadequacies notwithstanding. In 
recent times, when President Uhuru Kenyatta succeeded Mwai Kibaki in April 2013, he made public 
appointments which, despite the constitutional provisions mentioned above, were seen to favour the 
Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities, the ethnic communities of the president and his deputy respectively. 
The appointments were taken to parliament for vetting and interrogation, to ensure that they met the 
constitutional thresholds, but with the side of the government dominating parliament, the one-sided list 
of names was endorsed. This is also a clear indication that it is not enough to have a constitutional 
framework in place, without the political will and a firm commitment to the rule of law. This means that 
other mechanisms must be put in place to avoid such a scenario where parliament through numerical 
strength is used to rubber stamp the decisions of the executive, in spite of their constitutional 
shortcomings. 
In relation to this issue of dominance, in 2011 the National Integration and Cohesion 
Commission (NCICa 2011), a commission mandated by the Constitution to facilitate and promote 
equality of opportunity, good relations, harmony and peaceful coexistence between persons of different 
ethnic and racial backgrounds in Kenya, carried out research on ethnic diversity in the Kenyan civil 
service. This research revealed that the big five ethnic communities in Kenya — Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luhya, 
Kamba and Luo – occupy about 70% of positions in the civil service, while twenty other ethnic 
communities hold less than one per cent (NCIC 2011b:5). However, the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin, the 
communities from which all the Presidents of Kenya have come, have the largest number of posts in the 
civil service, as the research identified: 
The Kikuyu constitute the largest single dominant ethnic group in all ministries and departments, 
except in the Prisons Department, the Office of the Prime Minister and the Kenya Police. The 
Kalenjin are the second largest group in the Civil Service. They are also the most dominant group 
in the Prisons Department, and the Police Force. These two groups alone make up close to 40 per 
cent of the entire Civil Service. Their numbers in the Civil Service suggest a direct relationship 
with the tenure of the presidency, in that they have both had a member as President for over 20 
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years. It is also curious that in the newly constituted ministries, these patterns of ethnic 
patronage are still evident (NCIC 2011b: 7). 
 
These findings suggest a dangerous precedent set by the successive governments and therefore 
they remain an explosive threat to national unity and cohesion. This research by NCIC gave 
credence to the Kenyan commentators who harshly criticized nepotism and favouritism in 
government, especially during Kibaki’s regime (Omar 2011; Dolan 2011; Koigi 2012). This 
manipulation and dominance has continued to affect the country in negative ways and it has 
certainly widened the ethnic rift, increased resentment and discontent among the other ethnic 
communities, thus producing fertile ground for violence. 
3.3 ETHNICIZED POLITICS 
Underlying the polarization in Kenyan politics are the modes of political organization in Kenya. 
While it is important to recognize some limited shifts in trends, ethnic-based political 
organization has bedeviled Kenyan politics since colonial times…When constitutional changes 
allowed for multiparty politics in the 1990s, the ethnicisation of politics gained an even sharper 
edge. All the political parties formed after the reintroduction of multiparty politics have drawn 
their core support from the ethnic kin of their top leadership (KNCHR 2008:18). 
 
The problem of ethnic-based politics started with the “divide and rule” approach of the colonial 
government, who organized their administrative boundaries on ethnic lines and used approaches meant 
to cause tension and suspicion among different ethnic groups so that they could not forge a united 
struggle for independence. The post-independence government did not discontinue this approach and 
since then all the successive governments have used the approach, though in contextualized and 
modified forms, to take over power and to maintain it. This has continually entrenched ethnicity in 
Kenyan politics, perhaps in a way unprecedented when compared to any other country (cf. Percox 
2004:138, Okoth 2002:282). 
In many democracies political parties are mobilized around ideas and policies, but in Kenya 
politics has been highly ethnicized, a reality that has brought about two situations whose implications 
have continued to have far-reaching consequences for the country. First, political parties are formed 
along ethnic lines and this has brought about the balkanization and polarization of the country, as 
Stephen Sesi (2009:5) argues: “Kenyan politicians have looked for collective identities and used them for 
their political expediency.”  This balkanization means that the leading political parties consist of large 
ethnic groups, a reality that has subsequently inspired block voting, where different regions vote in 
unison for particular political parties. Secondly and consequently, there has been political dominance by 
the large ethnic communities in Kenya over the smaller ethnic groups. While there is nothing inherently 
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wrong with the collective will of ethnic groups, in a highly polarized country like Kenya this generates a 
sense of political marginalization, resentment and discontent among the smaller ethnic groups. This has 
resulted in serious political delusion.  
On the one hand, hyped by nepotism and favouritism in government, this delusion rides on the 
belief that when a particular ethnic group has one of its own ascend to power, that will translate into 
growth and development of that community. This is a political delusion because even though a 
particular ethnic group has in some ways benefited from political favouritism and nepotism, it is actually 
only the political elites in that community who benefit. This fact is attested by Wa Wamwere (2012a), 
Dolan (2011) and Sesi (2009:5), who have all argued that Kenyan politics is elite-driven. Wa Wamwere 
(2012a) argues that “Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu elites exploit Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu lower classes almost 
equally,” a fact also acknowledged by Dolan (2011), who states that “The Kikuyu top jobs are not widely 
distributed among their community, nor indeed are the Luo jobs well dispersed among the Nyanza 
population.” This was one of the findings made by the Kenya Justice, Peace and Reconciliation 
Commission (TJRC 2013:58) who found that:  
The perception that ethnic representation in government results in direct economic and other 
benefits to the represented community is pervasive in Kenya. While the Commission acquired 
evidence that such benefits do not necessarily accrue to those communities who are represented 
– even in the highest offices of the land – the perception that they do lead to intense 
competition for such representation, and thus increases the likelihood of violence during 
elections. 
 
On the other hand, the people are under a political delusion to develop a general hatred towards the 
ethnic groups that seem to be favoured by the government of the day, without interrogating how those 
groups benefit as a whole. The result of this is resentment and discontent among some ethnic 
communities, even as Sesi (2009:6) notes: “Over time negative attitudes developed among some ethnic 
groups against those who were thought to have usurped power from the rest of the country and 
sentiments to the effect that only one ethnic group was appointed to leadership position in the 
government.” The remedy for such politics should be approaches, political or otherwise, that can be 
applied to de-ethnicize politics. The political domination by particular ethnic groups continues to be a 
breeding ground for animosity and as such continues to be a time bomb for conflict. Ethnic interest and 
attachment should not supersede national interest and attachment in any way because, when it does, it 
can develop tendencies of exclusion and hatred leading to violence.  
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3.4 ECONOMIC MARGINALIZATION AND SOCIAL INJUSTICES 
Allusion to ethnicity in Kenyan politics camouflages the root causes of the country’s problems – 
historical injustices relating to land distribution, impunity, exclusion, economic and social 
inequality, weak and under-performing public institutions, corruption, political elite wars and an 
electoral system that sharpens rather than mitigates the destructive effects that negative 
ethnicity can be mobilised to achieve (KNCHR 2008:24). 
 
Scholars and commentators on Kenya’s politics and post-election violence have pointed to 
unresolved historical grievances, especially with regard to land allocation, as an important 
underlying factor in the violence…Where civic rights have opened the doors for acquisition of 
land, they have often come into collision with the rights granted by ethnic citizenship. This is 
what frames the discourses of the “foreigner-Indigenous”, “outsider-indigenous” in places like 
the Rift Valley and the Coast Provinces. Even where the “foreigner/outsider” might be allowed to 
continue holding the land they might have purchased, “indigenous” sentiments have been 
strongly opposed to any attempts by the “foreigner/outsider” to seek political leadership (KNCHR 
2008: 17,18). 
 
The politics of domination and ethnicity have bred economic marginalization, which in turn has given 
rise to inequity and inequality. According to the Friedrich Stiftung (2012:2), “regional inequalities and 
imbalances have increasingly become a source of political conflict.” Alongside unfair distribution of 
national resources, wide regional disparities have continued in critical areas like education, health and 
economic sectors. However, economic marginalization is both deliberate and accidental. It is deliberate 
through intentional political decisions and policies which facilitate unfair distribution of national 
resources. Successive regimes, due to lack of political will, have done little in policy, strategy or 
affirmative action to uplift the economic status of these underdeveloped areas. Economic 
marginalization is accidental through natural causes where, on the one hand, regions adversely affected 
by harsh climatic conditions (like the North-Eastern region of Kenya) remain underdeveloped, while 
regions with favourable climatic conditions (like the Rift Valley region and central province) tend to 
develop more quickly. This kind of natural marginalization can only be understood against the fact that 
agriculture is the backbone of Kenya’s economy. The factor of proximity also plays a huge role in 
development; with regions near main cities tending to develop faster than regions in remote places 
which are forgotten and abandoned. It is important to note here that even in those regions that are 
seemingly developed, acute levels of marginalization are present in some specific areas. 
Approaches to mitigate the economic marginalization that causes inequity and inequality have 
been carelessly neglected and it has been associated with political marginalization encompassed in 
ethnicized politics, which has brought about the political delusion mentioned above. As such, ethno-
political marginalization is a creation by politicians for mobilization to power and a great mover of 
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Kenyan politics. Economic marginalization cannot be mitigated through the politics of ethnicity but only 
through new government policies and approaches.  
  However, ethno-political marginalization has been so deeply entrenched in the social and 
political fabric of Kenya at the expense of the underlying causes of economic marginalization and it has 
become a recipe for violence. KNCHR found that ethnicity camouflages the underlying factors of the 
violence, a fact also acknowledged by Wa Wamwere (2012a), who argues that “ethnic conflicts in Kenya 
are not entirely about ethnicity. They are about scrambling for scarce resources and power.” Wa 
Wamwere traces this problem to capitalism, which gives way to a battle of classes where the rich 
continue to exploit, oppress and dominate the poor of all communities. He asks: “So, do Kikuyu elites 
exploit and oppress poor Kenyans including poor Kikuyus? Yes they do, but not alone. Non-Kikuyu elites 
exploit poor Kenyans, including those of their communities as well” (Wa Wamwere 2012b). 
Social injustice in relation to the violence is exhibited in land distribution,13 which has been an 
emotive and complex issue in Kenya. Problems revolving around land have their root in political 
misdoings through dominance, as discussed above. The Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular 
Allocation of Public Land (CIIAPL), a commission constituted in 2003 to investigate the issue of land in 
Kenya, found that “A combination of legal and political factors … have over the years conspired to 
facilitate illegal and irregular allocations of public land” (CIIAPL 2004:7). CIIAPL found that many of the 
presidential land allocations were illegal since they were made for political patronage, given out either 
as political reward, or in return for political loyalty. The commission also notes that public land has been 
the subject of outright plunder through speculation, which has resulted in the unjust enrichment of a 
few people at great expense of the general welfare of the public” (CIIAPL:10, 74).  
Similar to the divide and rule approach of the colonial government, the issue of land also has a 
colonial legacy. According to the Kenya Land Alliance14 (KLA), colonial governments would dispossess 
entire local communities from their land but when the post-independence government took over, they 
did not resettle the dispossessed. Rather, a cautious market-based hybrid system of resettlement was 
preferred to a wholesale and massive land restitution programme. In addition, the Government adopted 
                                                          
13 This is a complex issue and therefore it requires more attention something that is not possible in this study, due 
to its limited scope.  
14 The Kenya Land Alliance (KLA) is a not-for-profit and non-partisan umbrella network of Civil Society 
Organizations and Individuals committed to effective advocacy for the reform of policies and laws governing land 
in Kenya. KLA was founded in 1999 and registered as a Trust in 2001. http://www.kenyalandalliance.or.ke/  
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certain policies and laws which had been introduced by the colonial government and fundamentally 
affected the rights of certain communities and many displaced peasants never got back their land, a 
reality that only heightened the resentment and discontentment of these communities who felt that 
justice has not been done (KLR 2004:6).  
This situation brought about a squatter problem which is a direct consequence of the colonial 
land policy and law. According to KLA, the dispossession of many Kenyans from their land meant that 
only massive resettlement could provide a solution to the problem of landlessness. The Kenyatta 
government opted to resettle the displaced peasants through a settlement scheme programme which 
was based on the free market principle of “willing buyer, willing seller” which did not favour the 
majority of poor Kenyans who had lost their land. As such, the middle class took advantage of this 
principle and acquired massive pieces of land, while the political elite abused the process to accumulate 
large tracts of land at the expense of the poor and landless, who remain squatters in their own country 
(KLA 2004:7). This is also the finding of the Land Commission, which found that while the establishment 
of settlement schemes and their subsequent allocation in the early years of independence generally 
conformed to the original objectives, there was a general deviation from these objectives in the 
following years (CIIAPL: 125). Subsequently they note:  
The most glaring finding by the Commission with regard to settlement schemes is that land was 
allocated to personalities who were entirely undeserving. This was due to the fact that the 
allottees were neither “landless” nor in possession of any unique skills and facilities to be able to 
use the land in an agriculturally productive manner for the benefit of the country’s economy” 
(CIIAPL 126). 
This finding has persisted in the country to date, especially in the Rift Valley and Coastal regions and has 
made citizens permanent squatters in their own ancestral land. In the Coast region, for instance, KLR 
states that the colonial government introduced a land ordinance that affected the people living in the 
coast, which required them to get the titles of their land under the ordinance. The majority of the local 
people were disadvantaged because they were ignorant of this procedure; hence they could not claim 
ownership of land under the ordinance and as a result there arose the problem of elite absentee 
landlords who took advantage of this ignorance and acquired vast pieces of land and to this day 
continue to collect rent from the local people. These absentee landlords are basically not natives of the 
coast region and the local people continue to feel cheated and oppressed (KLR 2004:8). The 
combinations of these factors relating to land have continually made the Coast region prone to violence. 
In conclusion, unfair displacement of people from their native land through discriminatory 
colonial policies of land alienation and irregular allocation and distribution of land have been the genesis 
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of perennial land clashes, particularly in the Rift Valley and the Coast regions. Land issues have given 
way to insider/outsider, foreigner/indigenous discourses which have continually produced land 
tensions. Land issues are highly politicized and are used for political ends and this explains why land 
issues are only revived during election periods, which leads to politically instigated inter-ethnic clashes, 
whose result is displacement of people who had acquired land – either through resettlement schemes 
or genuine purchase in regions seen as belonging to a particular ethnic community. This issue brings on 
board another form of injustice, because the constitution of Kenya recognizes the rights of every citizen 
to live and own property anywhere in the country. Unless these social injustices are conclusively 
addressed they shall continue to pose a threat to peace in an already polarized nation because, as Julius 
Nyerere (1973:110) argued, “Injustice and peace are in the long run incompatible; stability in a changing 
world must mean ordered change towards justice.”  
 
3.5 MISSIOLOGICAL REFLECTION ON POLITICS IN KENYA 
Having discussed the nature of politics in Kenya, there is a need for a missiology that can bring about 
meaningful transformation in the political arena in Kenya and such a transformation can only happen 
through faithful commitment to the mission call of the churches in Kenya. This is a proposal for a 
prophetic missiology, in constant and sincere dialogue and partnership with an African worldview. 
 
3.5.1 A prophetic missiology 
The presence of socio-political evils in Kenya mentioned above necessitates a prophetic missiology 
which boldly confronts these evils. This kind of missiology relies heavily on prophetic hermeneutics, 
especially through the model of the Old Testament prophets (and their prophetic interaction with the 
political powers of their time) as well as the prophetic example of Jesus. Some scholars have written 
about reading the Bible politically. Brueggemann (2012:5), for example, argues that, “All interpretation 
of the Bible is political and that it is not objective but, either knowingly or unwittingly, explicitly or 
implicitly, a voice of advocacy.” Christopher Rowland (2012:19) argues that “the Bible offers a typology 
which can be identified with and at the same time be a means by which the present difficulties can be 
shown to be surmountable in the life of faith and community commitment.” Richard Bauckham 
(2012:33) alerts us to an objection that is based on drawing contemporary political relevance from 
biblical texts, especially the Old Testament, due to dispensational differences, especially the theocratic 
nature of Old Testament Israel. Bauckham (2012:33) himself holds that God and his purpose for human 
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life in both testaments remain the same for human life now – a position that is held in this section 
because the principles of justice and democracy remain constant even though the contexts in which 
they are exercised may change. 
When the Church is called to be prophetic it can also be said that it is called to be a sacrament, 
which means it is both a sign and an instrument (cf. De Kock 1996, Bosch 1991), an understanding that 
evokes different perspectives. For instance, Bosch (1991:376) argues that the church as a sacrament and 
sign calls for a creative tension of being called out of the world and at the same time sent into the world. 
Wynand de Kock (1996:142) holds a similar perspective: “Christ is present in the church and the church 
is present in the world through the empowerment of the Spirit of Christ and the church as sacrament is 
an instrument which effects what it signifies in and to the world.” Bosch (1991:376) also warns us that 
the understanding of the church as a sacrament can bring the risk of the church being seen as a superior 
model to be emulated. Instead, “The picture of the church as a sacrament must be expressed 
transparently so that the spirit of dialogue and coexistence will not be taken away from the true spirit of 
Christian mission” (Pham 2010:280) This is exactly what Bevans and Schroeder (2011) calls mission as 
“prophetic dialogue.” 
A prophetic missiology also embraces both the ordained ministry and the ministry of the laity in 
social transformation. This is what Bosch (1991:467) has referred to as “mission as ministry by the whole 
people of God.” According to the documents of Vatican II, “All the people of God share the prophetic 
office of Christ by a life of faith, love and praise of God because all have been anointed with the spirit of 
prophecy” (LG 12). Also, “Christ the great prophet … fulfils his prophetic voice not only through the 
hierarchy but also through the lay people" (LG 35). This “prophethood of all believers” approach 
contradicts the common notion that assumes that the prophetic mandate is a preserve of ordained 
ministry. Dietrich Bonhoeffer (2012:299) has distinguished between the responsibility of the spiritual 
office and the responsibility of the Christian in the prophetic role. He holds that it is the responsibility of 
the spiritual office to devote earnest attention to the proclamation of the reign of Christ as King and that 
it shall address government directly in order to draw its attention to shortcomings and errors which 
must otherwise imperil its governmental office. In regard to the political responsibility on the part of 
individual Christian, Bonhoeffer (2012:300) states,  
Certainly the individual Christian cannot be made responsible for the action of government, and 
he must not make himself responsible for it; but because of his faith and his charity he is 
responsible for his own calling and for the sphere of his personal life, however large or however 
small it may be. If this responsibility is fulfilled in faith, it is effectual for the whole of the polis. 
There is a responsibility of every individual for preserving the purity of his office and mission of 
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the polis. In this way, in the true sense, every individual serves government with his 
responsibility. No one, not even government itself, can deprive him of this responsibility or forbid 
him to discharge it, for it is an integral part of his life in sanctification, and it arises from 
obedience to the Lord of both Church and government. 
Bonhoeffer’s sentiments are a call to every Christian to uphold gospel values in their own ways in their 
contexts and this will spread throughout like fire. Ken Wilson and Alex Vines (1995:141) give us a good 
example of the contribution of lay people in a process of democratization in Mozambique. They argue 
that the peace that was necessary for the democratization of Mozambique was established not by the 
United Nations, political parties or church hierarchies but through the work of the local people who 
locally brokered a ceasefire and conflict resolution procedures. On this Le Bruyns (2012:71f) argues that 
“responsible citizenship affirms the meaningful and constructive role ordinary people in their personal 
and professional capacities can fulfil towards the common good.” This invites the churches to embark on 
teaching and empowering their members to actively participate in patriotic values and endeavours, a 
task discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. 
A prophetic missiology has two dimensions: a dimension of constructive confrontation and a 
dimension of promotion. Such confrontation and promotion should almost be simultaneous if it is to fill 
the gap usually left by the tendency of the Church to just speak against socio-political injustices and do 
nothing about it. Constructive confrontation is based on the practice of the Old Testament prophets 
who boldly confronted the political powers of their time. Leonardo Boff (1979:172) argues that the 
prophetic task deals with annunciation and denunciation in the wake of social injustices, human rights 
violations, suffering, totalitarian states, absolutist ideologies and so on. The other dimension of a 
prophetic missiology is that it does not only confront evils but also promotes democratic values.15 Some 
scholars have argued that democracy is not strictly a political experience because it has other 
dimensions, a perspective also held in this section. John Murray (1960:47-48), for instance, holds the 
view that “democracy is more than a political experiment; it is a spiritual and moral enterprise”. 
Similarly, John Lewis (1976:194) seems to also attest to this when he argues that there are overlapping 
concerns, both in government and church: the unique value of persons; the concern for justice; peace 
and orderly life in the body politic; and the ultimate ends and purposes of good governance.” Hence, 
                                                          
15 The use of the term democratic values should not be confused with democracy as a political system. It is used 
here to mean values and principle of governance based on justice which are meant for the welfare of all the 
citizens of country. It is as a result of loopholes in democracy as a political system that the big ethnic communities 
in Kenya have continually dominated the small communities, even though political power has been legally 
obtained. Democracy as used in this present study is not meant to mean ‘‘the rule of the majority” but “rule for 
the common good.” 
 35 
 
going with Lewis’ comparative approach, as the church is called to witness to the values of the kingdom, 
it is equally called to witness to democratic values. 
One of the ways the church can promote democratic values is by the church itself upholding and 
reflecting democracy from within. On this issue, Daniel Ott (2011:359) says that “the church fosters trust 
through the internal practice of democratic community wherein persons value community and 
communities value persons.” He further notes that it is through heightening democratic tendencies 
within the church that there will be renewed trust between the church and the public sphere (Ott 
2011:360). Unless the church has light in its internal democracy, it cannot be the light of the world.  
Another way that the church can promote democracy is through education for responsible 
citizenship. This can be done through various ways as it fits particular contexts. Most notably, the 
Roman Catholic Church has continually used pastoral letters to educate its members to be responsible 
citizens. An example of this is a pastoral letter sent by the Kenya Episcopal Conference to the Catholic 
Christians before the elections of 2013. The bishops exhorted the Christians: “As we approach the 
forthcoming General Elections, we remind our brothers and sisters that the principles of democracy, 
respect for human life and one another … are vital for the preservation of peace before, during and after 
the elections” (Daughters of Paul 2012:4,5).  
Another way of education is the pulpit ministry. Lewis (1976:196) sees the pulpit as an 
important platform to form political conscience. He further notes that the sermonic diet should be wide 
and varied and in dealing with matters of political interest hermeneutically, the word of God becomes a 
reference point, hence making the prophetic concern the will of God. However, Lewis’ opinion poses the 
risk of “Christianizing the government” which should be avoided by working on the issues that are 
common to the interest of the whole community. Lewis (1976:196) has further argued that, 
The church is obligated, therefore, to help its members understand the moral issues involved in 
governmental and political actions. It has unique responsibility to help shape a Christian moral 
conscience in the discharge of one’s citizenship. It fulfils this obligation when it educates its 
members in the moral issues confronting government in the writing and administration of laws of 
the land; in the attainment of justice for all its citizens; in directing its members into responsible 
political involvement; and in working with all other citizens for a “just and peaceful society” . 
This shaping of a Christian moral conscience should also have an empowerment dimension. To citizens 
under the bondage of political manipulation education may not be enough but an empowering 
education is needed. In other words, political manipulation requires political empowerment to be 
remedied. Amon Kasambala (2005:271) views empowerment as a missional concept and notes that, 
“Empowering becomes a process of enabling the other to reach towards their God-given potential, and 
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allowing them to apply the same in their localized situations.” Given the reality of political manipulation 
and oppression in Kenya, most Kenyans are in a kind of a bondage that makes their patriotic loyalty 
secondary to ethnic loyalty. This is dangerous because ethnic loyalty is exclusive and dominating but 
patriotic loyalty is inclusive and serves the national good and interests. As such, there is need of a 
missiology that empowers citizens first and foremost to have their eyes opened so that they can 
discover that they are political hostages and secondly to empower them to resist political powers that 
manipulate and oppress them. De Kock (1996:139) notes that this empowerment is not just for the sake 
of empowerment but an empowerment that is fuelled by the mission of God in the world. Mission in 
light of the current discussion should be inspired by Jesus’ motive in Luke 4 “to set the captives free” 
and it is based on a missiology which aims at setting citizens free from political bondage. 
There are some notable examples of the role of the church in the process of democratization in 
Africa. Paul Gifford (1995b: 277) discusses the role that the churches in Liberia played during the time of 
civil war, anarchy and uncertain political times, especially during the time of Samuel Doe and Charles 
Taylor. Most notable is the brokering of a peace initiative by the joint effort of the Liberian Council of 
Churches (LCC) and the National Muslim Congress in 1990. During the anarchy in Liberia, the LCC called 
for peace negotiations through public statements and organized marches, even when it was risky to do 
so. Emmanuel Katongole (2011:40) highlights the critical role that Archbishop Desmond Tutu played 
during the transition from apartheid to New South Africa as well as in the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, which has subsequently influenced processes of Truth and Reconciliation in other countries 
in Africa. He also commends the role played by Archbishop Odama and the Acholi Religious Leaders 
Peace Initiative that advocated an end to armed conflict in northern Uganda and facilitated the talks 
that brought together the rebels and the government. These are only a few examples that show how the 
churches in Africa have prophetically intervened in situations of political uncertainty and transition. 
However, as it will be seen in the subsequent section, such prophetic intervention in Kenya and Liberia 
has not been championed by churches as institutions but by individual church ministers under their 
personal initiatives. This serves as a call to the church as an institution to embrace the prophetic call in 
contexts of public corruption, political manipulation and oppression as well as socio-economic injustices.  
 
3.5.2 A missiology in dialogue with the African worldview.  
Each cultural group in the world has its own unique identity. Joseph Nyasani (1997:56-57) argues that, 
like Asians and Europeans, Africans are products of unique cultural edifices and streams that arose from 
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environmental conditioning and long standing cultural traditions. He further argues that within this 
cultural stream, there are psychological and moral characteristics pertaining to African identity, 
personality and dignity. It is these cultural edifices and streams that are referred to as the African 
worldview – and not “worldviews” – in this chapter, because as John Mbiti (1991:6) argues, although 
each African people have their own cultural heritage which could be different from the others, they add 
to the variety of an African worldview. Also, it is these cultural edifices and streams that give the 
Africans their identity beyond the colour of their skin and geographical position. It is important to note 
that culture and religion are inseparable in the African sense and it is difficult to talk of one without 
talking of the other (Mbiti 1991:10; Mugambi 1989:128). 
There are current discussions in theological and missiological circles that the centre of gravity of 
Christianity is shifting to the southern hemisphere (cf. Sanneh 2003, Jenkins 2010, Galgalo 2012). This 
growth is perceived against the so much mentioned decline of Christianity in the West. However, what is 
clear is that the measuring rod for both the decline and growth in reference is numerical strength, 
always evaluated through attendance of church services. This is certainly not a sufficient ground for 
making a holistic judgment of the status of Christianity in the world today. There have been some 
concerns about the nature of Christianity in Africa which is largely seen as inefficient within the African 
realities in the socio-political sphere, what Katongole (2009: 84) calls “Christianity without 
consequence.” Galgalo (2012:7) concurs: 
At a deeper level Christianity has failed to inspire, shape or transform African social 
history and basic identity. A glance through history may unravel why Christianity even 
though widely accepted and followed in Africa has remained a stranger within the 
phenomenal world of African religiosity.  
 
Although Christianity has affected some arenas in Africa like democracy, as discussed above, it has not 
meaningfully on a large scale affected the socio-political realities of Africa. This has led to critical 
questions such as is asked by Katongole (2011:40): “the major question is why has Christianity despite 
its overwhelming presence, failed to make a significant dent in the social history of the continent?” One 
of the responses to this question is what Katongole (2011:43) himself calls the ambiguity of Christianity 
in its relationship with Africa’s social history. As a result, Christianity has never been fully at home within 
the social, material and political complexities of African life. This is the concern that arose out of the 
genocide in Rwanda one of the most evangelized country in Africa (Katongole & Hartgrove 2009:93) and 
also the 2007/8 post-election violence in Kenya, a country with about eighty five percent Christians. As 
such therefore, these concerns should be discussed alongside the discussions of the rapid growth of 
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Christianity in Africa. As Laurenti Magesa (1997:16) argues, there is a persistence and continuity of 
African religion despite its exclusion by Islam and Christianity in Africa. Likewise Uzukwu (1982:45-46) 
argues that the African worldview is alive and can therefore not be ignored: 
This persistence of the African worldview, in spite of the multiple assaults directed against it, 
shows that any search for new paradigms today that ignores the African vision of the world is 
doomed to failure … only those values which are fundamental to the African’s perception of the 
universe should be used and radically interpreted to form the new sub-structure of Africa of 
tomorrow.  
This argument by Uzukwu seems to be similar to the approach of Lewis mentioned above, when they 
draw the similarity between democratic values and kingdom values. Consequently, Andrea Ng’weshemi 
(1999:61) raises perhaps the most fundamental question as far as this discussion is concerned:  
How does the African Religion help people to face the challenges connected with the African 
history of colonialism, poverty, ethnic wars and other problems which the continent has and is 
still experiencing? Are there any areas or aspects of African Religion that need further 
examination and elaboration in the present African situation to make it relevant as a way of life 
and life itself, inseparable from other realities of human life?  
 
Therefore, a missiology that can work towards the transformation of the Kenyan political situation must 
be in active communion with other players and most particularly with the African worldview. There 
must be deliberate and strategic attempts to entrench some African values in modern politics. It is such 
a thinking that leads Segaja and Ojara (1997:61), in their discussion on the role of the Church in East 
Africa in regard to the transformation and Africanisation of politics, to argue that “Politics in Africa, like 
Christianity, needs to become African. It is more European and Western than is Christianity.” They also 
note: 
The church …must find ways by which it can inspire the revitalization and injection of African 
values, such as communality or collectiveness, non-exclusion and pluralism into modern politics 
in Africa …We also contend that the inculturation of the Gospel in Africa will always remain half 
done unless sociopolitical environment (thinking and practice) has a strong African 
character. Moreover more has been written on the need of inculturation in Africa, but little has 
been done to effect it (Segaja and Ojara 1997:61). 
 
It is through this kind of inculturation of both Christianity and politics in Africa that African values which 
can enhance proper governance and promote peaceful communities are embraced. Such African values 
can be said to be encompassed in the African philosophy of community which glued many African 
societies together because the interest of the whole society exceeded that of the individual or a 
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particular ethnic community. Such a philosophy leaves little room for forms of exclusive, dominating and 
oppressive tendencies. 
 
3.6 THE CHURCHES IN KENYA AND POLITICS 
This section seeks to analyze the approach of the churches in Kenya to politics. The relationship 
between churches and politics has been ambiguous in many ways. Many churches were torn between 
different opinions, while others were focused on their mission in the political world. Whereas this can 
be done in the light of the 2007/8 post-election violence, it will be more helpful to look at the general 
understanding of politics by the churches and the nature of practice that emerges from such an 
understanding. Understanding the progressive nature and dynamism of politics in Kenya will help in 
understanding the whole picture.  
 
3.6.1 Agency: who were involved? 
Among the churches in Kenya, perhaps apart from the Roman Catholic Church and the NCCK who 
regularly speak as institutions, in the PCEA and ACK there were only particular individuals who spoke in 
their own personal capacities (Gifford 1995a:1, Lonsdale 2009:65, Throup 1995:156). This is similar to 
what happened in Liberia during the civil war, where most churches were thoroughly integrated in the 
system and it was individual clergy who spoke out rather than their churches (Gifford 1995a:278). Some 
notable names of clergy that can be mentioned in this regard in Kenya are: Archbishop David Gitari, 
Bishop Alexander Muge and Bishop Henry Okullu – all of the Anglican Church of Kenya (ACK) – and 
Reverend Timothy Njoya of the Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA). These clergy acted from 
personal conviction because the ecclesial institutions they represented were either for the government 
or were highly divided in opinion. They were outspoken critics of the Kenyan government on issues of 
abuse of human rights, socio-injustices and, more prominently, advocating multi-party democracy. In 
their quest they faced opposition from within and without.  
From within, often times the institutions to which they belonged had to give statements 
disassociating themselves from the sentiments made by these clergy, with Njoya being defrocked and 
reinstated by PCEA a number of times (Throup 1995:156-161). From without, these clergy – in speaking 
against the government – were taking dangerous risks that not only threatened them as individuals but 
also their families. Gitari went through many tribulations, which included attacks by gangs on his house 
and public embarrassment by politicians (Gitari 2004:220). Okullu too had a share of similar tribulations, 
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with his life continually threatened by political actors (Gachuhi 2010). Muge was also continually 
threatened and his resilience led to his death, which is widely thought to have been an assassination. 
Apart from Muge, who paid the ultimate price, Njoya is arguably the most vocal and as such he has 
suffered physically more than any other clergy in Kenya. Through his encounters with the authorities he 
has been detained without trial, and has survived brutal beating by security agents. After Kibaki came to 
power in 2002, some of the evils in Moi’s regime continued and apart from the mentioned clergy there 
has not emerged bold clergy to confront the political powers in regard to social injustice and 
governance.  
In the 2007 post-election violence, the KNCHR report identifies, in general ways, how the church 
was involved politically. Whereas there are some instances that are clear on which churches and 
particular church leaders were involved in matters of politics discussed above, it is difficult in many 
cases to state which churches and church leaders were involved without doing a thorough empirical 
research.  
3.6.2 Ecclesial Scrutiny 
Since the post-independence period in Kenya, there have been some political situations that have 
demanded the participation and contribution of the churches. Most notably there are four main 
episodes that can be mentioned. First, is the era of president Moi (from 1978 to 2002) which was 
characterized by massive corruption, abuse of human rights, social injustices and political assassinations 
and tyranny (Wa Wamwere 2002:159, Vogl 2012:13, Wa Mungai & Gona 2013:219). The response of 
Kenyan churches to these issues was ambiguous, with some supporting the status quo, others opting 
not to interfere with politics, while some criticized it. Secondly, there is the fight against one-party rule, 
which saw the introduction of multi-party democracy in 2002. Church leaders were instrumental in this 
process and struggle, especially in the absence of an active and organized opposition because of the 
risks and threats it entailed. Thirdly, there is the process of constitution writing which saw the 
promulgation of a new constitution in 2010. However, during the referendum of 2010 that saw the 
promulgation of the current constitution, the churches in Kenya were divided, with some supporting it 
and others opposing it. Many churches left the decision to the discretion of their members, while some 
(especially evangelical) churches unsuccessfully propagated what was referred to as “the no campaign,” 
whose objection to the passing of the constitution was based on Christian concerns. Finally, there is the 
2007/8 post-election violence where the churches were involved in different ways. While some 
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preached peace, others were involved in disturbing it and in many instances the churches were seen to 
be complacent and partisan. According to the KNCHR, 
Faith organisations were however tainted by what citizens perceived as pre-election partisanship. Leaders 
of FBOs were often seen to support certain political parties….the comments by John Cardinal Njue 
indicating his scepticism about the Majimbo system of government illustrate the extent to which religion 
was implicated or perceived to be fronting partisan agendas ahead of the 2007 elections. The public’s 
perception that FBOs were not neutral further compounded the polarisation that was characteristic of the 
2007 elections that had resulted in a situation where no single national institution appeared neutral 
enough to offer moral leadership when the country descended into chaos” (KNCHR 2008:142).   
 
This ethnicisation is also reflected by the extent to which other institutions were unable to play a 
mediating role to curb the violence or to address the injustices it occasioned. Religious leaders too 
admitted having failed in their duties to preach without political or ethnic partiality” (KNCHR 2008:167). 
 
Generally speaking, from the foregoing discussion, three categories of participation in politics by 
churches in Kenya can be identified. First, some churches saw the demarcation between politics and 
religions clearly drawn hence they did not actively engage in politics. On this, Gitari (2004:7-8) argues 
that, “Church leaders who have adopted the attitude that politics and religion cannot be mixed may 
have come to the conclusion that there is nothing to be debated as the line of demarcation between 
church and politics is very clear.” However, another reason for the churches’ passivity at that time was 
fear and intimidation posed by the government and many churches were not willing to face the threat.  
Secondly, some ecclesial institutions supported the status quo for different reasons. Gifford, for 
instance, says: “During the one party rule, some churches were seen to be supporting the government 
either from ethnic or clientelist considerations or out of a theological conviction that political 
involvement was not the of churches” (Gifford 1995a:41). Thirdly, some church leaders understood that, 
“The concerns of religion are so broad that politics, like all other aspects of human life, is hardly out of 
religion’s ambit” (Galgalo, 2010) and this was the conviction that inspired the clergy mentioned above. 
From the encounters of these clergy, it appears that the prophetic approach is the most 
prominent means through which the churches in Kenya have engaged politics. As such, the leaders seem 
to lean so much on the Old Testament prophets from whose approach they borrow. Lonsdale (2009:60) 
argues that, “In Kenya as elsewhere, the Old Testament is generally regarded as the main biblical archive 
in which to search for prophetic statements of truth to power, the New as the source-book of personal 
and societal salvation. Many Kenyan churchmen, those of a more liberal theological persuasion combine 
the two.” Gitari (2004:7) identifies the roots of his theological approach to involvement in the public life 
of Kenya:  
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The doctrine of creation reminds us that God not only creates but also sustains his creation; the 
doctrine of humanity reminds us that God commanded humans to take part in his creativity; the 
doctrine of incarnation reminds us that God took residence among us and spoke on the stage of 
human history; the doctrine of God shows us how Jesus was involved in the social, political, 
economic and spiritual affairs of the world. These have been the theological roots of my 
involvement in the public life of Kenya.  
This systematic theological approach is an example of the theological conviction of the clergy who 
confronted the political powers that hosted injustices and aristocracies. An example of this is one of the 
most notable sermons by Gitari, who used the story of Naboth (1 Kings 21:1-29) to speak against land 
grabbing that was happening in his diocese (Gathogo 2007:148).  
Another theological approach to politics in Kenya has been the “change from within” approach. 
The proponents of this approach think that by entering government they can change things from within, 
can lead by example and can reach more people with their service. They also quote texts like Proverbs 
29:2: “When the righteous thrive, the people rejoice; but when the wicked rule, the people mourn,” to 
justify their quest for political office. This has been the main reason why some clergy have sought 
elective political offices in recent times16. One of the church leaders vying for political office in 2013, 
Boniface Adoyo, argued that, “I am in politics to serve people, even the church is service to mankind. My 
little church involvement has limitations in meeting Kenyans’ social needs through offerings of the 
church, but I’m frustrated by mismanagement of public resources” (in Barasa 2013). Adoyo sees his 
service as bishop as service to humanity, intended to extend this service outside the constituency of the 
church and being a church leader he has a vantage position to manage public resources. Galgalo (2010) 
comments: “A prophet and a politician may share similar concerns, but there is no confusion of roles or 
difficulty in telling the two apart.” These different kinds of theological understanding have shaped and 
formed political involvement by churches, some of which are discussed in the subsequent section. 
 
3.6.3 Discernment for action: What kind of encounters do Kenyan churches have with politics?  
Theological understandings of politics have continually shaped the actions of churches in Kenya toward 
politics. In other words, the understanding of missiology defines the mission of the Church. For those 
who discern God at work in the political arena, participate in it by using different public actions. First, 
there is the use of the pulpit. The “prophetic” clergy, who have already been discussed, fearlessly used 
                                                          
16 Most of the clergy who went for elective political positions were however unsuccessful. In the current 
parliament, the only clergy who was successful is Rev. Mutava Musyimi, who is the immediate former Secretary 
General of NCCK. 
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the pulpit to advocate justice and political change. These sermons would cause significant discomfort 
among the political class and as a result they led to the persecution of those clergy. Another action is 
activism which was exhibited by Njoya through demonstrations and rallies. It is in so doing that he was 
detained and bodily harmed by security forces. It is through such activism that the Moi government was 
pushed to amend the constitution to give way to multi-party democracy.  
Perhaps the most popular form of action has been statements and press conferences. This 
approach was used by church leaders whenever they felt they needed to respond to some socio-political 
issue in Kenya. The effect of such press statements can be said to be inconsequential because nothing 
was done by the government in response to such statements. Another criticism of this approach is the 
selective way in which the churches spoke out. The Church has been much more vocal on evangelical 
and moral issues than it has been on critical political issues. For instance, the absence of the Church’s 
voice in regard to nepotism and favouritism in public appointments, as discussed above, is very 
disturbing. 
Another emerging trend is Church leaders attending political meetings and rallies, thus openly 
displaying their political affiliation. On this Galgalo (2010) argues: “All-out political campaign rallies by 
the Church amount to crossing the very thin line between prophecy and party politics, in the raw 
contextual sense of the word.” Also, during the election campaigns of 2013, church leaders were seen 
offering special prayers for specific political candidates in churches as well as at political rallies, which 
clearly indicated what political faction these churches belonged to. However, while offering prayers for 
political leaders is not in itself a bad thing, doing so selectively for particular politicians is questionable 
since it gives those churches partisan and non-neutral tags.  
Another action is the opening of the pulpit to politicians during worship services, who then use 
the pulpit to propagate party political interests. However, some churches have since reflected on this 
issue. The Anglican and the Roman Catholic churches, for instance, have banned the use of church 
pulpits by politicians (Leftie 2012). Dolan (2012) also gives the example of Archbishop Boniface Lele and 
his eighty priests in the Mombasa Catholic archdiocese who categorically stated that they would neither 
host prayer rallies nor allow their church facilities to be used for promoting divisive ethnic groupings. 
 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted to deal with the complex issues of politics in Kenya by asking what is wrong 
with politics in Kenya. The evils of political dominance and marginalization, ethnicized politics and 
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economic marginalization and social injustices were identified. The chapter also asked what would be a 
missiological response to such politics and a proposal of prophetic missiology and a missiology in 
dialogue with the African worldview was proposed. There was also an analysis of the practice of the 
churches in regard to politics which has showed how the church both as an institution as well as 
individual church leaders have responded to political events that demanded the church’s voice and 
action. God is concerned with good governance and the holistic well-being of his creation and therefore 
he is doing something about the socio-political evils in Kenya. The churches in Kenya are called to take 
sides, not the side of oppressive forces but the side of justice and good governance. This means that the 
church has a missional role to play in situations of bad politics and situations of social injustices, and 
unless it fulfils this role, it fails to participate in the mission of God in Kenya.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ETHNICITY IN KENYA 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the topic of ethnicity, following mainly Wa Wamwere’s17 understanding of the 
term. Wa Wamwere (2008:97) argues that there is something wrong with the usage of the word 
“ethnicity” to refer to both innocent ethnic identity and harmful ethnic hate and – to remove any 
possible confusion around the term – he prefers the term “ethnicity” to refer to positive ethnic identity 
and “negative ethnicity” to ethnic hatred, bias and exclusivism. Negative ethnicity played a huge role in 
the 2007/8 post-election violence and to understand it, this chapter has three sections. First, it 
addresses the nature of ethnicity in Kenya by using corresponding quotes from the KNCHR report. Two 
trends are discussed in this regard: Negative ethnicity as an ideology, and culture and distorted 
identities. Secondly, it reflects missiologically on ethnicity based on the contextual understanding of 
ethnicity in Kenya. Three dimensions are reflected on: unity in diversity, liberating identity and humanity 
as first identity. Finally, it analyzes the relationship between the Kenyan churches and ethnicity. 
 
4.2 NEGATIVE ETHNICITY AS AN IDEOLOGY AND CULTURE 
Kenya remains an exceedingly ethnically-polarized country. Ethnic suspicions stoke intrigue 
within virtually all public institutions and public life generally, in turn making it difficult for public 
institutions to facilitate effective nation-building. This indeed was the scenario, which Kenya’s 
security forces encountered when they attempted to protect the lives and property of Kenyans 
during the post-elections violence (KNCHR 2008:168). 
 
Negative ethnicity has continually affected Kenya as a nation in many grave ways, but the most extreme 
instance was the 2007/8 post-election violence. It has continued to erode national cohesion by widening 
the rift between different ethnic communities and as such it remains one of the major threats to peace, 
stability and tranquillity in Kenya. With such devastating effects, negative ethnicity should be abhorred, 
fought and rejected at all cost. However, instead of banning it, most Kenyans have embraced negative 
ethnicity as an ideology and consequently as a culture, with its roots penetrating in almost every area of 
the social fabric in Kenya. Most astonishingly, it has been embraced by most Kenyans, regardless of their 
social, educational or religious status. This is the reason why Wa Wamwere (2011) has said: “Ultimately, 
                                                          
17 Koigi wa Wamwere is perhaps the Kenyan who has written and spoken  most incisively on ‘negative ethnicity’. 
He has done this in books and newspaper articles as well as in television interviews. His most outstanding work in 
this regard is Towards genocide in Kenya: the curse of negative ethnicity (Wamwere 2008). 
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negative ethnicity is Kenya’s opiate of the people. Smoked together, it equalizes weak and powerful, rich 
and poor, kings and subjects, bishops and atheists, professors and illiterates. What really is it?” With 
such influence among the citizens, negative ethnicity has continually and prominently become the 
platform on which national matters are played out and the lens through which matters of national 
interest have been viewed. For the purpose of this chapter, there are basically four areas where this has 
happened: politics, institutions of higher learning, the media and the churches.  
Ethnicity, as already elaborated in the previous chapter, has featured significantly in shaping 
politics in Kenya and has become the determinant factor in national politics. Hence Wa Wamwere 
(2012a) states: “Inevitably, we look forward to elections, not as a democratic exercise by citizens to give 
themselves the best possible leaders, but as a do-or-die contest between communities whose results 
are the beginning of an endless struggle for resources and power.” Another example related to this is 
the way negative ethnicity has affected the public sense of justice. This becomes visible when some 
prominent politicians are accused of public offences like corruption, and their respective ethnic 
communities see it as an attack on their community. It is because of such attitudes that the Eliud 
Wabukala, the head of ACK, has urged Kenyans “to desist from the tendency of protecting wrong doers 
on the basis of tribalism and ethnicity” (Nation 2010).  
Next to the political sphere, negative ethnicity has also penetrated institutions of higher 
education. Ethnic patterns continue to inform universities’ faculties. According to the audit conducted 
by NCIC in six public universities and nine constituent colleges, the majority of staff either come from 
the same ethnic group as the Vice-Chancellor or the principal or the locality of the institution (NCIC 
2012:10):  
In the public universities and constituent colleges, the five largest communities – the Kikuyu, 
Luhya, Kalenjin, Luo and Kamba who together make up about 66% of the Kenyan population 
constitute over 81% of the total workforce. This severs opportunities to enhance the face of 
Kenya in these institutions thus excluding the other more than 37 ethnic communities. For 
example, in the six public universities analyzed, the representation of the five big communities is 
over 86% (NCIC 2012: 7). 
This statistics show that like in the political appointments discussed in the previous chapter, the big five 
ethnic communities continue to dominate institutions of higher learning to the exclusion and 
marginalization of other ethnic communities, a political oppression that has heightened animosity 
among ethnic groups. 
Perhaps the most influential shaper of negative ethnicity, however, is the media: the electronic 
and print media, vernacular radio stations and the social media. Jamal Abdi Ismail and James Deane 
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(2008:320-321) argue that the media have been in the forefront of the struggle for reforms in Kenya, 
exposing corruption and acting as a vigorous forum for public debate. However, they argue that this 
reputation is now being challenged because the media have been accused of fanning the flames of 
ethnic hatred and of marginalizing voices of reason at a time of ethnically polarized politics. Ismail and 
Deane see this failure also in existence of vernacular radio stations, which serve a particular ethnic 
group with particular political interests and as a result it becomes difficult to balance different interests.  
Social media have also become a fertile ground from which negative ethnicity breeds. The level 
of hatred propagated through social media in Kenya has reached worrying proportions and more so 
because it is being propagated by the youth (cf. Nation, 2013a; Nation, 2013b). With the technological 
revolution in Kenya, many young people can easily access social media, and with this possibility the 
ethnic bigotry in it continue to shape their ethnic imaginations, which makes them see Kenya through 
prejudiced ethnic spectacles, an explosive threat to the future of the country.  
The flourishing of negative ethnicity as an ideology in public spheres has been accepted as a 
norm, with many people getting socialized by it. It has been successfully but worryingly embedded as 
the nation’s ideology of politics, economics, elections, public institutions and general life. Negative 
ethnicity continues to promote exclusion and marginalization, a trend that should be avoided and 
eliminated as it does not promote a cohesive society and further to that it poses grave consequences to 
the peace and stability of the nation.  
 
4.3 DISTORTED ETHNIC IDENTITIES  
 
A key official of the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, Eldoret informed the KNCHR that in 
the period immediately after violence began, many local people were heard saying that all PNU 
people must go ‘kwa nini walipiga kura nje?’ (Why did they vote for ‘outsiders’?), and ‘iko adui’, 
(there is an enemy) referring to the presence of the non-Kalenjin. The level of hostility towards 
the Kikuyu community was expressed by a Kalenjin Elder Jackson Kibor during an interview with 
the BBC in which he said: ‘...We will not sit down and see one ethnic group lead Kenya. This is a 
war, we will start a war. One ethnic group cannot lead the other ethnic groups’ (KNCHR 2008: 
71). 
Matters of identity are matters of belonging. Culture and kinship never go away and it is very important 
for people to have a shared language, history, culture, songs, literature and food. Ethnic identity creates 
a sense of belonging, hence its diversity and this diversity, as Makau Mutua (2012) agues, should be a 
strength and not a debilitating weakness. Albert De Jong (1999:7) concurs with this when he argues that 
“Ethnic identity is a basic component of African nature and cannot be done away with,” a view also held 
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by Mary Getui (1999:18): “Being at ethnic variance is an inevitable reality.” As such, ethnic diversity 
should not be demonized. What should be abhorred is a distorted sense of ethnic reality that brings 
about exclusivism and ethnocentrism. Peter Gichure (1999:23) states: “Ethnicity is a blessing, 
ethnocentrism is a curse.” In Kenya, distorted ethnic identities imply destructive categorization of other 
ethnic groups, demeaning labelling of some particular ethnic groups and ethnic superiority and/or 
inferiority complexes. Destructive categorization creates the categories of “them, outsiders” and “we 
insiders,” which may lead to exclusion and violence. According to the report of the Kenya Truth, Justice 
and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC 2013:58): 
Ethnic tension and violence occur when communities assert a superior claim over a territory at 
the expense of or to the exclusion of others. Such superior claims are based on the assumption 
that ownership or occupation at some point in the past created an exclusive claim for such 
ownership or occupation in the present. Such exclusive claims to territory inevitably create 
classes of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. This perception of people as outsiders as opposed to fellow 
citizens often lead to increased tension based on ethnicity which, in turn, created the potential 
for ethnic violence. 
This exclusive insider/outsider dynamics are against the constitution of Kenya, which gives all citizens 
the freedom of staying anywhere in the country. However, this provision many not be as easy as it 
sounds because of other factors like historical injustices as have been discussed in chapter three. These 
distorted identities have a colonial legacy, when many administrative boundaries were formed along 
ethnic lines because the colonial government confined African political activity to ethnic districts. This 
form of identity has been reinforced by political manipulation, since ethnic otherness is seen as a point 
of departure and division and, due to ethnicized politics, the outsider is seen as an enemy for voting 
against the will of the insiders.  
Demeaning labelling of particular ethnic groups has been done through setting up of ethnic 
stereotypes and perceptions. In this regard, the TJRC (2013:59) found:  
Negative perceptions and stereotypes are a major cause of ethnic tension in the country. Labels 
have been put on certain communities, portraying them in broad, often negative terms that 
generalize certain traits and apply them to all individuals belonging to the described community, 
regardless of how individuals perceive themselves. For example, the Kikuyu are sometimes 
described as thieves, the Maasai as primitive, the Somali as terrorists, etc. 
These stereotypes have also started appearing in ethnic jokes in recent times, though some of these 
jokes are not meant to go beyond the comedy zone, they too are dangerous as they shape distorted 
ethnic identities. Richard Jenkins (2008:67) says: “Ethnic jokes are a potent site of passive resistance to 
domination. They are also equally effective in the categorization of ethnic subordinates. Jokes facilitate 
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categorization where it may not be socially acceptable or explicitly possible; there’s no such thing as just 
a joke, and ethnic jokes are no exception”.  
Existing ethnic superiority and/or inferiority complexes closely connect to demeaning labelling 
and have political and cultural reasons. Politically, superiority complexes are a direct product of the 
political dominance of large communities, as Wa Wamwere (2008:97) argues: “Assumed ethnic 
superiority leads to negative ethnicity,” while inferiority complexes are the direct product of political 
marginalization, often common among the small tribes who struggle for political survival in Kenya. 
Culturally, there are some ethnic communities that look down upon some communities due to their 
cultural practices. This is what Sesi (2009:4) has called cultural supremacy. On this the TJRC (2013:59) 
found:  
The Commission also received evidence that some stereotypes are drawn from and driven by 
traditional cultural beliefs and practices. For instance, the Commission heard that men from 
communities that do not practice male circumcision have always been stigmatized and regarded 
as lesser or weaker men, and therefore, incapable of or unsuitable to take political leadership of 
the country. 
In 2013, the NCIC conducted a nationwide study on the use of coded language and stereotypes by 
various communities in Kenya and how they are perceived by the users and target groups. They 
concluded: “This study was prompted by the realization that individuals sometimes use stereotypes and 
coded language to invoke feelings of hate towards particular Kenyan ethnic communities which, in turn, 
raises the possibility of recurrence of ethnic conflicts” (NCIC 2013). Dangerous stereotypes used include: 
the Kikuyu are thieves; the Luo are uncircumcised’ children and not fully developed; the Kamba are 
wizards; the people from the Coastal region are lazy (Cf. NCIC 2013). Such stereotypes and coded 
language inspire ethnic animosity and dehumanize people from some ethnic communities and have 
been and remains a recipe for violence and instability. As a result there must be approaches that seek to 
combat the threat posed by such distorted identities and there must be deliberate interruptions of the 
stories that emerge from such stereotyping.  
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4.4 MISSIOLOGICAL REFLECTION ON ETHNICITY 
Having discussed the nature of ethnicity in Kenya, the primary question to ask is: What kind of 
missiology is required to respond to and mitigate the ethnic realities discussed? Because God does not 
stand with exclusion and marginalization, there is need for a missiology that can, on the one hand, 
promote a proper view of ethnicity and, on the other hand, combat distorted ethnic perspectives. It is 
on this basis that this study discusses the concept of unity in diversity and the concept of humanity as 
“primary identity.” 
 
4.4.1 Unity in Diversity 
Otherness has been often mistakenly perceived in negative forms. Denise Ackerman (1998:16) points 
out that otherness has often been seen as problematic, threatening and alienating. Zizioulas (1998:349) 
agrees: “It is not true that by definition the other is my enemy.” Otherness is diversity, a diversity that 
should be celebrated and not abhorred, a diversity that need to be embraced and not scattered and a 
diversity that should be accepted and not rejected. Mwaura (2009:26) has observed: “Ethnic diversity is, 
what, how and where people are and diversity is a blessing which should be turned into a fruitful and 
rewarding resource that can be used to enrich the concept of nationhood.” 
Diversity is always perceived through categories of difference and distance. The more people 
are aware of their differences the more they tend to keep a distance from each other. To Ackermann 
(1998:16, 26), difference is a reality we should not bother to wish away, when she argues:  
We must always be alert to the reality of difference. It will not go away, neither should it… If we 
believe that difference is no accident but rather a reality and a gift which challenges us to just and 
loving relationships, we will not be alone in our efforts to practice relationship and mutuality.  
 
However, this is only one side of the coin. The other side is that otherness can, when manipulated, 
cause internal problems such as disrespect of human rights and social injustice and when diversity is 
used this way it becomes a curse (Tarimo 2008:299). Zizioulas (1998:349-350) likewise argues that 
difference becomes a threat even when in actual fact it does not pose any threat. This threat is based on 
some fear of the other that is pathologically inherent in our existence and it is nothing but fear of the 
different. However, this argument by Zizioulas cannot be taken in its absolute sense. The claim that the 
fear of otherness is inherent may not be accurate because it presupposes that we are born to fear 
otherness. The fear of otherness is nurtured rather than inherent. Zizioulas (1998:350) continues: 
When the fear of the other is shown to be the fear of otherness we come to the point of 
identifying difference with division. This complicates and obscures human thinking and behaviour 
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to an alarming degree. The moral consequences are in this case very serious. We divide our lives 
and human beings according to difference. We organize states, clubs, fraternities, even Churches 
on the basis of difference. The different beings become distant beings: because difference 
becomes division, distinction becomes distance. 
From these views, it can be argued that when otherness becomes a point of departure and a foundation 
of division it breeds exclusivism and rejection. Diversity should enrich our existence and beautify our 
world because division and exclusivism creates acute poverty in our existence and makes our world 
indecent because of hatred, rejection and violence. In an attempt to better understand the concept of 
diversity, there are some theological perspectives that need to be explored. Ecclesiology offers a good 
starting point in understanding diversity because the Church as the body of Christ properly 
demonstrates how we can understand diversity. Ackermann (1998:16) notes: “To speak of the other is 
to speak of the nature of the church, the one body of many parts, challenged to unity in Jesus Christ.” 
This is affirmed by Frank Macchia (2004:5), who points out: “Unity is one of the marks of the church, and 
division is scandalous.” The proponents of ecclesial unity sometimes mistake unity for uniformity on the 
one hand and diversity for disunity on the other. Macchia (2004:5) argues:  
Western philosophical systems have stressed uniformity or singularity of meaning... 
Under the influence of this way of thinking, ecumenists have been tempted to see 
increased diversification and difference within Christian traditions as signs of failure 
rather than as a movement of God's Spirit in the world. They labor under an inadequate 
ecumenical hermeneutic. 
Though Macchia’s sentiments are not representative of all ecumenical approaches, they provoke us to 
separate the distinction between legitimate diversity and legitimate unity, on the one hand, from 
scandalous divisions and idolatrous uniformity, on the other. This argument rightly suggests that not all 
uniformity or unity is indeed good. Certainly this is more understood against the tower of Babel 
experience (Genesis 9:1-11). Eunice Kamaara (2010:126) argues that, although Christian values are 
expected to foster national cohesion and identity, more often than not Christianity has provided a 
convenient and effective rallying point around which ethnic conflicts are mobilized. She justifies her 
arguments by referring to research reports that have highlighted the role of churches in genocides, 
something Katongole (2009) has also documented – particularly in the events of the Rwanda genocide 
of 1994. Inasmuch this is a truism, it is incorrect to blame Christianity for this, as Kamaara seems to do. 
While divisive tendencies have emerged under the auspices of Christianity, it is certainly not Christianity 
that has inspired such actions, but rather the lack of Christian values.  
Due to how Christianity was packaged and propagated in Africa, perhaps the dimension of 
Christianity that can be questioned is its inability to inspire and foster social-political transformation in 
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many places in Africa, as discussed in chapter three. Mwaura (2009:21) comments on this that although 
Christianity in Africa has grown tremendously, it has not translated into a transforming spirituality that 
fosters Christian and national identity; hence negative ethnicity has become a demon that threatens to 
tear apart not only the nation but also the church. One of the factors to which she attributes this 
situation, is that Africa inherited a divided Christianity that was also marked by political quarrels. She 
puts it this way: “The implanting of a divided Christianity by different denominations from different 
countries with diverse political agendas has left a lasting adverse mark on African Christian identity” 
(Mwaura 2009:21). However, like Kamaara, she erroneously blames Christianity for the polarity when 
she argues that “Christianity which could have been a unifying force, drawing inspiration from the 
traditional African values of family, solidarity and hospitality, emerges and remains at time as a divisive 
force” (Mwaura 2009:21). Certainly Christianity cannot be a divisive force in the sense in which Mwaura 
discusses it. It is the precisely the lack of prominent Christian values like love, forgiveness and unity thatr 
has caused the division. 
Another theological perspective that can be used to better understand the concept of unity in 
diversity is the Eucharist, otherwise also referred to as Holy Communion. Zizioulas (1998:356) argues 
that it is not by accident that the Church has given to the Eucharist the name of Communion, for in it we 
find all the dimensions of communion. God communicates himself to us, we enter into communion with 
Him and with one another: 
The Eucharist does not only affirm and sanctify communion; it also sanctifies otherness…This is 
the heart of the Church, where communion and otherness are realized par excellence… It is the 
place where difference ceases to be divisive and becomes good. There is only one kind of 
exclusion that Eucharist communion permits; it is the exclusion of exclusion, i.e., of those things 
that involve rejection and division (Zizioulas 1998: 356). 
Also looking at this relational aspect of the Eucharist is Ackermann (1998:26), who argues that through 
the Eucharist our relationship with Christ offers us a relationship with those who partake of Communion 
together with all who suffer and seek new life. For the Eucharist to have meaning in our lives, she 
further notes that we need to feel its powerful pull to the radical activity of loving relationships with 
those who are different because “the One who calls us to the table knows our differences. The one who 
issues the invitation and asks us to make peace with one another when we come, knows full well just 
how difficult that can be” (Ackermann 1998:27). In other words, we can say that as in the same way the 
Lord of the table invites and accepts us to partake of his table, our shortcomings and otherness 
notwithstanding, he also calls and invites us to accept other people despite their shortcomings and 
otherness. Also, when we get the invitation to draw near the Lord and his table, we are drawn to his 
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people of all tribes, nations and languages (Revelation 7:9). However, in ecclesiastical circles the 
Eucharist has been a point where we depart from the unity in diversity imagined through the use of the 
concept. The Eucharist can still not be celebrated together by certain churches and also not all members 
of the Church are officially permitted to partake of the Table. This is a theological gap that requires the 
Church to reflect on critically. 
Another theological perspective that can enhance the understanding of diversity is the 
Pentecost event. Macchia (2004:5) has highlighted some features of Pentecost that enhance unity in 
diversity. He notes that at Pentecost, many languages are understood in unison by the hearers, at 
Pentecost the people are sent forth in unity and clarity of truth and at Pentecost God scatters people 
abroad to preach the gospel of reconciliation: 
The unity of Pentecost is thus not abstract and absolute but rather concrete and pluralistic. The 
unity at Pentecost is expressed in a vast diversity of tongues "from every nation under heaven" 
(Acts 2:5). No language, culture, or journey of faith is neglected or devalued. This is a unity that 
respects and fulfils the scattering and diversification of peoples from Babel. Otherness is not 
denied but embraced in this differentiated and complex unity of Pentecost (Macchia 2004: 6-7).  
This perspective is also shared by Mwaura (2009:21), who argues that because the first Christian 
community that came into existence at Pentecost consisted of Jews from every nation under heaven, it 
serves as a call to love across barriers of race, class and gender. Indeed, the Pentecost event can serve 
the purpose of bringing people together despite their diversities, because – as Macchia has rightly 
observed – otherness is not denied but embraced and accepted.  
The third theological perspective that enhances unity in diversity is the Trinitarian perspective, 
which like the Eucharist also follows a relational track. Ackermann (1998:16, 20) explains:  
To speak of the Other is to speak about the ambiguity of God, the One who is Wholly Other and 
Wholly Related … We worship a triune God. There is a dialogue within God; between Father, Son 
and Spirit. Ours is a Trinity which is in relation. However, the mutual self-giving relationship of 
the Trinity does not mean that Father, Son and Spirit are collapsed into one undifferentiated 
divinity. Each member of the Trinity acts as an agent. Each one of the divine persons of the 
Trinity gives of the self to the other while at the same time each reflects the presence of the 
other. 
 
Likewise, Zizioulas (1998:352) argues that:  
There is no other model for the proper relation between communion and otherness either for 
the Church or for the human being than the Trinitarian God. If the Church wants to be faithful to 
her true self, she must try to mirror the communion and otherness that exists in the Triune God. 
The same is true of the human being as the "image of God."  
 
 54 
 
Flowing from Ackermann’s argument, there are three factors drawn from the Trinitarian approach that 
can be said to enhance unity in diversity: dialogue, relationship and mutuality. To understand this 
concept better, Zizioulas (1998:353) highlights four characteristics of otherness drawn from the trinity 
that can inform our understanding of diversity and otherness. First, otherness is constitutive of unity 
and not consequent upon it. This is because God is not first one and then three, but simultaneously one 
and three and his oneness or unity is not safeguarded by the unity of substance. Secondly, otherness is 
absolute: The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are absolutely different, none of them being subject to 
confusion with the other. Thirdly, otherness is not moral or psychological but ontological. This means 
that we cannot tell what each person in the trinity is but we can only say who the person is. Each person 
in the Holy Trinity is different not by way of difference of qualities but by way of simple affirmation of 
being who he is. Finally, and as a result, otherness cannot be conceived apart from relationship: Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit are all names indicating relationship.  
In conclusion, from the foregoing discussion, through the perspectives of the Eucharist, the 
Pentecost event and the Trinity, diversity is a gift from God and as such it is not to be seen as a problem 
or a curse but as a blessing that can enhance unity. Whenever God calls us he calls inclusively and in 
unity. This unity is facilitated by love which covers the sins of exclusion and marginalization. Turning to 
God means turning to each other, for we cannot turn away from each other and draw near to God. 
 
4.4.2 Humanity as primary identity  
Identity defines who a person is and how they understand themselves. There are debates whether a 
person has a single identity which is multi-faceted or multiple identities. The position preferred in this 
study is that a person has multiple identities, like religion, gender, ethnicity and nationality, which define 
who that person is. This view is also shared by scholars like Laurie McCubbin (2009), Amartya Sen 
(2006), Fiona Lee & Jeffery Sanchez-Burks (2009). Lee and Sanchez-Burks (2009:343), for instance, argue 
that “Having multiple identities is not necessarily problematic… However, when one’s multiple identities 
have conflicting values and norms, challenges may arise.”  
An example of such a challenge is exhibited by the tension between the Christian identity and 
African cultural identity. Some African scholars, like Bujo (1994) and Galgalo (2012), have argued that 
the Christian in Africa faces an identity conflict. This conflict is demonstrated in the debate on the term 
“African Christians” versus “Christian Africans.” According to Galgalo (2012:6-7), the distinction between 
the two seem to carry different connotations, interpretation and understandings together with the 
 55 
 
subsequent implications and emphases that arise from such distinction. Perhaps many African Christians 
would prefer the prominence of the Christian identity but considering the ways in which Christianity is 
abandoned for example in favour of ethnicity, there are connotations based on the premise “the blood 
of ethnicity is thicker than the waters of baptism”18 (Katongole & Hartgrove 2009:22). 
Based on this understanding of multiplicity of identities, there should be a sense of what is one’s 
primary identity. Lee and Sanchez-Burks (2009:343) note that “our relational and social contexts are 
deeply related to how multiple identities are managed in our everyday lives.” Snodgrass (2011b:272), 
who seems to speak from the single identity theory, argues that “we all have multiple determiners of 
identity some of which are important while some are not, hence they do not have a primary defining 
force.” These views suggest that multiple identities vary in importance and therefore there is need for 
them to be managed. Flowing from this premise there is a proposal that “humanity” should function as 
primary identity. There are three reasons for this choice: First, it is on the basis of humanity that all 
identities are formed and organized; secondly, the identity of humanity does not change but the other 
kinds of identities are dynamic because, as McCubbin (2009:107) argues, they grow and change over 
time.  
Ackermann19 (1998:16, 27) shares the same underlying view that the call to full humanity is a 
call which takes place within the reality and the challenge of difference and otherness and it is nothing 
less than the call to grapple daily with the challenges, implications, and surprises of seeking to be in 
relationship with each other in all our difference and otherness, in the fullness of our humanity: 
My humanity is found, shaped and nurtured in and through the humanity of others. I can only 
exercise my humanity by being in relationship with others and there is no growth, happiness or 
fulfillment for me apart from other human being… Authentic existence is living as a fully human 
part of a whole in mutual relationship, participating not possessing, needing one another, 
knowing that we belong to one another (Ackermann 1998:18, 22). 
 
Likewise, Snodgrass (2011a:132) rightly observes: “The identity that one should be pursuing is the exact 
opposite of self-glorification, for one's true identity is not found merely in one's self. A person's identity 
                                                          
18 This is phrase is credited to Cardinal Roger Etchegaray, who visited Rwanda on behalf of the Pope at the height 
of the genocide. Perplexed by the extent to which Christians participated in the genocide, he asked in a meeting 
with church leaders: “Are you saying that the blood of tribalism is deeper than the waters of baptism?” It was 
quoted from Hebblethwaite (1994). See also Joseph Galgalo’s commentary under this title in the light of the 
Kenyan situation available at: http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Blood-of-ethnicity-is-thicker-than-the-
water-of-baptism-/-/440808/923774/-/eses5cz/-/index.html 
19 Ackermann does not discuss the concept of humanity in the same understanding of primary identity, as used in 
this dissertation.  
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is not merely about him or her; it is about that person in relation with and for people and with and for 
God.“ This perspective that our humanity is to be found in the humanity of others seems to flow well 
with the African concept of ubuntu as explained by Tutu and Mbiti. Tutu (1999:34-35) writes: 
Ubuntu is very difficult to render into a Western language. It speaks to the very essence of being 
human….It also means that my humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in theirs. We 
belong in a bundle of life. We say, ‘a person is a person through other people’ … I am human 
because I belong, I participate, I share. A person with ubuntu is open and available to others, 
affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good; for he or she has a 
proper self-assurance that comes with knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is 
diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or 
treated as if they were less than who they are. 
Mbiti (1969:109) encompasses the perspective in this way: 
Whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and whatever 
happens to the whole group happens to the individual. The individual can only say: 'I 
am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am.’ This is a cardinal point in the 
understanding of the African view of man. 
This means that, according to the concept of ubuntu, one is not apart from the humanity of others. If 
this is the case, chances of exclusion and marginalization are significantly minimized. According to 
Ackermann (1998:24), one of the ways to appreciate the humanity of others is by sharing our stories. 
She holds that telling our stories and hearing the stories of others allows our stories to intersect; even 
though they sometimes conflict, accuse and diverge greatly, they also attract, connect and confirm. As a 
result our stories touch one another and change so that subsequently we too are changed. This call by 
Ackermann is certainly a call to a dialogue in which people can listen to each other in respect and 
humility. 
Ken Davis (2003:93) attributes this identity of humanity to the biblical creation story. He argues 
that as the human race is one, all diverse people on earth belong to one family created by God. He calls 
this “creational unity.” He further argues that God enjoys diversity and that different ethnic groups are 
but an expression of this divine joy. He concludes it this way, “Because he is the God of creation we 
affirm the unity of the human race. Because he is the God of variety we affirm the diversity of ethnic 
cultures” (Davis 2003:106). This means that we cannot and will not discover our identity in isolation; 
hence we need to reverse the retreat into cocoons of exclusiveness and marginalization. 
It is important to note that the concept of humanity as primary identity is not in any way 
supposed to negate Christian identity. Christian identity has a significant role in helping us to accept the 
humanity of others. The doctrine of imago Dei, for instance, should be an influence and a platform from 
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which the acknowledgement of the humanity of all springs forth. This also informs the concept of 
humanity as primary identity because we are all firstly human beings created in the image of God before 
sharing in any of the other kinds of identities – social, gender, religious, cultural and political. 
Furthermore, the humanity of each person in not fragmented, as in other kinds of identities. The 
humanity of all is identical and nothing else can be used to qualify it, for all share in the same humanity.  
Another dimension of Christianity that can influence the “humanity as primary identity” model 
is Christian unity and ecumenism. Kamaara (2008:137) is correct when she argues: “If the Church is to 
lead to national unity, it must cultivate unity within itself so that historical, ecclesiastical, and doctrinal 
differences are not allowed to breed disunity among Christians.” However, this unity should not become 
an end in itself. There could be a temptation to understand Christian unity in exclusive forms. Kamaara 
(2008:137) rightly captures this when she says: 
Beyond Church unity, unlike nationalism, Christian national identity must not be confused with 
an identity of Christians for Christians alone. Indeed, the mission of the Church is not limited to 
serving Christians only. True Christianity is inclusive in recognition of the equality and dignity of 
all humans as beings created in the image of God. Indeed, like Christ who came not to be served 
but to serve (Mt 20: 28), the Church has the mission of facilitating full humanity to all whether 
they are Christians or not. 
Kamaara’s views seem to suggest that any kind of unity that is exclusive is not appropriate and is 
scandalous. This means that ecumenism should not stop with religious unity but should also address all 
manner of divisiveness that affects the society of which the churches are members. This kind of 
approach can inspire a holistic approach to divisiveness and hence ecumenism can be a good base of 
inspiring national unity. Christian unity should inspire inclusive tendencies and relationships and also 
motivate us to appreciate and accept each other with all our complexities, differences and otherness, as 
envisioned by the concept of “primary identity.” 
4.5 ECCLESIAL SCRUTINY: CHURCHES AND ETHNICITY IN KENYA  
In Kenya, to use Ayward Shorter’s (1999:28) words, the churches are both victims and accomplices of 
negative ethnicity. The churches have been victims by being targets of violence because most of them 
are associated with particular ethnic groups. This perhaps explains why there were numerous arson 
attacks on church buildings during the post-election violence. An example of this is perhaps the most 
tragic incident of the violence, namely the torching of Kiambaa Assemblies of God Church with scores of 
Kikuyu people inside. The church was not only a hiding place for the Kikuyu but it was also closely 
identified with them (KNCHR 2008:66).  
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The churches have been accomplices of negative ethnicity through aiding and abetting 
ethnocentrism. One specific area is the colonial legacy of ethnization of churches, where churches are 
seen as ethnic identities or promoters of ethnic interests. The history of Christianity in Kenya cannot be 
told without telling the story of colonization, because the missionaries worked very closely with the 
colonial government. According to Bolaji Idowu (1973:429), “It was an error of judgment for the Mission 
to identify herself closely with the ruling colonial powers on the continent of Africa.” One of those errors 
was the missionaries working with the administrative boundaries set by the colonial government, which 
were inspired by the divide and rule approach. Alongside this, the missionary scramble for Kenya led to 
the demarcation of operational territories of different missionary agencies on ethnic lines, which 
created mono-ethnic denominations. Kamaara (2010:136) notes: 
Christian denominations in Kenya continue to be almost synonymous with the map of ethnicity. 
The Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA) is especially notorious as an entirely Agikuyu 
church, the Seventh Day Adventist as largely Abagusii and Akamba, the African Inland Church as 
largely Kalenjin, and the Quakers (Friends) as largely Luhyia.  
The establishment of mono-ethnic denominations may not have had serious implications at the 
beginning, but eventually it has posed serious threats. With the introduction of ethno-politics in Kenya 
and the inability of churches to be neutral in the face of ethno-politics, the churches were robbed of the 
ability to promote and mediate reconciliation in the country. Tarimo (2010:305) observes: “The 
tendency of manipulating ethnic identities prevails also in Christian churches… Ethnocentrism exists in 
churches as it does in the political sphere.” According to KNCHR (2008:142), “The public’s perception 
that FBOs were not neutral further compounded the polarization that was characteristic of the 2007 
elections that had resulted in a situation where no single national institution appeared neutral enough 
to offer moral leadership when the country descended into chaos.”  
These quotes show the large extent to which the churches in Kenya have become ethnicised. To 
understand better the ethnization of churches there are tendencies that have made churches 
accomplices of negative ethnicity, both in the mono-ethnic and seemingly heterogeneous 
denominations. Ethnic exclusivity in the mono-ethnic denominations is inevitable especially through 
membership, liturgy and administration. In the light of ethno-politics, these denominations are 
politically predictable.  
To seemingly heterogeneous denominations like the Catholic and ACK churches, negative 
ethnicity is portrayed through administrative faces. David Waruta (1992:127) comments on these 
churches that “those that happen to be multiethnic with a national outlook are plagued with internal 
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inter-ethnic conflicts.” Shorter (1999:29) points at the creation of encapsulated dioceses, aligning with 
ethnically oriented governments. Building on Shorter’s argument, most of the bishops of the Catholic 
and ACK churches serve in their respective ethnic regions.20 While this by itself is not a bad thing and it 
has a list of benefits like familiarity with cultural, social, economical, political and religious dynamics of 
the region, in an ethnically polarized society like Kenya it does little to help the churches to witness and 
participate in the mission of reconciliation in the country. One of the consequences of such an approach 
is the rejection by congregations of clergy who are seen as ethnic outsiders, as Shorter (1999:29) notes. 
This is a demonstration of the extent to which negative ethnicity informs ecclesiology. A good example 
of this is the current rejection of a Catholic bishop in Nigeria on the basis of his ethnicity (cf. Onyejiuwa 
2013).  
Based on the foregoing discussion, the churches in Kenya have ethnic and political tags which 
continue to jeopardize their ministry of reconciliation in Kenya. According to KNCHR (2008:130), it is 
because of this kind of setting that some local church ministers and pastors found it easy to promote 
ethnic hatred right from the pulpit.  
Religious leaders in areas such as Limuru and Nyeri used the pulpit to convey messages mounting 
to hate speech against non-Kikuyu communities and generally rallying the Kikuyu to protect ‘our 
community’. These leaders uttered phrases such as Ciaigana ni Ciaigana (enough is enough), 
suggesting that the Kikuyu community should no longer simply stand by while attacks against 
them continued. In Kirathimo IDP camp in Limuru, which hosted Kikuyu returnees from other 
provinces, one religious leader urged the people that “The Kikuyu should be armed the way I am 
armed with a Bible. 
The existence of negative ethnicity in churches in Kenya compromises their mission in the country. 
Joseph Healey (2010:56) observes that “one would have hoped that the deeper Gospel values could 
overcome these ethnic divisions, but this has not been always the case.” Likewise, Tarimo (2010:305) 
notes that Christian teaching calls it followers to promote a multi-ethnic community of an inclusive 
family of God built on faith, love, and hope.” There is need of empirical research to establish how 
homogeneous denominations have continued to exist and grow for over a century while maintaining the 
mono-ethnic tag. The churches in Kenya have so far not seen negative ethnicity as a problem of and 
within the churches. The churches, through their public statements, have strictly placed the blame on 
politicians for hyping ethnic hatred. It is only when there is a paradigm shift in churches’ discourses on 
                                                          
20 See http://www.ackenya.org/ack/bishops.html and  http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/country/bke2.html 
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ethnicity ‒ where negative ethnicity is not seen just as a political problem but also a Church problem ‒ 
that the churches will be able to participate with authority and credibility in the mission of reconciliation 
in Kenya.   
It has been argued in this section that ecumenism is capable of inspiring national unity. Thinking 
along this line, the churches in Kenya imagine ecumenism in the classical sense of Christian unity and 
cooperation, although inter-faith cooperation has also been seen as part of ecumenism (cf. AFCAST 
2005; NCCK 2013a). Based on this understanding, the churches in Kenya have fostered ecumenism 
through discourses of Christian commonness. Ecumenism in Kenya may have succeeded in promoting 
denominational and Christian unity but it has not succeeded in addressing ethnic disharmony among 
Kenyans, the majority of whom are Christians. This reality calls for a further reflection on the role of 
ecumenism in dealing with ethnic tensions and division among Christians. If this is not done, any 
ecumenical effort will be superficial and technical. Ecumenism in Kenya should simultaneously name and 
interrogate divisive trends among Christians, both in denominational circles and nationally. Though 
ecumenism claims unity in Christ (John 17:20-21), ethno-politics claim division in ethnicity. Though 
Christ brings Christians together in unity, ethno- politics separate people in ethnic divisiveness and it 
seems that the voice of ethno-politics is louder than the voice of ecumenism in Kenya. Ethnic division 
certainly affects Christian unity and therefore the churches must address the issue of negative ethnicity 
with utmost urgency, care and commitment. When this is done faithfully, it will open the eyes of the 
churches to see areas in which they are guilty of negative ethnicity.   
4.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed the issue of negative ethnicity as it is perceived and practised in Kenya. 
Negative ethnicity has become an ideology and has been accepted as a culture by most Kenyans across 
the board. There are distorted ethnic identities that bring about ethnic superiority and/or inferiority. 
Against this ethnic reality in Kenya, a missiological reflection has been done with a proposal of 
promotion of unity in diversity and humanity as primary identity. Finally, there has been an overview of 
the churches in Kenya in regard to ethnicity. God is the creator of all from every nation, tribe, people 
and language (Revelation 7:9), he is a God of diversity and as such diversity should not be used as a 
ground for division, domination, marginalization or oppression. Rather, ethnic diversity should be seen 
as a cultural mosaic to be celebrated and embraced.  
The foregoing discussion challenges the churches in Kenya to reflect on approaches that can 
help them to be agents of reconciliation in multi-ethnic Kenya. It calls them to critically reflect on ways 
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to turn away from the darkness of negative ethnicity through actions of light that seek first and 
foremost to de-ethnicise the churches and to develop a new commitment to an ecumenical 
understanding that promotes unity in diversity in a multi-ethnic context. This kind of ecumenism does 
not only bring different denominations and Christians together but also different ethnic communities. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN KENYA 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the topic of human rights through the events of the 2007/8 post-election 
violence. Though the term “human rights” is a political term, it has been widely accepted and used in 
theological circles. The term “rights” is used in this study to connote mandatory necessity. Following 
Thomas Fleiner’s (1999:1-3) approach, human rights are understood from the perspective of inherent 
human dignity. The dignity of a person is to be found in the sanctity of life, hence life and all that 
supports it are to be respected and protected: “Human beings … are also unique and need to be 
respected in their uniqueness. Human dignity demands that a person’s uniqueness, his individuality, is 
respected and that he is not rejected” (Fleiner 1999:2). A person’s dignity is not to be seen in isolation 
from other people or society but it is to be understood in a relational perspective. Hence, human rights 
are rights that protect and promote the dignity of humanity as encompassed in every individual in 
relation to other people and the society. Human rights violations are therefore those things that attack 
and rob the humanity of a person. However, from this understanding one may fall into the temptation 
of thinking that human rights and human dignity are synonymous. However, it is human dignity that is 
the basis of human rights, and not vice-versa.  
There is a deep interconnectedness between politics, ethnicity, violence and human rights. As 
such there is a need of an integrated approach in an attempt to address this inter-relatedness. Human 
rights violations are about power relationships and structures. It is about the dominant oppressing the 
weak and powerless. Domination leads to oppression and injustice, which take place as human rights 
violations. Human rights are also about identity. The categories defined under power; that is categories 
of the dominant, powerful, powerless and weak are categories of identity. Besides, the identity and 
dignity of humanity are at the core of human rights discourses. When the humanity of others is rejected 
and denied, their rights are rejected and denied. In Kenya, ethnicity as an identity was critically shaped 
and formed by the patterns of the violence and, as it was argued in chapter four, violence largely grew 
from negative ethnicity. Generally speaking, violence is all about human rights violations; hence, if there 
were no violations then ethnic violence could not have occurred. 
This chapter has three sections: Firstly, there is contextual understanding of human rights 
violations in Kenya, with arguments that human rights violation in Kenya has been a developing culture 
entrenched through impunity. It is also argued that humanity is at the heart of human rights hence 
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dehumanization is the framework through which many human rights violations happened. Secondly, 
there is a missiological reflection on human rights. This represents a hermeneutical approach to human 
rights, and also discussion about cultivating a culture of respect for human rights based on the argument 
that a “culture” (or anti-culture) of human rights violations can only be combated by a culture of respect 
for human rights. Thirdly, there is an overview of how the churches in Kenya relate to the issue of 
human rights. 
 
5.2 CULTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN KENYA 
Kenya presently exhibits characteristics which are prerequisites for the commission of the crime 
of genocide … Another characteristic present in Kenya is the impunity subsequent to which past 
acts of violence in 1992, 1997 and 2005 have gone unpunished. Consequently, unless the state 
and Kenyans take remedial measures, the probability of genocide happening in Kenya at some 
future point in time is real (KNCHR 2008:5). 
 
Human rights violations in Kenya are not unique to the post-2007 election period. There has been a 
trend of large scale violations of human rights from the colonial period to successive post-independent 
governments. During the colonial period, the colonial masters used violent power to dominate and 
govern Kenyans. The usurping of this power happened in the framework of domination and injustice, 
which resulted in grave human rights violations through torture, extrajudicial killing and land injustices. 
Fabian Klose (2013:93-94) terms colonial rule as a “terror regime”: “From the perspective of the colonial 
rulers, the position of strength enjoyed by white people and the prestige derived from it had to be 
maintained at all costs, meaning that every anticolonial provocation was to be answered with 
retaliation.” Specifically, this retaliation was a response to the Mau Mau21 revolt which was challenging 
colonial rule in Kenya. 
After the 2007/8 post-election violence, the TRJC (2013) was established by an act of parliament 
to investigate gross violations of human rights in Kenya between 12 December 1963 and 28 February 
                                                          
21 Mau Mau was a resistance group, drawn mainly from the Kikuyu ethnic community, who engaged in a military 
revolt against the colonial government between 1952 and 1960. For a detailed account of the Mau Mau uprising 
see, Maloba (1993). In recent developments, the Mau Mau have sued the British government for human rights 
violations during the colonial period. The case has been determined and some prayers granted. See: Britain to 
compensate Kenya Mau Mau for colonial–era abuse. Nation [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/world/Britain-to-compensate-Kenya-Mau-Mau-/-/1068/1874116/-/nb3ntr/-
/index.html. (Accessed on 10 November 2013). 
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2008. The commission found that there were gross violations of human rights orchestrated by the state, 
especially by the first two post-independence governments of Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Moi, who used 
the repressive laws, policies and practices initially employed by the colonial government (TJRC 2013: 10). 
The specific violations include massacres, political assassinations, unlawful detention accompanied by 
torture and ill-treatment, economic marginalization, violations of economic rights, land injustices, extra-
judicial killings and enforced disappearances (:1-70).  
Arguably, it is during the rule of Moi that the violations of human rights reached worrying levels. 
(Wekesa 2013:14). According to TJRC, the creation of a de jure one party state by President Moi’s 
government resulted in “severe repression of political dissent and intimidation and control of the media. 
Repression of political speech and the media allowed many violations to occur with little public scrutiny, 
much less accountability” (TJRC 2013:10). The Commission also found that political assassination was 
one of the tactics used by the state and the political elite to repress dissent or eliminate political 
competition and when investigations into specific assassinations were undertaken, they were usually 
deliberately shut down before conclusion and in instances where they had been concluded, their reports 
of findings and recommendations were never publicized (TJRC 2013:23).  
There have been also violations of human rights through cycles of political violence during 
election years since the advent of multi-party democracy: 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007. It is however the 
post-2007 violence that reached unprecedented levels. In recent years, the most common violation of 
human rights is extra-judicial execution by the police, which was characterized by state-sanctioned 
killings and disappearances, use of excessive and disproportionate force to summarily execute 
individuals who were suspected of being criminals or members of proscribed criminal gangs. An example 
of this is the execution of about five hundred members of Mungiki, an outlawed ethnic group, during 
the rule of Mwai Kibaki. (TJRC 2013:131-132, KNCHR 2008: 45,75,103).  
The major reason for the recurring gross human rights violations in Kenya is the culture of 
impunity which is deepseated in the country and which has been complicated by the fact that the state 
itself has been guilty of violating human rights through commission and omission. For instance, 
according to KNCHR (2013:4), “the Government’s response to the post-election violence was slow and 
ineffectual. The rule of law nearly collapsed in large swathes of the countryside and informal 
settlements in urban areas. Where the Government acted, its responses tended to be unwieldy and 
disjointed”. The TJRC states that: 
The Commission finds that in most cases, the state has covered up or downplayed 
violations committed against its own citizens, especially those committed by state 
 65 
 
security agencies. During the entire mandate period (1963-2008), the state 
demonstrated no genuine commitment to investigate and punish atrocities and 
violations committed by its agents against innocent citizens (TJRC 2013:10).  
The failure of the state to investigate and punish gross violations of human rights in Kenya has created a 
culture of impunity not only among the political class but also among the masses, as it was exhibited 
during the post-election violence. According to TJRC (2013:148), during the violence, the perpetrators 
took advantage of the breakdown of social order, the increased armed conflict, and general lawlessness 
to commit offences with impunity. The Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) carried out research in 
2011 on the faces of impunity in Kenya and, among other conclusions, they found that  
Corruption and human rights violations are endemic and the major governance concerns for Kenya. 
They are the most egregious indicators of impunity and are deeply rooted in society ... It can be 
deduced that the culture of impunity is so entrenched into Kenyan society that human rights 
violations and grand official corruption committed by state and non-state actors remain unresolved 
(KHRC 2011:2, 4).. 
 
As noted above, there have been investigations into human rights violations carried out by Commissions 
of inquiry established by sitting presidents and acts of parliament. In 2008, Africa's Centre for Open 
Governance (AfriCOG) carried out a research to investigate the efficacy of these commissions and found 
that, “Kenya’s experience with commissions of inquiry reveals that they are a very expensive 
postponement of the moment of truth and justice” (AfriCOG 2008:7). It is as result of the 
abovementioned violations and the failure of the state to prosecute the violators that a trend of 
impunity and consequently a trend of human rights violations has become deeply entrenched in Kenya. 
For this culture to die there must be concerted systemic ways of dealing with those responsible for the 
human rights violations, with subsequent prosecution and punishment. When the government upholds 
the rule of law the social order is maintained thus creating an unfavourable environment for further 
violations of human rights. 
 
5.3 DEHUMANIZATION  
There were several incidents of discrimination, dehumanization, humiliation, intolerance and 
prejudice. There were forced circumcisions of people, reference to non-Kikuyu people as ‘nduriri’ 
(an often demeaning term referring to non-Kikuyu people), reference of Luo people as sub-
human and denial of services to non-Kikuyu people. In Juja, for example, a water vendor refused 
to sell water to non-Kikuyu people. Other victims told of calls for businesses not to sell to non-
Kikuyu people. The former MP for Limuru, George Nyanja, said that the Kikuyu cannot be led by a 
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‘Kihii’ (uncircumcised man in the Kikuyu language), in reference to Raila Odinga (KNCHR 
2008:128)22. 
 
Kenya presently exhibits characteristics which are prerequisites for the commission of the crime 
of genocide. One such feature is the dehumanization of a community using negative labels or 
idioms that distinguish the target group from the rest of society. Communities such as the Kikuyu 
and Kisii resident in the Rift Valley were referred to by some Kalenjin politicians as “madoadoa” 
(stains) before and during the post-election violence (KNCHR 2008:5). 
 
In the North Rift Region, an estimated 35 people were burnt to death in the Kiambaa Church 
burning alone. These killings were particularly brutal and considered emblematic of the violence 
in the North Rift Region and the country as a whole. In the Matunda area of the North Rift Region 
14 young men were lynched to death by armed youths. Three children were burnt alive in 
Gituamba in Saboti Constituency 550 in Saboti Constituency, Trans Nzoia District in late February, 
2008. The attackers guarded the entrance to ensure that no one escaped from the house. This is 
clear demonstration of intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm (KNCHR 2008:145). 
 
As already noted, humanity is at the core of human rights hence dehumanization is at the heart of 
human rights violations. Dehumanization in the context of the 2007/8 post-election violence happened 
within the framework of negative ethnicity, hence the relationship between human rights violations and 
negative ethnicity is indisputable. Ethnic prejudice and cultural supremacy led to dehumanization of 
particular ethnic groups which was the main ground for violations because, as Wa Wamwere (2008:118) 
argues, “negative ethnicity must first dehumanize so that it can destroy.” Dehumanization was mainly 
done through humiliating ethnic labels, stereotypes and derogatory ethnic terminologies because 
“language is a potent weapon in reducing the humanity of others” (Wa Wamwere 2008:118). Different 
communities use derogatory language to dehumanize other communities. For example, the Kikuyu use 
the term nduriri – which literally means “other nations” (goyim) as used in the Old Testament – to refer 
to other ethnic communities. The worst use of dehumanizing language is when people are referred to as 
animals or non-living things. The Kikuyu, for instance, use terms such as nyamu cia ruguru, which 
literally means “animals from the West” (Wa Wamwere 2008:118), which has the connotation of “not 
full human beings.” The Kikuyu were referred to as madoadoa (stains) (KNCHR 2008:5), a term that 
suggest the need of ethnic cleansing. Wa Wamwere (2008:119-20) adds: 
The most explosive term of ethnic dehumanization, however is nyoka, snake. In the idiom of 
negative ethnicity, to be a snake is to deserve destruction. A snake need not bite, or even look 
about to strike, to deserve its fate. It is dangerous. It must die. And what about its eggs? A little 
snake or the egg of a snake is also a snake…Kill the young one before it grows, smash the egg 
before it hatches. 
                                                          
22 The choice of dehumanization as the topic of discussion of this chapter, was not done in exclusion of the list 
indicated in this quote.  
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The image of a snake perhaps explains the brutal killing of children and expectant mothers during the 
violence and also in other contexts of ethnic and racial conflict in the world. Added to this dehumanizing 
language there are other stereotypes which are used daily in households. These include: “The Kikuyu are 
thieves, the Kalenjin are greedy, the Luo are proud and haughty, the Kamba are cowards.” Such 
humiliating ethnic labels, stereotypes and derogatory ethnic language continue to be accepted and 
embedded in the thought frames of different communities in Kenya and have been faithfully passed on 
through the generations.  
In turn, this kind of language gradually produces hatred and exclusion, which continually erodes 
the dignity encompassed in humanity in two ways. Firstly, in the eyes of the violator, the humanity of 
the hated person is diminished; hence any harm can be visited on the hated. Secondly, the humanity of 
the violator is also diminished and as a result they have no conscience of humanity that could stop them 
from violating the rights of the hated. Consequently, rejecting the humanity of others is actually 
rejecting humanity in totality, for all human beings were created equally by God. If considerations of 
humanity were upheld during the violence, most of the violations of human rights could not have 
happened. It is not by accident that the crimes committed in the violence were labelled as “crimes 
against humanity.” Unless the hate and exclusion produced and carried by humiliating ethnic labels, 
stereotypes and derogatory ethnic language is interrupted, the culture of inter-ethnic animosity and 
conflict will continue to pose grave threats to the country.  
5.4 MISSIOLOGICAL REFLECTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
Justice, equality and freedom ‒ which can be said to be the main pillars of human rights ‒ are also some 
of the cardinal teachings of the Bible and as such human rights are also a matter of faith. The theological 
understanding of justice, equality and freedom may differ slightly from the understanding of these 
terms from a political science perspective but the spirit of the terms remains the same. For instance, 
biblical justice may differ somewhat from criminal justice. God is equally concerned with the justice, 
equality and freedom of all humanity hence human rights are of great concern to him, as it was stated 
by the 5th WCC Assembly in Nairobi in 1975:  
Our concern for human rights is based on our conviction that God wills a society in which all can 
exercise full human rights. All human beings are created in the image of God, equal and infinitely 
precious in God's sight and ours. Jesus Christ has bound us to one another by his life, death and 
resurrection, so that what concerns one concerns us all (WCC 1999).  
This section discusses how theology/missiology can help in both understanding human rights and in the 
mitigation of human rights violations in Kenya with a proposal of a missiology that is established on 
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what John Witte (2010:13) calls a “human rights hermeneutic” and that can help in cultivating a culture 
of respect for human rights.  
5.4.1 A Hermeneutic of Human Rights 
Since this is a missiological study, the preferred approach to human rights of the present study is based 
on biblical scholarship, with the argument that the Bible gives an appropriate and practical basis on 
which human rights can be understood and from which a culture of respect for human rights can be 
developed. There are three reasons for this choice. Firstly, and flowing from 5.2, the human rights values 
of justice, equality and freedom are also values promoted by gospel teaching Some scholars, like 
Christopher Marshall (1999:28) and Dinesh D’Souza (2007:67,75), argue that secular human rights 
tradition has borrowed much from the foundation of Christian theological assumptions and ethical 
values. 
The second reason for this stand is borrowed from Marjory Maclean (2012:46), who argues that 
the code of conduct is higher within the Church and that, as such, the Church should be a nobler 
example than the secular world. Maclean’s argument means that the Christian call to respect human 
rights goes beyond legalistic duty and becomes part of our redemption story: “Human rights belong to 
our redemption, not just to our creation” (Nelson 1982:12). Finally, the biblical approach is not self-
centred or individualistic, hence it does not glorify individualism as echoed in texts that can be 
considered as human rights texts, such as “Do to others as you would have them do to you” (Luke 6:31) 
and “In humility value others above yourselves” (Philippians 2:3). Rowan Williams (2012) argues that 
“Christian convictions are about human dignity and human relatedness, how we belong together… I 
believe this reconnection can be done by trying to understand rights against a background not of 
individual claims but of the question of what is involved in mutual recognition between human beings.” 
An alternative approach to the biblical scholarship approach to human rights could have been the 
United Nations declaration on human rights (UNDHR) but this was not preferred, for two reasons. The 
first reason is based on one of the criticisms given to UNDHR by scholars that it is individualistic 
(Buchanan 2004:156, Taringa 2007:250, Cotesta 2012:158, Williams 2012) as opposed to the biblical 
approach. According to the biblical approach the attention is taken away from the individual and as such 
the well-being of the individual has a communal dimension. This communal approach is also shared in 
the African sense of community as expressed in the philosophy of ubuntu (discussed in chapter three). 
However, the rights and interests of the individual are submerged in the rights and interests of the 
community. Whereas this is not the case all the time, there are instances, especially in Africa, where the 
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rights of children and women are swallowed by the cultural interest of the community. A good example 
of this is female genital mutilation and forced early marriages in some African communities, all done 
without necessarily the consent of the individuals.  
Secondly, there are human rights which are not secured by UNDHR policies, which is the human 
rights framework used by constitutions and legislations (Cf. Nelson 1982:9, Greidanus 1984:19, Williams 
2012). For example, the right to work, shelter and food is dependent on the economic capacity of a 
particular government. The biblical approach, for instance, lays great emphasis on giving bread to the 
hungry and giving shelter to the homeless as a Christian obligation (other examples include Isaiah 58:10. 
Mathew 25:31-46, James 2:14-18). By favouring a biblical approach to human rights, the present study 
does not claim superiority for this approach. It does not undermine the UNDHR nor does it advocate an 
exclusivist human rights approach. Williams (2012) rightly cautions: “It is important for the language of 
rights not to lose its anchorage in a universalist ethic.” This current study also acknowledges that “the 
World Council of Churches, through its Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, 
participated in the drafting of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, and contributed the text 
in Article 18 on freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. The WCC has since been active in 
promoting the declaration's implementation” (WCC 2008b). 
Having discussed the approach of this section, there are three factors that fuelled human rights 
violations. First, there is hatred, which stirs up dissension, conflict and contention (Proverbs 10:12). 
Hatred blinds a person from seeing the humanity of other people and leads to disrespect for the sanctity 
of life and human rights. This is the hatred that was exhibited by Cain when he killed his brother Abel 
(Genesis 4:1-16); it is the hatred that has facilitated genocides, ethnic cleansings and prejudices all over 
the world. Secondly, there is discrimination, which facilitates a demeaning attitude and excluding 
tendency. Thirdly, there is domination, where the strong dominate the weak and the rich dominate the 
poor. These three things, which are not mutually exclusive, are addressed in the whole Bible – from 
creation to the law to the prophets to the ministry of Jesus and to the teaching of the apostles. Some 
scholars like Marshall (1999:29), Nelson (1982:1) and Alf Tergel (1997:313) remind us that there is a 
diversity of theological approaches to human rights adopted by different ecclesiastical traditions. 
However, the position held in this present study is that even in this diversity the values of human rights 
– equality, justice and freedom – remain constant.  
In the biblical creation narratives, the equality and worth of every person is acknowledged 
through the creation of humanity in God’s image, which has evoked different understandings among 
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different people. To D’Souza (2007:68), created in God’s image means equality and he argues that 
although many have rejected the proposition that all human beings are created equal, the equality that 
is drawn from the Christian idea means that God places infinite value on each human life and loves 
every person equally. D’Souza’s idea of equality certainly raises concerns, especially when looked 
through the socio-economic lens and therefore the Christian stand against inequality, inequity and 
unfairness should be emphasized. To Martin Schindehutte (2012:20), the concept of imago Dei implies a 
common special dignity among all human beings:  
The Christian idea of humanity that draws its specific dignity from the Imago Dei has 
proved to be valuable. It enables us to serve the well being of all fellow humans by 
facing God’s image. What this image means becomes obvious in Jesus Christ, in whom 
God himself as a human being suffered under enmity and violence, standing in love and 
solidarity with all in this world who suffer and are oppressed. 
This view on dignity is also held by Sidney Greidanus (1984:15), who argues that “because all human 
beings are created in the image of God, it follows that all human beings are of exceptional worth. 
Because God created man as a creature of exceptional worth, he bestowed certain rights on man which 
he did not bestow on animals.” Another view on the imago Dei is expressed by Julius Nyerere 
(1973:111):  
For the present conditions of men must be unacceptable to all who think of an individual person 
as a unique creation of a living God.  I refuse to imagine a God who is poor, 
ignorant, superstitious, fearful, oppressed, wretched – which is the lot of the majority of those 
He created in His image. Men are creators of themselves and their conditions, but under the 
present conditions we are creatures, not of God, but of our fellow men. 
 
Nyerere seems to say that the image of God is continually distorted by human actions. Following 
Nyerere’s line of thought, regrettably it is within the framework of political, religious, social and 
economic structures that the worth of a person is defined and it is through evils like inequalities and 
injustices emerging from these structures that the image of God in a person is continually destroyed. 
The value of a person is in their being, and the understandings of imago Dei discussed above attempt to 
bring the human worth of every person to the fore and as such this is an appropriate foundation on 
which to base a hermeneutic of human rights. 
In the Decalogue, more than half of the laws are about the rights of other people – their 
authority, life, relationships, integrity and property. The ministry of the Old Testament prophets was 
basically a denunciation of violations of other people’s rights especially through dominance. Examples 
include the prophetic intervention in the Ahab and Naboth incident (1 Kings 21) and the David and Uriah 
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episode (2 Samuel 11). One of the central foundations of human rights is the sacredness of human life 
and Greidanus (1984:15-16) rightly argues that God is not only concerned with life itself but also the 
quality of that life. To protect life, God has established laws that protect human life based on the “You 
shall not kill” commandment (Exodus 20:13). God has also established laws that protect the quality of 
life and that include rights to rest (Exodus 20:9-10), rights to freedom (Exodus 21:6, Deuteronomy 
15:12-18), rights to food (Deuteronomy 23:24-25, 24;19-22, Leviticus 19:9-10), rights to fair wages 
(Leviticus 19:13, Deuteronomy 24:15, Jeremiah 22:13), rights to social security (Deuteronomy 23:19, 
Leviticus 25:10) and rights to justice (Deuteronomy 19:15, 27:19). It is the rights to justice that can be 
said to be prominent in the Old Testament. Greidanus (1984:11) argues that “One of the ways in which 
Israel was to disclose the reality of the kingdom of God was to show the justice and shalom of God's 
kingdom. God demands justice in his kingdom.” Gerhard von Rad (1962:370) has also pointed to the 
centrality of justice in the Old Testament: “There is absolutely no concept in the Old Testament with so 
central a significance for all the relationships of human life as that of tsedaqah. It is the standard not 
only for man's relationship to God, but also for his relationships to his fellows.” In the light of human 
rights, justice has to do with just social relationships, which is a central principle in human rights.   
The ministry of Jesus was basically centred on justice, freedom and equality. This is 
demonstrated by his association with the socially marginalized, hated and despised as well as his love 
for the poor. Charles Taber (2002:99) argues that the approach of Jesus was radical because 
Jesus alone among all religious founders and leaders rejected all forms of discrimination 
and insisted that all human beings ought to be treated in exactly the same way. His own 
dealings with women, with children, with lepers and other ritually polluted people, and 
with foreigners radically undermined all the distinctions that human societies of his day 
unanimously institutionalized. He extended the category "neighbor" to all humankind and 
insisted that the two Great Commandments applied to all; and he taught his disciples to 
love even their enemies. 
 
Alongside Jesus’ agenda for the marginalized, his restorative agenda is spelled out in his manifesto of 
Luke 4:16-21, where there is good news of hope to the poor, there is restoration of sight to the blind 
and freedom to the oppressed and prisoners. It is on the basis of this manifesto and the gospel 
teachings of Jesus that the apostles built their social theology. The Pauline teachings, for instance, lay an 
emphasis of equal worth of the Jew, the Gentile, the slave, the free, the male and female on the basis of 
faith in Jesus Christ (Galatians 3:28).  
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5.4.2 Cultivating a culture of respect for human rights  
A trend of human rights violations can only be combated by a culture of respect for human rights. The 
task of cultivating a culture of human rights involves imagining and building a vision of a society based 
on respect for human dignity. The Church as a significant opinion shaper should create a vision and a 
possibility of a society that respects human dignity and therefore honours human rights. It is through 
painting such a reality in the minds of Christians that a culture of human rights is cultivated and 
sustained. One of the ways to do this is through human rights education based on a hermeneutic of 
human rights. This is an emphasis laid by Sam Kobia, the then Secretary General of the WCC, who in 
2008 with other nine leaders from different world religions signed a statement entitled Faith in Human 
Rights. In his statement he exhorted his fellow religious leaders, “As religious leaders, our role is to study 
carefully our respective holy scriptures and teachings so as to find grounds for a theological rationale in 
defence of human rights” (WCC 2008b). Perhaps the most efficient way to do this is through the pulpit 
because through the ministry of the word of God and the frequency with which the pulpit is used, a 
human rights conscience can be created among the people and the Christians are equipped and 
empowered to fulfil their human rights responsibility in society.  
Another way of building a culture of human rights is through upholding human right values 
within the practice of the Church. Down ecclesiastical history, the Church has exhibited discrimination 
and prejudice tendencies through doctrines and practice. Tutu (2010:7) argues that religion should 
produce peace, reconciliation, tolerance and respect for human rights, but that it has often promoted 
the opposite. Tutu invokes the support of anti-Semitism by Christians, the propagation of apartheid by 
devout Christians in South Africa, the blazing cross symbol of the notorious Ku Klux Klan and the use of 
Christianity to justify racism. To add to Tutu’s list, the biblical justification of slavery cannot go 
unmentioned. Even so, it should not escape our attention that many Christians played a critical role 
under very difficult circumstances in calling for constitutional reforms, opposing marginalizing and 
discriminating public policies and fight against oppressive structures that promote prejudice. Most 
notably, the roles of Dietrich Bonhoeffer in the fight against Nazism in Germany, Martin Luther King Jr. 
in the struggle against racial discrimination in the United States and Desmond Tutu in the fight against 
apartheid in South Africa remain prominent. In ecumenical circles the work of WCC and the All Africa 
Conference of Churches (AACC) are important to mention because of their role in developing a 
theological basis for the churches' role in promoting and defending human rights. The WCC has been 
committed to human rights since its involvement with UNDHR to its own resolutions through its General 
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Assemblies. For instance, the Nairobi Assembly of 1975 was very important, as it was called to draw up 
the WCC's human rights agenda (Palestine Israel Ecumenical Forum 2013). As a result, the work of the 
WCC in oral and theological intervention in situations of violations of human rights in places like Congo 
and Arab territories (See WCC 2001; WCC 2005; WCC 2010b), remain outstanding. Following suit is the 
AACC, which through its General Assemblies have come up with resolutions that affirm their role in 
advocating human rights in Africa. Most notably, is its constant prophetic intervention in Zimbabwe with 
an example of a pastoral appeal they sent to President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, urging him to put 
the welfare of the country first (Africa Focus 2003). 
Another way of building a culture of human rights is through the struggle for human rights. Nico 
Koopman (2007:106-107) and Witte (2010:13) remind us there are legal and constitutional frameworks 
needed for enforcement of human rights and in some contexts such frameworks or procedural rights to 
fight for human rights are absent. In such contexts the Church has a prophetic role to play in calling for 
constitutional reforms, opposing marginalizing and discriminating public policies and fight against 
oppressive structures that promote prejudice. The examples of Bonhoeffer, King and Tutu mentioned 
above and the Church leaders in Kenya mentioned in chapter three come to mind. In order for the 
prophetic role to be efficient in such contexts there is a need of partnership with other players as it was 
the declaration of the Nairobi assembly: 
That gospel leads us to become ever more active in identifying and rectifying violations of human 
rights in our own societies, and to enter into new forms of ecumenical solidarity with Christians 
elsewhere who are similarly engaged. It leads us into the struggle of the poor and the oppressed 
both within and outside the church as they seek to achieve their full human rights, and free us to 
work together with people of other faiths or ideologies who share with us a common concern for 
human dignity (WCC 2005: 32) 
As such the gospel becomes both the light that points at the darkness of human rights violations and 
also the platform on which ecumenical partnership and bonds are made in the fight against abuse of 
human rights. In conclusion, it is through having a hermeneutic of human rights that the Church is aware 
of the work and ways in which God is involved in the world as far as human rights are concerned and it is 
through growing and building a culture of human rights that it can participate in this work of God. 
5.5 ECCELESIAL SCRUTINY: CHURCHES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN KENYA 
According to the articulated discourses on human rights in their documents, the churches in Kenya 
approach the issue of human rights from a human dignity perspective based on a hermeneutic rooted in 
the doctrine of imago Dei. The dignity of every human, which is given by God in creation, is to respected 
and protected. Hence the theological understanding that emerges here is creation-centred, in which a 
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common humanity is to be found. The Catholic Church’s understanding of human rights is shaped by 
Catholic Social teaching (CST):  
The fundamental message of Sacred Scripture proclaims that the human person is a 
creature of God (cf. Ps 139:14-18), and sees in his being in the image of God the element 
that characterizes and distinguishes him…Therefore, being in the image of God the 
human individual possesses the dignity of a person, who is not just something, but 
someone (Article 108, also Kenya Episcopal Conference 2012:16).  
 
The ACK (ACK, Justice and Peace, 2009) theological understanding of human rights is based on the 
premise of human dignity affirmed in creation. Hence, restoration of human rights is also based on 
restoration of human dignity robbed by social injustice. The NCCK (2013f) stated: 
The Bible teaches us in Genesis 1:26 that man was created in the image of God. Therefore all 
people have an inherent and inalienable dignity resident in them. However, we Kenyans have 
dehumanized ourselves and our neighbors. We call on each Kenyan to love his neighbor as they 
love themselves. The NCCK commits to continue promoting human dignity and to facilitate 
gender equity through provision of opportunities for women, youth and persons with disabilities 
to participate in church and social leadership. 
According to the Practice and Procedure of the PCEA, “This Church recognizes that God has created all 
human beings equal and free in their rights: to life, liberty, dignity and security” (PCEA 1998:146). This 
kind of theological understanding by the churches means that the dignity of a person is to be found in 
the sanctity of life, hence life and everything that supports it are to be respected and protected, through 
creation of awareness and rebuking the violators. As such, from this theological approach, the churches 
saw the violence as a threat to the sanctity of life and disregard to the dignity of the victims. 
However, even with this kind of theological articulation it is only the NCCK and the Catholic 
Church who directly and explicitly address issues of human rights. For instance, the Catholic Church has 
continually used pastoral letters and its institutions to promote human rights awareness among its 
members. The Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC) facilitates programmes that seek to 
empower communities to actively promote, protect and respect human rights. This is commonly done 
through awareness and training in all the dioceses of the church in Kenya (CJPC, 2013b; see also Pirouet 
1995:255). Perhaps it is through this education that KNCHR mentions the role that a Catholic 
congregation played during the post-2007 violence. According to KNCHR (2008:109), “St. Teresa’s 
Catholic Church in Kibuye was useful in gathering information on the number of persons whose rights 
had been violated and providing a forum for the KNCHR and other actors to meet with affected 
individuals during interviews”.  
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  Through the Kenya Young Christian Students (KYCS), the Church also trains students in 
secondary schools, colleges and universities on human rights and civic education as well as creating 
public awareness for these, both within the students’ world as well as in the society (KYCS, 2012). For 
the NCCK, alongside the human rights awareness programs, the institution has a project aimed at 
advocating and enhancing the protection of the human rights of people living with HIV/AIDS, a project 
whose staff are properly trained in the legal, ethical and human rights of people living with HIV/AIDS (Cf. 
Kenya Legal and Ethical Issues Network on HIV and AIDS, 2011).   
Generally speaking, in addition to the explicit human right actions of both the Catholic Church 
and NCCK, the churches in Kenya have approached issues of human rights through injustices propagated 
and fanned by unjust political structures. In other words, the churches read the signs of the times in 
regard to human rights through the framework of political injustice, which was seen as the genesis of all 
other injustices. This meant that fighting oppressive political systems amounted to promotion of human 
rights. This led the Catholic Church to establish the CJPC in 1988 as the executive arm of the Kenya 
Episcopal Conference to deal with matters of peace and justice by promoting justice and challenging 
oppressive structures in society (CJPC, 2013a). Working closely with the Catholic Church, the NCCK in 
1991 created a Department of Justice and Peace (DJP) “with which it was determined to continue 
fighting State injustices through a programme of educating people about their political rights and 
democracy. The creation of this department enabled the NCCK to define more clearly their advocacy 
activities” (Gibbs & Ajulu 1999:49). Following closely the move by NCCK to form DJP, the ACK 
established Justice and Peace Commission (JPC) in 1991 which 
Generally seeks to advocate for the removal of the many social injustices and structural obstacles 
within the dominant value of propagating for the establishment of a truly free, open, flourishing 
and democratic society, in which all human freedoms are entrenched for the full realization of 
the Kingdom of God in Kenya. It also seeks to nurture, build and sustain harmony, tolerance and 
social responsibility amongst Kenyans. It struggles for restoration of human rights, human 
dignity, integrity of creation, peace and reconciliation in support of the on-going democratization 
process (ACK, Justice and Peace, 2009). 
Later on in 1998, the PCEA established the Justice, Peace and Reconciliation Committee (JPRC), whose 
mission is to promote justice, peace and reconciliation (PCEA, JPRC, No date). The most outstanding 
work of CJPC, DPJ, JPC and JPRC is civic education among their members and also their grassroots 
presence. For instance, there is literally a JPRC in almost every congregation of the PCEA.  
There are however, no traces of churches’ direct actions in the 2007/8 post-election violence in 
regard to human rights, in the KNCHR report or in other documents. All attention was given to internally 
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displaced persons and this attention was only through relief, as will be discussed in chapter six. Other 
victims of violations were neglected and therefore there is a need to have their stories heard and a 
process of healing initiated for them. 
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
Gross violations of human rights in Kenya have taken place not only during the post-election violence 
but throughout the political history of the country. Most of these violations happened through social 
injustices facilitated by unjust political structures and policies as well as the culture of impunity in Kenya; 
hence it became the main approach of addressing violations of human rights. As human dignity is at the 
heart of respect for human rights, dehumanization is the root cause of violation of human rights. The 
churches in Kenya, with the exception of the Catholic Church and NCCK, have not directly – through 
their theological discourses and practice – addressed the issues of human rights. There is therefore an 
urgent need for a serious rethinking of the theology of human rights in Kenyan churches and the 
disconnection that exists between articulated discourses on human rights and the practice of those 
churches. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
VIOLENCE IN KENYA 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Though the present study is about the whole event of the 2007/8 post-election violence, this chapter 
focuses on the agency dimension of the violence and a missiological reflection on violence. The 2007/8 
post-election violence, as the name suggests, can be referred to as political violence. While there are 
other factors that contributed, as discussed in chapter three, it is in the framework of politics that this 
particular violence erupted. Gamini Samaranayake (2008:46) notes that “there is no general agreement 
on the definition of political violence” but for the sake of this study the working definition of political 
violence is taken from Harold Nieburg (1969:13), who defines political violence as “acts of disruption, 
destruction (and) injury whose purpose, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, 
implementation, and/or effects have political significance, that tend to modify the behaviors of others in 
a bargaining situation that has consequences for the social system.”  
This chapter has three sections. The first section reflects on the agency involved in the violence, 
with special attention given to three main actors: politicians, youth and churches. The second section is 
a missiological reflection on violence, which is done in dialogue with biblical scholarship. The third 
section is a scrutiny of the churches in Kenya, with attention given to how the churches understood their 
role in the 2013 general elections.23  
 
6.2 AGENCY 
Having discussed the nature and dynamics of the 2007/8 post-election violence in chapters two and 
three, it will be helpful in this chapter to address the issue of agency. There are many actors who were 
involved in different ways in the violence. The KNCHR report identifies politicians, business people, 
youth, faith based organizations, state agents and the media as the main actors. For sake of space and 
magnitude of their participation, this chapter discusses politicians, youth and churches as the main 
actors in the violence. However, the agency of churches is discussed separately in the spirit of the logic 
of style of the previous chapters. 
 
 
                                                          
23 The 2013 general elections are important to note because they give us a perspective on whether the churches in 
Kenya have learned any lessons from the 2007/8 post-election violence. 
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6.2.1 Politicians and violence 
The violence was largely instigated by politicians throughout the campaign period and during the violence 
itself via the use of incitement to hatred (KNCHR 2008:3). 
 
Further, the magnitude of the destruction that the attackers caused in the Rift Valley in particular and the 
swiftness with which they moved pointed to a high level of organisation, financing and provision of 
transport. It is alleged that local politicians and business people financed the violence (KNCHR 2008:135). 
 
There has been a close relationship between violence and power, where politicians in Kenya have been 
using violence to attain and sustain power. This is a colonial legacy inherited from the colonial masters 
who gained and maintained power through violent conquest, which included the divide and rule 
approach discussed in chapter three and also the violent combating of the Mau Mau movement that 
was fighting colonial rule. Due to the nature of politics in Kenya, with politics of ethnic balkanization and 
politics of money, politicians are given undue prominence and enjoy an uncritical following from the 
masses. Politics in Kenya is highly competitive, especially because of the outrageous remuneration of 
political offices. Kenyan legislators are among the best paid legislators in the world (Kaara & Atsianga 
2008:159, National Assembly 2010:32); in fact, empirical research has shown that they are the second 
highly paid legislators in the world (The Economist 2013; Herbing 2013). The correlation between money 
and power (politics) has been regularly drawn (cf. Mandel 1992; Bretton 1980), especially by observers 
using neo-Marxist approaches. For this economic reason, many politicians use all means possible – 
including violence – to gain and maintain power, which makes politics dangerously competitive. 
The KNCHR report has repeatedly stated that politicians instigated the violence (KNCHR 2008:3, 
13, 19, 88, 132), hence they carry the greatest criminal responsibility for their participation and 
involvement, mainly in two ways. Firstly, the politicians continually incited the masses and aroused their 
feelings of hatred through taking advantage of the fanatical following they enjoyed from the masses. 
Their political campaigns were punctuated with rhetoric of hate and divisiveness, which were channelled 
through stereotypes and negative perceptions against particular ethnic groups. Hate speech was pegged 
on highly emotive issues like land, where idioms were used to suggest the presence of unwanted people 
in particular regions. A good example is the use of the Swahili word madoadoa (stains) and snakes, 
mentioned in 5.3, to achieve this purpose. This idiom was specifically understood to imply a necessity to 
evict people considered to be non-indigenous (Cf. KNCHR 2008:5, 52, 58, 103, 134). Another emotive 
area that was hyped by politicians was the alleged political dominance of some ethnic communities, 
where hate speech was used to protest against the alleged dominance (Cf. KNCHR 2008:24, 214). 
Incitement was exhibited by direct calls for defence, where politicians charged the masses to pick up 
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arms in defence of “their people.” Most of the retaliation and counter-attacks were as a result of such 
incitement (cf. KNCHR 2008:3, 36, 54, 81, 129).  
Secondly, politicians not only incited the people but also mobilized, financed and offered 
logistical support for attacks and counter-attacks. Politicians, in collaboration with influential business 
people and community leaders, used young people, especially organized gangs, to facilitate attacks 
(KNCHR 2008:96, 105, 130, 135, 144, 157). Politicians took advantage of the youth adversely affected by 
the harsh economic realities in Kenya who were ready to be used by the politicians at a fee. As a result, 
a nexus was created between violence, youth and unemployment, which is the discussion of the next 
section. 
 
6.2.2 Youth and Violence 
The attackers moved in groups that would comprise an average of 100 young men in any given 
episode… The attacking youths would come in big groups of hundreds and would divide 
themselves moving silently before attacking, hence we were caught unawares (KNHRC 2008:58). 
 
Unemployed youths within Central Province took advantage of the unrest to engage in theft and 
other unlawful practices (KNCHR 2008:126). 
 
Though the youth are the majority in Kenya, the political dynamics in Kenya have reduced them to 
political spectators and instruments of violence. The youth are politically marginalized and as a result 
their participation in elective politics is very minimal. For instance, in the current elective political 
offices: Parliament (92 members), Senate (47 members) and Governor (47 members), there are less 
than ten youth aged below the age of 35. This is largely so because of the money-politics factor in Kenya 
(cf. Obonyo 2010; CMDK 2011a). It is because of this marginalization that the Constitution of Kenya 
(2010) requires that political parties nominate 12 members to represent special interests (including the 
youth) in parliament and two members (one man and one woman) in the senate (Articles 97 & 98). The 
Center for Multiparty Democracy - Kenya (CMDK) is one of the non-governmental institutions that seek 
to empower young people to active political participation: 
In a bid to assist the young aspirants overcome the Achilles hill that is political 
endorsements of their more moneyed and well connected opponents. CMD-Kenya’s 
County debates are affording them an appropriate platform to discuss their political 
agenda, challenge their opponents, and showcase their capacity, track record and 
abilities to the electorate and the media (CMDK 2011b). 
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The youth are instruments of violence because politicians in Kenya have continually misused them in 
causing violence and as such the youth, specifically of the male gender, were the main perpetrators of 
the violence (Njogu 2009:170; UNICEF 2012:10). While it is generally assumed that the youth involved in 
the violence were aged 15 years and above, research carried out by Kimani Njogu (2009:165, 296, 34. 
170) indicates that even youth aged between 12-15 were actively involved in the attacks. Investigations 
have also proved that most of these young people come from low income backgrounds (KNCHR 
2008:126, 146; IMF 2010:76-77) which is specifically evidenced by organized youth gangs that carried 
out attacks, as discussed below. The conclusion that can be drawn from these facts is that there is a 
close relationship between youth violence and economic factors; it is consequently difficult to address 
the issue of violence without addressing the economic issues related to the youth.  
The statistical data on youth, provided in chapter one, indicate that Kenya is a youthful country 
and therefore most of the problems in the country related to education and employment are largely a 
youth challenge. The majority of the youth are unemployed, which is one of the main reasons why they 
participated in the post-election violence. The rate of unemployment in Kenya has escalated in alarming 
rates down the years and as a result many young people turn to crime and violence. Generally, research 
tends to draw a nexus between crime, violence and antisocial behaviour among the youth living in 
adverse economic realities, with the conclusion that youth from poor economic backgrounds are more 
prone to crime and violence (Cf Taylor 1995:175-176; Baumer, Rosenfeld & Wolff 2013:55; Connor 
2002:147). Though a close relationship has been drawn between youth unemployment and violence, it 
is important to note that it is not every unemployed youth that is involved in the violence.  
In Kenya as well, the relationship between violence and youth unemployment has been closely 
linked with the history of violence (Cf. Human Rights Watch 2002:147; Mwangola 2007:148; KNCHR 
2008:126; IMF 2010:76-77) which has manifested itself mainly in two ways. Firstly, it is through 
opportunism, where idle and unemployed youth took advantage of the broken social order to engage in 
looting and other crimes (Oloo 2007:76; KNCHR 2008:37, 100, 126). Secondly, it is through manipulation 
by politicians who take advantage of the idle youth, a tendency enhanced by the culture of disbursing 
money to eligible voters during political campaigns. This money culture has encouraged the emergence 
of militia-like gangs, also referred to as vigilante groups, which are ethnically organized (cf. Mwangola 
2007:148; Anderson 2002:542; KNCHR 2008:36, 42). Mshai Mwangola (2007:148), for instance, notes 
that “each gang is associated with a politician. While some specifically started as political ‘support’ 
groups for particular politicians, others either took advantage of the political context to offer their 
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services to particular factions or emerged in response to insecurity, poverty or other needs.” David 
Anderson notes that the idle youth “too easily become a political instrument in the hands of those with 
money to pay, playing key roles in electoral and post-elections violence so as to ensure a particular 
electoral outcome” (Anderson 2002:542). Among these militia gangs, the Mungiki (which is associated 
with the Kikuyu) is perhaps the best organized (KNCHR 2008:44) and most feared criminal group, 
especially for its extortion network and heinous murders. The gang features numerous times in the 
KNCHR report (KNCHR 2008:20, 29, 36)24.  
 
6.4 MISSIOLOGICAL REFLECTION ON VIOLENCE 
Conflict and violence remain major threats to peace in the world today and by the virtue of the Church 
being in the world, they remain a major concern for the Church. The threats of terrorism, weapons of 
mass destruction, inter-ethnic, inter-country and inter-religious conflicts are perhaps more prevalent 
today than at any other time in history. This section deals with how the biblical understanding of 
violence can shape the Church’s mission in a world full of conflict and violence. 
 
6.4.1 Violence in the Bible 
The Bible is full of texts that refer to violence, since it was a reality in the life of Israel, the life of Jesus 
and the life of the early church. It contains texts that are certainly difficult to understand, hence in this 
section such texts will be referred to as “difficult texts.” These texts are also problematic, as Kjetil 
Freithem (2004:21) argues: “The most basic theological problem with the Bible’s violence is that it is 
often associated with the activity of God; with remarkable frequency. God is the subject of violent 
verbs.” It is not possible to talk about violence from a theological perspective without invoking these 
texts and it is through this attention that we can arrive at an acceptable biblical theology of violence. In 
the Old Testament, for instance, there are many episodes of violence initiated by God himself as well as 
by his people Israel. God is presented as “mighty in battle” (Psalm 24) and he initiates violence of the 
kind that would be called genocide today. Most notably are Noah’s flood (Genesis 6-7), the Passover 
killing of Egyptian children (Exodus 12) and the Sodom and Gomorrah violence (Genesis 19). There are 
also conquest narratives in the Pentateuch and Prophets where God‘s people engage in mass killings as 
                                                          
24For further discussion on mungiki phenomenon see Kagwanja (2005) and Knighton (2009). 
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a result of divine instruction (cf Genesis 32, 34; Exodus 17; 2 Kings 1:10-12). The apocalyptic writings are 
also full of the language of violence and the eschaton has some violent characteristics. 
Difficult texts certainly raise very pertinent and difficult questions which, as Dianne Bergant 
(1994:46) states, should not be avoided. The quest to understand these texts is quite a struggle and it is 
such struggle and tensions that led to the error of Marcion, who introduced a sharp division between 
the Testaments because he was appalled by the notion that the God portrayed in the Old Testament 
was violent and brutal (Cf. Boersma 2004:41; Bartlett 2001:54). Many Bible readers today are 
understandably trapped in Marcionite thinking and as Anthony Bartlett (2001:54) rightly argues, though 
Marcion’s attempt at coherence through separation failed, his sensitivity was not misplaced.   
There are many hermeneutical approaches to the interpretation of such texts. There are 
teleological approaches whose focus is the goals achieved through violence. Walter Brueggemann 
(1997:244) observes that the violence assigned to Yahweh is to be understood as counter-violence, 
whose goal is a nonviolent end, which according to Freithem (2004:18) is meant to accomplish loving 
purposes. To Bergant (1994:51), God was not preoccupied with violence but he waged war in order to 
restrain chaos and establish peace and order. Freithem (2004:23), for instance, argues that God uses 
violence in two ways: judgment and salvation – with some events having both results. In judgment, 
divine violence always seems to be related to human sin and, generally speaking, “if there were no 
human violence, there would be no divine violence” (Freithem 2004:21). For salvation, Freithem 
(2004:24) notes that violence becomes the means by which God’s people are delivered from violence, 
with an example of the exodus event – where violence is used to deliver Israel from the violence of 
Egypt (Exodus 15:1-3). However, the difficulty with the exodus event is the slaying of innocent children 
of Egypt, keeping in mind the fact that it is God himself who had hardened the heart of Pharaoh. Richard 
Bowman and Richard Swanson (1997:61) point to the use of divine violence to establish and legitimize 
Hebrew authority, to regenerate and renew the vitality of the nation, especially during the era of the 
Judges. The approach that “the end justifies the means,” which is advocated by these scholars, certainly 
raises some difficulty because it is hard to reconcile with texts that do not have love as their end. For 
instance, the texts in which God ordered massacres of nations which decided not to worship him and 
the killing of innocent people for the sins of individual persons. Bowman and Swanson (1997:61) have 
also raised a concern against this approach when they point at the violent activities portrayed in the 
Samson story, which do not end with an integrated and peaceful society but with a brutal act of revenge 
with the help of God’s hand. 
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Another way of handling difficult texts is through biblical criticism. Bergant (1994: 51) states that 
YHWH was perceived as sovereign, which meant that in any battle he therefore had to emerge as 
conqueror. His people Israel believed that he was personally present in their lives as their patron, hence 
he was willing to defend them against other nations that threatened them. These nations were regarded 
as opponents of YHWH as well and their transgression of Israel’s sacred boundaries was considered as 
pollution. The problem that arises from this hermeneutical approach is God’s favouritism of Israel, to the 
exclusion of other nations who did not worship YHWH. If God created humanity with free volition, why 
does he not respect the choice made by human beings out of this freedom, even when it is against him?  
There are scholars who find a literal reading of violent texts in the Bible morally repugnant and 
unacceptable (Stark 2011:33). Origen, for instance, insisted that it is impossible to interpret the meaning 
of the conquest narratives literally, hence “unless those carnal wars were a symbol of spiritual wars, I do 
not think that the Jewish historical books would ever have been passed down by the apostles to be read 
by Christ’s followers in their churches” (in Stark 2011:34). This kind of approach has been questioned by 
other scholars (Cf. Boersma 2004:47-48; Bergant 1994:47). Hans Boersma (2004:47-48) argues that it is 
not helpful to interpret God’s wrath as a metaphor that does not truly speak of reality. Why do we use 
an argument of “the restrictions of human language” exclusively for those characteristics of God in the 
biblical narratives that we find less appealing? Bergant (1994:50) rightly asks: “If the descriptions are 
more metaphorical than factual, why were such violent metaphors preferred?” 
6.4.2 Reading difficult texts 
There is a tendency to ignore difficult texts, especially when one encounters struggle in understanding 
them. Bowman & Swanson (1997:60) warn that a hermeneutic of avoidance is an ethically irresponsible 
and irresponsive way of reading; hence there is a need for what Bartlett (2001:54) calls a radical 
hermeneutic or what Eric Seibert (2012:64-65) calls “reading the Bible actively.” This entails ethically 
critiquing – rather than uncritically approving – violent texts and also reading the Bible faithfully, which 
means reading it conversantly, which will lead to asking questions about certain texts. Some of these 
hermeneutical questions include: “Might there be more than one way of understanding biblical 
statements that not only sanction but actually encourage war?” (Bergant 1994:46). “How does an 
interpreter responsively and responsibly read violent sacred narratives in a violent secular world?” 
(Bowman & Swanson 1997:59). How do you reconcile the violent texts with texts of shalom? This 
section is not an attempt to answer these questions, because even with hermeneutical explanations 
given above, the tensions in these difficult texts still persist. However, this struggle should be seen as 
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part of the journey towards understanding faith and not necessarily as points of confusion and 
contradiction. The purpose of this section is to propose a guideline to understanding violence from a 
liberating perspective, even in the midst of difficult texts. 
The approach that is preferred in response to difficult texts is the one proposed by Seibert 
(2012:73, 80) who suggests that we should read the Bible non-violently. This means using dissonant 
(nonviolent) voices to undermine dominant (violent) ones. He gives an example of passages describing 
nonviolent resolution of conflict, such as Joseph’s forgiveness of his brothers (Genesis 45-50) and 
Abigail’s swift intervention that prevented a massacre (1 Samuel 25), examples which can be brought 
into conversation with texts that resolve conflict through lethal force. Flowing from Seibert’s thesis, 
difficult texts should be read in the light of texts that abhor violence and promote peace. Margot 
Kässmann (1998:26) states that there is much evidence in the Bible describing God as the giver of 
shalom. Freithem (2004:20) argues that God sharply rejects violent people – for example “the 
Lord…hates the lover of violence” (Psalm 11:5) – and such a resolute divine opposition to human 
violence is important to remember in reflecting upon divine violence (Freithem 2004:21). The ultimate 
opposition to violence in the Bible is certainly demonstrated in the Jesus event, especially through his 
incarnation and ministry as well as his death on the cross. The Jesus event should at least help in 
answering some of the questions arising from the difficult texts, as Boersma (2004:41) argues: “All 
traditional interpretations of the cross must in some way give an account of the relationship between 
divine violence and the atonement.” 
6.4.3 The Incarnation and Ministry of Jesus 
The incarnation is important in understanding violence because Jesus, God incarnate, comes face to face 
with violence through his birth, ministry and consequently his death. He is born in a violent environment 
where male children are massacred by Herod because of him (Matthew 2:16-18). Throughout his earthly 
ministry, Jesus teaches against violence, with the best example being the Sermon on the Mount (Mt 5-
7). He represents a new order where evil and violence are to be overcome with what is good:  
You have heard that it was said, ‘Eye for eye, and tooth for tooth.’ But I tell you, do not resist an 
evil person. If anyone slaps you on the right cheek, turn to them the other cheek also. And if 
anyone wants to sue you and take your shirt, hand over your coat as well. If anyone forces you to 
go one mile, go with them two miles. Give to the one who asks you, and do not turn away from 
the one who wants to borrow from you (Matthew 5:38-48). 
Jesus also encounters instances of violence, to which he responds with a nonviolent attitude. For 
example, he sternly rebuked those calling for destructive fire from heaven (Luke 9:54) and he responds 
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to Peter’s violent attack with healing and an appeal to put down the weapon of violence (Matthew 
26:52). Building on Jesus’ model, many scholars (cf. Kässmann 1998; Hoeft 2006) have called for a 
nonviolent response to violence. The WCC and the Roman Catholic Church have continually supported a 
nonviolent approach to violence. The WCC initiated a Decade to Overcome Violence (DOV) in the period 
2001-2010, in its relentless efforts to mitigate violence in nonviolent ways in a broken world (WCC 
2004). According to the WCC, “Peace-building in non-violent ways is a Christian core virtue and an 
imperative of the gospel message itself” (WCC 2006). Consequently, the WCC proposes dialogue and 
political negotiations as means through which violent conflict can be overcome (cf. WCC 2008a; WCC 
2010a). Like the WCC, the Roman Catholic Church supports dialogue and negotiation. In recent times 
this approach has been used by Pope Francis to appeal to the world’s 20 largest economies to abandon 
a looming military solution to the Syrian Conflict and embrace a peaceful solution through dialogue and 
negotiation (Vatican 2013a). A nonviolent approach is what Lisa Cahill (1994:2) refers to as Christian 
pacifism, which is “essentially a commitment to embody communally and historically the kingdom of 
God so fully that mercy, forgiveness and compassion preclude the very contemplation of causing 
physical harm to another person.”  
 This nonviolent response is by no means an escapist approach or what Walter Wink (2003:3) 
calls “pervasive inversion,” where the lessons from the Sermon on the Mount are interpreted to mean 
an inactive and uncritical response to oppressive systems. Kässmann (1998:27) argues that the call in 
the Sermon on the Mount is to nonviolence, not to non-resistance; a view supported by Jeanne Hoeft 
(2006:49), who notes that “resistance arises out of the context of violence, from within the same culture 
that perpetuates violence.” Wink (2003:175) argues that turning the other cheek is an act of humiliating 
the aggressor, and giving the undergarment is an act of unmasking cruelty and going a second mile is a 
way of protest. However, looking at Wink’s hypothesis today, it may raise some problems. Turning the 
other cheek may not humiliate the aggressor but it can actually accelerate aggression. Giving the 
undergarment may not unmask cruelty but expose the victim to further humiliation. Going a second 
mile may not be a protest but an extra burden on the shoulders of the victims.   
Whereas this proposal of resistance can work in some situations of violence, the question arises: 
What kind of resistance should be used in the face of brutal attacks? Should the victims helplessly resign 
their fate to the hands of their violators? A further question is whether there is a necessary or justifiable 
violence that can be used as protest and resistance. For instance, what is the place of self defence in 
brutal violence? These questions lead to the Augustinian “just war” ethic which, as Cahill (1994:1) notes, 
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allows violence under certain conditions but attempts to limit it, both by constricting the valid causes for 
going to war (for example, defence of the common good, proportionality, last resort, declaration by a 
legitimate authority, hope of success) and by restraining the actions of war. Darrell Cole (2002:74), 
building on the Augustinian approach to war, argues: “God restrains evil out of love for his creation. Just 
wars acts are God-like insofar as they restrain evil and are done out of love for the neighbor – both the 
neighbor we protect and the unjust neighbor who is the subject of our acts of violence” (Cole 2002:74).  
Like with the other difficult texts, Cole’s argument is also difficult, especially through classifying 
love and violence in the same category. However, his thesis is convincing when looking at the violent 
death of Jesus on the cross. Cahill (1994:1) highlights a tension (my emphasis) between just war thinking 
and Christian pacifism:  
While Church statements have sometimes had a significant impact on the public discussion of 
war, however, no clear and consistent theological resolution of the issues between the just war 
and pacifists interpretations of Christian teaching has been achieved. Many Christians and their 
leaders seem caught on the horns of both/and approach, in which some credence is given both 
to resort to war and to renunciation of violence. 
A good example of this tension raised by Cahill is the position of the Roman Catholic Church on self-
defence and war. According to the Catholic Catechism, “Love toward oneself remains a fundamental 
principle of morality. Therefore it is legitimate to insist on respect for one's own right to life. Someone 
who defends his life is not guilty of murder even if he is forced to deal his aggressor a lethal blow” 
(Vaticana 1994:545). Also: 
Legitimate defense can be not only a right but a grave duty for one who is responsible for the 
lives of others. The defense of the common good requires that an unjust aggressor be rendered 
unable to cause harm. For this reason, those who legitimately hold authority also have the right 
to use arms to repel aggressors against the civil community entrusted to their responsibility 
(Vaticana 1994:545).  
The contrary aspect of both the non-violent approach to violence and the self-defence teachings of the 
Roman Catholic Church should not be seen as a contradiction but as a tension that should be maintained 
in a creative balance. While the Church stands for dialogue, negotiation and reconciliation as means 
through which violence should be mitigated, it should also define the kind of response that is required in 
the event that these means are not bearing the intended results or when there is large scale violence 
that requires meaningful force to be interrupted. 
6.4.4 The Cross Event 
The cross event is the ultimate example of how Jesus dealt with violence. God incarnate comes face to 
face with violence. Though the cross event was seen as justice by the aggressors, it is an epitome of 
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nonviolent resistance to evil. Kässmann (1998:27) explains: “Jesus himself walked the path of nonviolent 
resistance to the very end. He remained a provocation to the powers even when he was dying on the 
cross. By his death it became obvious that he was not defeated but continued to be a scandal to the 
forces of violence.” Through his death on the cross, Jesus – though sovereign – submits to violence and 
this has become a perfect example of what our attitude towards violence should be. Pope Francis, in 
one of his messages on peace, noted that: 
My Christian faith urges me to look to the Cross. How I wish that all men and women of good will 
would look to the Cross if only for a moment! There, we can see God’s reply: violence is not 
answered with violence; death is not answered with the language of death. In the silence of the 
Cross, the uproar of weapons ceases and the language of reconciliation, forgiveness, dialogue, 
and peace is spoken (Vatican 2013b). 
Flowing from Pope Francis’ sentiments, the call of the cross is a call to reconciliation: reconciliation with 
God and reconciliation with each other. Kässmann (1998:5) says: “violence is not going to disappear 
from human life once and for all, but Christians can set signs of the reality of God’s kingdom in our 
world. Struggle to overcome violence in the knowledge that violence exists is an attitude of hope.” The 
mission of the Church in conflict situations is to mitigate and mediate through the language of love, 
forgiveness and reconciliation – a triad that characterizes the Jesus event. 
This section has focused on a missiological reflection on violence. Though there are violent texts 
in the Bible, they are not supposed to be read as an inspiration or justification of violence but should be 
read against texts of shalom with the Jesus event giving us an ideal model on which a 
missiology/theology in response to violence can be built. 
 
6.5 ECCLESIAL SCRUTINY: CHURCHES AND VIOLENCE 
Christianity in Kenya has an ambiguous history. On the one hand it was established through relief and 
development with establishment of mission schools and hospitals, and on the other hand it was 
established in the context of violence, a context of colonialism and oppression (Mwaura 2005: 163-164; 
Galgalo 2012:7). In colonial times, the Church was identified with the oppressor and as an oppressor 
through violence; the distinction between the missionary and the colonial master did not exist. Most 
resentment against the churches was with how they had forcibly and illegitimately acquired land, 
sentiments best captured by words attributed to Jomo Kenyatta: “When the missionaries came we had 
the land and they had the Bible in their hands. They told us to pray, closing our eyes. When we looked 
up again we had the Bible and they had our land” (in Baur 1994:477). The churches in Kenya have since 
been entangled with land controversies and are seen as part of the land problem in Kenya. The 
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ambiguity of the churches has continued through the history of the church in Kenya with the post-
election violence of 2007/8 being no exception. The response of the churches to the violence was 
ambivalent: On the one hand the churches stood with the victims and on the other they encouraged or 
allowed the perpetrators to do violence. 
6.5.1 Churches standing with the victims 
During the violence, the first response of the churches was humanitarian assistance, which was seen by 
the churches themselves as their immediate and appropriate mandate. One the one hand, the victims 
took refuge in churches because they saw them as havens of peace and the churches had no option but 
to accord relief assistance to them. However, the attackers often saw such churches as either “the host 
of our enemies” or as “the church of the enemy.” This perhaps explains why many churches were 
targets of arson attacks, and the number of churches that were attacked is an indicator that the Church 
as a sanctuary had lost its sacredness as well as its non-partisan or neutral tag (cf. KNCHR 2008:23, 30, 
31, 35, 38, 39). This offence against the churches should be a critical reflection point for the churches in 
Kenya as they, through repentance and reform, seek to restore the lost credibility and glory of the 
Church. 
Humanitarian assistance was appealed for through pastoral exhortation. However, even this 
humanitarian assistance was given along ethnic lines. For instance, in the Limuru area in Central Kenya 
predominantly inhabited by the Kikuyu, there were three large IDP camps, with the first two camps 
hosting Kikuyu victims. The one was run by the Kenya Red Cross and the other by Limuru Pastors 
Fellowship, who mobilized and called upon Christians around the vicinity of Limuru to give humanitarian 
aid to the victims. The other camp, which was in the Tigoni Police Station, hosted non-Kikuyu victims 
who were working in Limuru and its environs. The Tigoni camp, which had about seven thousand people 
(KNCHR 2008:127), was neglected and all the relief was given to the two Kikuyu camps. It is in Limuru 
that the KNCHR report (2008:130) states that Church leaders conveyed messages that amounted to hate 
speech.  
Humanitarian response was the default and reflex action of the churches but it is was not 
enough by itself. It was only the displaced victims that received so much attention from churches, with 
little done for other kind of victims like those who experienced sexual abuse, were physically assaulted 
or psychologically tormented and whose dignity also needed restoration and affirmation. Nyerere 
(1973:113) argued that “human dignity cannot be given to a man by the kindness of others. Indeed it 
can be destroyed by kindness which emanates from an action of charity. For human dignity involves 
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equality and freedom and relations of mutual respect among men.” Building on Nyerere’s thoughts, the 
victims of the violence needed to recover the dignity that had been taken away from them through acts 
of violence and if the churches had understood that, they would have vigorously worked beyond merely 
offering relief to displaced persons.  
 
6.5.2 Churches against victims 
The actions of the churches in Kenya during the violence can lead us to characterize them either as 
“churches of oppressors” or “churches for the oppressors.” They can be seen as churches of oppressors 
because they were part of the problem, through participation and involvement in the violence. Some 
Church leaders aided and abetted violence through incitement to hatred, using their pulpits to preach 
hatred and division against particular ethnic communities, in total disregard to the sanctity of the pulpit 
and biblical teachings:  
Kenyans had previously counted on the Church as one institution that stood for the rights of 
Kenyans particularly during the Moi era where the likes of the late Bishop Muge, the late Bishop 
Okullu and Bishop Gitari together with other leaders gallantly led Kenyans to require 
accountability from the political leadership. It was therefore shocking and disillusioning to 
Kenyans that instead of expected unity of voice some churches and church leaders preached 
hatred against other communities in total disregard to biblical teaching (KNCHR 2008: 31).  
  
Some pastors were accused of being key organizers of violence (cf. KNCHR 2008:117), while most of the 
Church leaders provided incitement through divisive messages (cf. KNCHR 2008:31, 130, 196). For 
instance, one of the pastors in Limuru urged: “The Kikuyu should be armed the way I am armed with a 
Bible” (KNCHR 2008:130).  
The churches can be seen as the church for the oppressors through their partisan and non-
neutral involvement with divisive politics, a reality that robbed the churches of their authority to offer 
leadership and mediation in the violence (Cf.KNCHR 2008:23, 31, 95). Churches were clearly identified 
with particular ethnic political divisions, hence: “It became increasingly predictable which church/church 
leader would support which political stand depending on which politician was advancing it and 
invariably the underlying reason was ethnic loyalty” (KNCHR 2008:31).  
The churches can also be seen as the church for the oppressors through their identification with 
the key suspects of the violence indicted by the ICC. Two of the suspects, the current president and his 
deputy, organized countrywide prayers cum political rallies, with spiritual leaders offering special 
prayers for them. These prayer meetings raised concerns and the conduct of the Church leaders was 
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questioned, especially because they had never organized any prayers for the victims of the violence. For 
instance, a cabinet minister asked: “I see preachers in rallies praying for the accused, but who will speak 
for the voiceless? Don’t the victims deserve prayers, too? We must not forget the victims of the post-
election violence” (Gekara 2012). There is biblical evidence that God stands with the poor and the 
oppressed, which is the central affirmation of liberation theologies. Darrin Belousek (2013:465) notes: 
“The poor receive God’s help, not because they deserve it, but because they need it. Indeed God’s acts 
preferentially in favour of the poor and needy.” The mission of the Church is to participate in the 
mission of God in the world, which means the Church should stand where God stands25 and because he 
stands with the poor and the oppressed, standing with the poor and the oppressed should be a critical 
and urgent mission of the Church. When the Church identifies with the oppressor and the strong at the 
expense of the oppressed and the weak, it ceases to participate in God’s mission among the oppressed 
and the weak.  
 
6.5 DISCERNMENT FOR ACTION: CHURCHES’ ACTIONS IN VIOLENCE 
To help in naming the practical actions of the churches in Kenya in regard to the violence, three 
convictions can be identified as the motivations from which they acted. Firstly, there was pastoral 
conviction which was the most urgent response by the churches because it addressed the most urgent 
needs. The immediate humanitarian response through rescue, relief and sheltering of victims at the 
height and in the aftermath of the post-election violence was the churches’ most noticeable 
constructive contribution and participation in the whole event of the violence (Cf. KNCHR 2008:96, 110, 
117, 122, 141). Many churches hosted internally displaced persons and regularly contributed relief 
assistance to such people who were hosted in churches, police stations and social halls. Most churches 
have social responsibility committees through which relief was given. The Catholic Church and NCCK as 
institutions have CJPC and DJP respectively, as the arms through which humanitarian help is given. The 
ACK as an institution has a Development Department which is involved in the physical, intellectual, 
environmental, social and economic life of the poor, the marginalized and all other vulnerable members 
of society (ACK, Provincial Departments, 2009). The PCEA as an institution has its Board for Social 
Responsibility “to promote and develop the project of the whole Church development of the Church 
                                                          
25 This expression comes from Article 4 of the Belhar Confession of the Uniting Reformed Church in Southern Africa 
(cf. Cloete and Smit 1984). 
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oriented organizations, as well as catering for all problems of social nature that affect human beings, 
both inside as well as outside the Church” (PCEA, Board for Social Responsibility Department, C) 
Secondly, there is the conviction of peacemaking, which was the logical thing to do after the 
initial humanitarian response. For instance, there were peace meetings organized by NCCK, which held a 
total of thirty eight interdenominational peace meetings around the country, aimed at reducing tension 
and diffusing the violence (NCCK 2011). NCCK also established local community networks in areas most 
affected by the violence, whose role was to bring about social transformation and to establish 
approaches geared at the promotion of peaceful co-existence at community level. Some of those 
approaches included building the capacities of church personnel in the selected areas through training, 
which was meant to contribute towards a common understanding of conflict management and peace 
building (NCCK 2013b). NCCK has also a peace project called South-Rift Reconciliation Programme which 
aims to help conflicting communities dialogue with one another towards peaceful coexistence (NCCK 
2011). The Catholic Church also took a similar peacemaking and reconciliation approach. Most notably is 
the project of the Catholic Diocese of Eldoret, arguably the area most affected by the violence. The 
programme involved rescue and protection of victims, relief support through provision of basic needs 
and inter-ethnic peace and reconciliation meetings (Korir 2009:1-6).  
Thirdly, there is co-operation and partnership, where the NCCK and the Catholic Church joined 
with other religious players in the framework of the Inter-Religious Forum (IRF) in order to have a joint 
ecumenical commitment which would form a formidable and concerted force to counteract he 
ineffectual statements by religious leaders in the country, perhaps because the religious leaders had lost 
their credibility and moral authority to carry out such a task. The IRF also carried out a research project 
into the violence which produced the report mentioned in chapter one.  
 
6.6 REFLEXIVITY: DO THE CHURCHES LEARN FROM THEIR EXPERIENCES?  
The churches in Kenya have often been criticized for taking partisan positions. At the height of the 
violence, for the reason of partisanship and involvement, it was not possible for the Church to either 
interrupt the violence or help bring together the antagonizing parties. Perhaps the initial intervention 
attempts by Tutu from South Africa can attest to this fact. However, after the post-election violence of 
2007/8, the churches openly admitted failure and complacency in the face of the violence. The NCCK 
organized a national pastors’ conference to take stock of the event. Many pastors gave testimonies 
about their activities during the crisis, including blessing warriors to engage in violence, while others 
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admitted having invited politicians to their churches where they used the pulpit to disseminate hate 
messages that incited people against members of other communities (Macharia 2008). In a paid up 
national newspaper statement the NCCK said:  
We own up to taking partisan positions on national issues, elevating our ethnic identities above 
our Christian identity, direct involvement in party politics and participating in post-election 
violence which were made more ominous by the deteriorating national values, sinful political 
strategies and failure to faithfully stand for biblical values and principles..We ask God to forgive 
us and to renew and empower our witness to His grace (Macharia 2008). 
The NCCK also resolved that churches should always play a pro-active and non-partisan role and said it 
was in the process of rebuilding its image and restoring confidence amongst the faithful as the country 
embarked on the road to national healing and reconciliation (Macharia 2008). Like the NCCK, the 
Catholic Church stated: "This time round the entire leadership of the catholic church shall remain non-
partisan in the forthcoming general elections because as a church we are interested in the unity of all 
Kenyans. We shall hold the Kenya's fabric together by our advisory role" (All Africa 2013). However, the 
NCCK has been adamant on some issues. Just before the elections of 2013, some Church leaders 
participated in some ethnically based gatherings dubbed GEMA and KAMATUSA26 meetings, which were 
perceived as propagating exclusive ethnic politics. In the light of the political agenda of these groupings, 
there was a public outcry against those Church leaders. The NCCK came out justifying the participation 
of the Church leaders: “We consider their presence there as an opportunity to ensure that what is 
discussed in these forums reflect the tenets of peace, love for each other and unity of our nation” (Leftie 
2012). The NCCK’s position differed sharply from the stand taken by the Anglican and Catholic churches, 
which condemned the revival of GEMA and KAMATUSA groupings (Leftie 2012).  
Perhaps due to the backlash the churches received after the 2007/8 post-election violence, they 
were keen and vigilant regarding their role before the elections of 2013, by engaging in different peace 
initiatives. The NCCK, for instance, held football tournaments because they saw them as “an appropriate 
moment to share peace messages and sign peace petitions in the lead up to the General Elections in 
March 2013” (NCCK 2013c). The NCCK also had a peace caravan designed to reach the public with peace 
messages before the elections (NCCK 2013d). NCCK also embarked on a series of intra- and inter-ethnic 
                                                          
26 GEMA is an acronym of Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association, which brings together three ethnic communities, 
Gikuyu, Embu and Meru that are closely connected. KAMATUSA is an acronym for Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and 
Samburu Association, a group that brings together four other ethnic communities The GEMA meeting endorsed 
the then deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta’s presidential bid. KAMATUSA endorsed the then Eldoret North 
Member of Parliament William Ruto’s presidential bid and resolved to mobilize the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and 
Samburu communities towards this. Kenyatta and Ruto were later elected as president and deputy president 
respectively.  
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community dialogue forums because they believed that, “by creating a series of interactions between 
conflicting communities, barriers will be broken, hostilities neutralized, past grievances resolved, trust 
fostered, resilience enhanced, and social bridges built” (NCCK 2013e). The Catholic Church used Lenten 
Campaigns to sensitize Christians on issues of peace and reconciliation and how they relate to the social 
teachings of the church (CJPC 2013:5-8). The PCEA and ACK warned politicians to stop inciting people 
and to preach peace (cf. Gakio 2012; Nation 2012b). Churches also joined together to help Kenyans to 
elect good leaders. This was done through civic education and also through organizing forums with 
presidential aspirants to secure their commitment to conduct peaceful campaigns and also prevail upon 
their supporters to uphold civility during the elections. This initiative ended with a Church-organized 
presidential debate aired on national television (Nation 2013d). However, most of these actions of the 
churches around this period can be said to be public relations initiatives and image redeeming actions 
hence there is a need for empirical research to determine whether these initiatives had any meaningful 
peacemaking and reconciling impact during that period.  
Perhaps the most outstanding peace and reconciliation effort was embodied by the efforts of 
the Christian community (henceforth referred to as the Kiambaa community) in the neighbourhood of 
the Assemblies of God Church that was razed with scores of people inside it during the 2007-8 violence. 
The initiative started with reconstructing the Church structure, where area residents drawn from the 
antagonizing communities worked in shifts to build the church. After the reconstruction, the church was 
renamed Kiambaa Unity and Reconciliation Church. The Kiambaa community also established annual 
forums that see members of the Church visit their neighbours to share peace messages (Nation, 2012c). 
These actions by the Kiambaa community have enhanced community cohesiveness and unity and it 
serves as an ideal example of a genuine commitment to peacemaking and reconciliation.  
 
6.7 Conclusion 
The complex nature of the history of political violence in Kenya calls for an integrated approach which 
seeks long lasting solutions that will build social cohesiveness and reconciliation in Kenya. The politicians 
have played prominent roles in instigating violence and as such there should be mechanisms to interrupt 
the factors that give them the space to play that negative role. The buck should certainly not stop with 
politicians and the people should be empowered to critically interrogate demagogic rhetoric and 
appeals made by politicians. There should also be an interruption of the outrageous wage bill which has 
adversely shaped politics in Kenya, which is totally inconsistent with the economic strength of the 
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country. The youth have been continually used as instruments of violence, a reality that is closely 
connected with economic factors affecting the youth. As a result, there should be concerted efforts and 
programmes whose focus and goal are to help the youth to be instruments of peacemaking and 
reconciliation. The youth also need to be empowered not to play into the hands of politicians; substitute 
approaches should be established to engage the youth to creatively handle idleness and unemployment. 
The churches should also embark on meaningful programmes of peacemaking and reconciliation, not as 
public relations initiatives or image redeeming actions but as actions based on a genuine commitment to 
the mission of God in Kenya. The following chapter discusses models of reconciliation based on the 
discussion of the foregoing chapters. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
MODELS OF RECONCILIATION IN KENYA 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of this present study is to develop models of reconciliation for the churches in Kenya 
in response to the 2007/8 post-election violence. God is actively concerned and working in Kenya and he 
is calling the churches in Kenya to rediscover their missional mandate in the socio-political arena. This 
chapter focuses on reconciliation as the missional mandate of churches in Kenya and on how this 
reconciliation can be imagined. Reconciliation as a theoretical framework is discussed, followed by 
reflections on models of reconciliation that are compatible with the issues raised throughout this study. 
This reflection is conscious of the cause-effect relationship between the interconnectedness of politics, 
ethnicity, human rights and violence. Consequently a cause-effect result is imagined through these 
models. 
 
7.2 RECONCILIATION AS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Reconciliation is the ultimate goal of any peace process in contexts of conflict and violence. Schreiter 
(2005:75) observes that due to important developments in societies around the world, a new paradigm 
of mission has been emerging that has its organizing principle in the understanding of mission as a 
model of and for reconciliation and healing. Bevans and Schroeder (2011:348, 389) whose 
understanding of reconciliation is largely shaped by Schreiter, sees mission as prophetic dialogue, with 
reconciliation understood as an integral part of this dialogue.  
Reconciliation mainly means transformation and restoration of lost and hurting relationships. 
Appleby (2008:8) argues that Jesus doesn’t merely renew the original relationship but transforms it. He 
particularly points at the vitality of the prefix "re" in reconciliation which denotes that this is not an 
exceptional relationship; there was a relationship before but it has been ruptured. Kirsteen Kim 
(2005:xvii, xviii, xix) observes that in the New Testament reconciliation is propagated as a relationship 
we have with God as a result of Jesus Christ and that opens the door for the church to participate in 
God’s mission in the world in the ministry of reconciliation (2 Corinthians 5:18-20), hence making the 
Church a reconciled and reconciling community. Bevans and Schroeder comment on this: “The 
possibility of reconciliation is one way, if not the most compelling way, of expressing the meaning of the 
gospel today. In the midst of unspeakable violence, unbearable pain and indelible scars on people’s 
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memory, the Church as God’s minister of reconciliation proclaims that in Christ and in his community, 
healing is possible” (Bevans and Schroeder 2011:390-391).  
Schreiter (2005:79-80) understands reconciliation from the relational dimension of missio Dei. 
He notes that much of the previous theological discourses have been addressed through the classical 
vertical understanding of reconciliation between God and sinful humanity and he points to a horizontal 
dimension of reconciliation between human beings as individuals and societies and between human 
beings and the earth. However, he notes that the horizontal understanding of reconciliation is grounded 
in the vertical understanding of God’s saving work and hence the mission of reconciliation is based in 
the missio Dei. Based on Schreiter’s arguments, inter-personal and societal reconciliation is realized on 
the basis of restored relationship between God and humanity through Jesus Christ. For Bosch 
(1991:514), reconciliation is connected to the cross: 
The cross also stands for reconciliation between estranged individuals and groups, between the 
oppressor and the oppressed. Reconciliation does not, of course, mean a mere sentimental 
harmonizing of conflicting groups. It demands sacrifice, in very different but also in very real 
ways, from both oppressor and oppressed. It demands the end to oppression and injustice and 
commitment to a new life of mutuality, justice and peace.  
Following from the above arguments, the reconciliation we receive from God is not in the words of 
Bonhoeffer (1959:43) “cheap grace.” It is sacrificial and cannot be realized without us acknowledging 
and repenting from our alienation on account of our sins. In the same way, we cannot be reconciled 
with each other unless the conditions of truth and justice are upheld. Other churches in Africa, as 
reconciling communities, have – within such a framework of reconciliation – played critical roles in their 
respective countries. Most notably is the role the churches played in South Africa through the TRC and 
also the role played by churches in Rwanda after the genocide through the gacaca courts: a praxis of 
peace, justice and reconciliation informed by African religion and culture.27 
The churches in Kenya need to be missiologically conscious of God’s call to them to be actively 
involved in the ministry of reconciliation according to their God-given authority and mandate. The 
subsequent sections discuss a reconciliation imagined in this study as model of reflexivity, healing, 
prophetic interruption and empowerment.  
                                                          
27 For more information about gacaca courts, see Morgan (2004) and Nsanzimana (2012).  
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7.3 MODEL OF REFLEXIVITY 
A model of reflexivity is based on the rationale of self evaluation and criticism. It is inspired by Matthew 
7:5: “First take the plank out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to remove the speck from 
your brother’s eye.” It is a call to the churches in Kenya to first deal with issues that hinder their 
effective participation in the mission of God. It is on such conviction that Martin Luther King Jr. exhorted 
the black protestors not to engage in the same things they were fighting against: “Darkness cannot drive 
out darkness; only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate; only love can do that” (in Mieder 
2010:71). It is also the consciousness that informed Desmond Tutu (2007:48) when he exhorted those 
fighting apartheid: “We must not allow ourselves to become like the system we oppose. We cannot 
afford to use methods of which we will be ashamed…”  
 A model of reflexivity also calls the churches to critical evaluation and regular stock taking on the 
efficacy of their approaches and practice. Reflexivity should be understood as a kind of spirituality that 
should be at the heart of the mission of the churches. Based on this rationale, this section reflects on 
particular areas of reflexivity that the churches in Kenya must focus on in order to witness to the 
kingdom of God and be agents of reconciliation in Kenya. Two areas are thus discussed: Influence of 
Christianity in the socio-political sphere and de-ethnization of churches.  
 
7.3.1 Influence of Christianity in the socio-political sphere 
Christianity has indeed grown in Kenya, with statistics indicating that about 85% of Kenyans are 
Christians (KNBS 2009), most of whom regularly attend church services. However, this kind of 
Christianity, in Emmanuel Katongole’s words, is a “Christianity without consequence” (Katongole & 
Hartgrove 2009:49), especially when looked at through the event of the 2007/8 post-election violence, 
where the gospel’s values of peace, love and unity were recklessly abandoned. Critical questions emerge 
from this reality, which churches in Kenya must ask if Christianity is to make a significant contribution in 
the socio-political arena. How can a country with such a huge number of Christians, who are supposed 
to be agents of God’s love, peace and justice be a host of social injustice, inequality and violence? How is 
it that Christianity has not significantly affected the socio-political complexities and realities of Kenya?  
 In an attempt to answer these questions, some scholars have approached the issue using African 
theological discourses where Christianity is discussed vis-à-vis African religion (cf Uzukwu 1982; Magesa 
1997; Galgalo 2012). Others, like Julius Nyerere (1973:111), approach the issue from a neo-Marxist 
angle: “Until men are in a position to make effective choices, they will become Christians in anything but 
name. Their membership of the church will be simply another method by which they seek to escape 
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from a consciousness of their misery. If you like religion becomes a kind of opium of the people.” It 
requires empirical research to establish why Christianity does not influence the consciousness and 
actions of many Christians in Kenya in relation to socio-political complexities and realities. 
 The influence of Christianity in the socio-political sphere should be one of the primary areas of 
reflexivity for the churches in Kenya, which is also a primary step towards reconciliation because it will 
give the churches an opportunity to listen to God more and subsequently discern the ways in which he is 
calling them to participate in his mission in Kenya. The churches in Kenya require urgent and critical 
reflection on what should be their relationship to party politics. The churches have been seen by many 
Kenyans as partisan and as instruments of particular political divides.  
However, the question that emerges is whether the church can avoid being partisan. One of the 
ways to answer this question is by drawing a distinction between the church as an institution and the 
church as an organism. The Church as an institution (see Costas 1974:35, Gudel 1985: 66, Hanson 
2000:164) is also referred to as an organization by some scholars (See Hegstand 2013: 127, Dusing 1994: 
546, Richard & Hoeldtke 1980: 30). According to Richard Scott (2008:49), institutions are “multifaceted, 
durable social structures, made up of social elements, social activities, and material resources.”As such, 
the diversities represented by the church leaves no room for partisanship and bias. The role of the 
Church as an institution in the context of politics is better captured by the words of Jim Harris,  
The church's role in politics is to be there visibly in the context of political policy formulation. The 
church has to be prophetic, speaking for God. The church has to herald the ethical values that 
enrich a nation. The church has to be bold and forthright, constructive and innovative. The 
church has to be "salt and light" in what is so often a corrupt environment, to bring light and 
health (Harris 1999:12). 
 
As such, when the Church rightfully plays its prophetic role it does stand on the side of God and it 
cannot be identified with any partisan political position. The Church as an organism connotes life, 
interdependence and contribution of each member of the Church (See Whitesel 2011:26, Burdette 
2006:346). As individuals are nurtured in the church, they tend to affirm beliefs and values that are 
reflected in their views and activities related to political, economic and cultural issues” (Hanson 2000: 
164). In conclusion, this means that Individual members of the Church can be actively involved in politics 
but the Church as an institution cannot.   
 There are various ways in which the churches have related with politicians that require 
interruption because they continually affect the churches’ prophetic witness in Kenya. As indicated in 
earlier chapters, the churches have continually showed preferential treatment to certain politicians, 
with churches offering special prayers for some of them. Politicians are also occasionally given the pulpit 
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to propagate their political interests, a trend that is now very common (Nation 2012a). Some churches 
have also been inviting politicians to preside over official Church events. For instance, it is now a 
common trend in the PCEA to invite sitting presidents to officially open the church’s General Assembly. 
While this is not a problem in itself, it does rob the church of the freedom and authority to prophetically 
engage the government. The government also appoints some church leaders to tasks for which they are 
remunerated. For example, the current archbishop of ACK is the chairman of the National Anti-
Corruption Campaign Steering Committee (Mureithi 2011). While there is nothing basically wrong with 
the churches engaging politics in the mentioned ways, the problem is the effect that this has on the 
mandate of the churches in the country. The churches are seen as partisan and it therefore becomes 
difficult for them to fulfil their prophetic and reconciliation mandates in the country. This engagement 
shows some submissiveness on the side of the churches, which is seen as respect which consequently 
leads to subordination of Church to politics. The Church has only one Lord to whom it should submit 
itself – the Lord Jesus – and should not serve the selfish interests of politicians at the expense of the 
masses. 
 Politicians should attend Church services like all other Church members and they should not be 
given any preferential treatment. The sanctity of the pulpit should be respected and restored with only 
Church leaders addressing matters of political nature prophetically and with liberational and 
empowerment intent. Church leaders should reject government positions that can easily mute their 
prophetic voice. This does not mean that the churches should not work in partnership with the 
government for the common good, but churches should do this with careful attention to their freedom 
and at a safe distance. The churches should also evaluate the efficacy of their means of engagement 
with politicians. The churches are used to numerous press statements, which have become the default 
means through which they make appeals and calls to the government and politicians. A general 
assessment of the effectiveness of this approach seems to suggest that it does not have a meaningful 
influence in the political space. However, to make a proper assessment of the impact of this approach 
there is need for careful empirical research. The churches should go beyond press conferences and 
engage in meaningful activism and protest that can push the government to action. An example of doing 
this is through legal redress to push for political action. By implementing such approaches, the churches 
will regain their prophetic voice that got lost through complacency and partisanship. They will also 
regain the moral authority to question political decisions and policies that compromise the common 
good.  
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7.3.2 The de-ethnization of Kenyan Churches 
Another area of reflexivity is the relationship between ethnicity and churches. In order to be agents of 
reconciliation in Kenya, the churches must deliberately and critically look into areas where they have 
promoted negative ethnicity and other modes of discrimination. It is such a reflexive approach that led 
the Symposium of Episcopal Conferences of Africa and Madagascar (SECAM 2000) to state:  
We on our part, recognize the need to do more to make our local Churches the best example of 
justice leading to peace. Traces of ethnocentricity sometimes are found at all levels of the 
Church’s administration including Episcopal Conferences. This destroys our credibility….We are 
determined to avoid and combat discrimination and favouritism in the Church. We shall do our 
best to bear witness to justice and peace in the Churches’ structures…  
The churches in Kenya must come to such recognition and to point at areas where negative ethnicity 
and other forms of discrimination are exhibited. Of primary concern is the de-ethnicization of churches 
in Kenya. Based on the discussion of ethnicized churches in chapter four, there is an urgent need for 
deliberate and strategic ways of de-ethnicizing the churches in Kenya, which calls for total 
transformation so that the churches can be a model of the kingdom of God in Kenya. The starting point 
is when these churches sincerely reflect for themselves on the areas where negative ethnicity is evident 
in their lives and seek ways through which they can transform and redeem their image. However, there 
are some general recommendations that can be made to help churches on the journey of de-
ethnization.  
 The churches should display a national outlook in their liturgy, staff and administration. The 
churches need to have clergy that represent ethnic diversity in Kenya and there should be realignment 
in postings, so that clergy are deployed to areas beyond their ethnic regions; by doing this the churches 
will enhance integration and they will become signs of unity in diversity. While there is nothing wrong 
with mono-ethnic churches, it is difficult for these churches to participate in the mission of reconciliation 
as such until the political tag on these churches is removed. This is because, as it is now in Kenya, the 
mono-ethnic tag of a church implies a particular political tag, hence the churches should work to remove 
any political tag that directly implies partisanship by redefining their relationship with politics, an issue 
discussed in the following sub-section.  
 Churches should also engage in deliberate actions and approaches that are geared towards 
diminishing ethnic overtones in their liturgy and other practices. The liturgical experience should be 
inclusive which can only be enhanced through language and participation. Many churches in 
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cosmopolitan contexts have a series of services each Sunday which include vernacular services28 which 
by themselves are not a bad thing. It is unfortunate that in multi-cultural settings, there are 
denominations which use vernacular languages to worship, which by itself technically exclude members 
of other ethnic communities. These services do not compliment efforts towards diversity hence there is 
a need to include different languages in worship. Homogeneous denominations should have deliberate 
programmes whose main goal is to remove the mono-ethnic tag. Such programmes include outreaches 
to members of other ethnic communities, which entail having clergy from these communities and 
establishing churches in the midst of these communities. The churches should also reform their 
administrative procedures, so that ethnic considerations in appointments and elections do not take 
precedence over merit and suitability 
 The establishment of such approaches calls for boldness to reflect upon and interrupt the status 
quo through radical ecclesiastical reforms. The churches should declare their intention to de-ethnicize 
their congregations and administration. This will give the Kenyan public a ground to trust the churches 
and will also make audible the churches’ prophetic voice against ethnic divisiveness. Certainly, there are 
challenges and tensions that are bound to emerge from such approaches but it is through creatively 
handling them that the churches can begin to participate in the mission of reconciliation. Consequently, 
ethnic barriers and exclusive tendencies are interrogated and confronted so that integration is 
enhanced; then the churches can become a sign pointing to the kingdom of God and instruments of 
reconciliation in the country.  
 
7.4 MODEL OF HEALING 
The model of healing is based on the rationale of bringing people and communities back to good health 
and stability. The 2007/8 post-election violence left wounds both in the minds of the victims and in the 
collective memory of Kenyans that need to be healed so that reconciliation can be fostered. The 
reconciliation imagined through this model of healing is the one proposed by Robert Schreiter (2005:80), 
which makes both victim and wrongdoer a new creation because healing in reconciliation is not a return 
to status quo, but something that takes all parties involved to a new place, often a place that they could 
not have imagined. Flowing from Schreiter’s opinion, it is the work of the churches in Kenya to help in 
imagining this new place through the ministry of reconciliation as envisioned through a three pillar 
                                                          
28 Vernacular services are services conducted using local dialects or what can be referred to as “mother tongue 
services”. 
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model of healing composed of truth, justice and forgiveness29, elements that are prerequisites for 
reconciliation. 
7.4.1 Truth 
The understanding of truth discussed in this section, is the truth encompassed in the findings of 
legitimate commissions of inquiry like KNCHR and TJRC, who through empirical research and public 
hearings have gathered facts surrounding injustices and violence in Kenya30. In this sub-section, 
preference is however given to TJRC because of its comprehensive scope in investigating past injustices 
and violence.  
After conflicting parties sit to reason together, it is truth that should inspire and guide this 
reasoning. Perhaps this is the reason why the slogan of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
South Africa was, “Truth, the road to reconciliation” (De Gruchy 2002:154). It is on the platform of 
truthfulness that conflicting parties begin to ask genuine and honest questions that seek to bring into 
the fore the underlying causes of the conflict. Using soteriological terms, it is only when sinners 
acknowledge their sinfulness that atonement becomes possible. In situations of conflict, the offender 
comes to terms with his offences and acknowledges his guilt. Schreiter (2005:82) states that the 
“concepts of truth-telling and the pursuit of justice are reorganized not just to address wrongdoing and 
justice in general, but as ways of allowing truth and justice to heal the memories of the past and work 
toward a different kind of future”. It is on the platform of truthfulness that efforts towards justice are 
guided and consequently reconciliation is realized. For example, the nationwide hearings commissioned 
by the “Truth, Justice and Reconciliation” commissions in South Africa after apartheid, in Rwanda after 
the genocide, and in Kenya after the 2007/8 post-election violence were all based on the truth of what 
exactly happened in these countries. 
However, there are people who have pointed to the relativity of truth as a challenge in the 
process of reconciliation, especially when that truth is contested. James Gibson (2004:135), focusing on 
the truth presented by the TRC in South Africa, argues that truth can also lead to “irreconciliation.” He 
cites the example that the reawakening of dominant memories and animosities can make everyone find 
something to hate in the findings. Such fears as raised by Gibson make the process of truth telling and 
                                                          
29 Truth, justice and forgiveness were essential components of reconciliation in South Africa (TRC) and Rwanda 
after the 1994 genocide. 
30 In defining the understanding of truth as discussed in this study I have closely followed Gibson’s approach in his 
definitions of truth in his article, Overcoming apartheid: Can truth reconcile a divided nation? (Gibson 2006). 
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subsequently the process of reconciliation delicate and sensitive. While Gibson’s sentiments are to an 
extent correct, especially when truth finding is seen as a witch-hunting process, there cannot be healing 
without unearthing the painful memories through the platform of truth. However, this kind of truth 
finding should be liberating as well as healing and not a mere task of exposing wounds of animosity.  
Such a liberating and healing process have also been imagined by Wilhelm Verwoerd and 
Schreiter. Verwoerd (in Wüstenberg 2009:97-99)31 calls the search for the truth “truth based criticism” 
that has the task of exposing and healing. In exposing, he notes that facts are uncovered through 
statements of the perpetrators and investigation agencies so that victims can come to terms with their 
past and be reconciled with their own fate. In healing, the victims stop fleeing from their memories and 
the healing process begins so that they can rediscover their own dignity. In Schreiter’s words,  
When those memories are of traumatic events, we find ourselves frozen in the past as it were, 
that is, those memories keep us in an eternal present of those terrible events, and can therefore 
stop any movement forward toward a pattern of different relationships in the future. The healing 
of memories is the coming free of that being held hostage to those memories, so that new 
relationships can become possible. This does not mean forgetting or denying genuine pain has 
occurred. It typically means, rather, acknowledging the truth of what has happened, seeking 
justice to redress the wrongdoing that has occurred, and creating the social space for a different 
relationship both to the events, and to the actors in that past (Schreiter 2005:81).  
 
Building on Scheiter’s proposals, the churches in Kenya should work towards helping victims of violence 
break from the tragic memories of their past and also work for a space of justice that compliments the 
release from past memories. Traumatizing memories of the violence have been narrated through the 
TJRC, which went throughout the country to collect statements from victims of historical injustices and 
violence through public hearings, and their findings were submitted to the president for 
implementation. The TJRC has gained credibility and acceptance among many Kenyans, hence the 
numerous calls from different quarters for the implementation of its findings. Fears have been already 
raised among many Kenyans that this report will not be acted upon, based on the treatment of previous 
reports of inquiry. Based on the findings of the already mentioned research carried out by AfriCOG and 
putting into mind that some powerful politicians in the current government are adversely mentioned in 
the report, there is a high possibility that the TJRC report may not be fully implemented. Unlike in South 
Africa, the TJRC in Kenya was not spearheaded by religious leaders, but the churches in Kenya have a 
                                                          
31 This is taken from unpublished paper presented by Verwoerd at the Fifth International Conference on Ethics and 
Development in Madras 1997 titled: “Justice after apartheid? Reflections on the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.”  
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moral and theological mandate to appeal to the government, including the use of legal mechanisms, to 
implement the recommendations made in the report for meaningful healing to take place in Kenya. 
However, this task may be beyond the capacity of churches alone and therefore they should work with 
other non-political players whose goal is to see the implementation of the findings of TJRC32. The goal of 
all this is that the culture of impunity will be checked so that justice can be seen to be done, in order to 
hasten the healing process and give hope for a secure future. 
7.4.2 Justice 
Truth should lead to justice and justice should be based on this truth. There is a close connection 
between justice and peace, as Nyerere (1973:110) submits: “Injustice and peace are in the long run 
incompatible; stability in a changing world must mean ordered change towards justice.” According to 
Schreiter (2005:80), reconciliation is God restoring the humanity of the victim that was taken away by 
oppression, poverty, disease and wrongdoing and therefore social reconciliation is to be understood as 
reconstruction in justice of a broken society, so that wrongdoing will not take place again.  
The churches in Kenya can work for justice in two ways: Firstly, they should work for justice in 
regard to the 2007/8 post-election violence. The most distinctive feature of justice imagined in this 
model is restorative justice, which – as Appleby (2008:10) argues – is not only concerned with the unjust 
but the just as well. In Wüstenberg’s words, “the victim rediscovers their dignity and the offender re-
enters into society” (Wüstenberg 2008:114). The nature of justice envisioned here is the one proposed 
by Wüstenberg (2008:184), which has two categories. The first category is reparation with regard to 
acknowledgement of suffering for victims and punishment for the offender. The second category is re-
establishment of justice for both the offender and the victim. Flowing from Wüstenberg’s approach, 
justice is when the offenders takes full responsibility for their offences and face the legal consequences 
thereof. Justice also involves restitution, where the offenders give back what they took from the victims, 
where applicable. There is already a criminal proceeding going on in the ICC against three Kenyans which 
is marred with doubt and uncertainty, especially among Kenyans, hence it may not be seen to be serve 
justice for the victims. The churches in Kenya should have a campaign meant to condemn impunity and 
call for the persecution of the perpetrators of the 2007/8 violence, especially the main actors, organizers 
and financiers.  
                                                          
32 The recommendations given by TJRC can be seen at: 
http://www.tjrckenya.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=573&Itemid=238 
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The other dimension of justice involves the many social injustices in Kenya that have continued 
to condemn many people to imposed poverty and indignity. Consequently, the gap between the poor 
and rich is widening through oppressive structures and exploitation, while levels of inequality and 
inequity are on the increase. Many people are treated without dignity and this is the reason why 
politicians use the youth as instruments of violence; the masses are manipulated to unquestionably 
follow politicians, hence robbing them of the dignity of freedom to political decisions. The churches 
have a mandate of leading the people in constructive nonviolent protest against these oppressive 
structures, as imagined by Nyerere (1973:115): 
At a given and decisive point in history men decide to act against those conditions which restrict 
their freedom as men. I am suggesting that unless we participate actively in the rebellion against 
those social structures and economic organizations which condemn men to poverty, humiliation 
and degradation, then the church will become irrelevant to man …Everything which prevents a 
man from living in dignity and decency must therefore come under attack from the church and 
its workers. For there is nothing saintly in imposed poverty, and although saints may be found in 
slums, we cannot preserve slums in order to make them breeding grounds for saints.  
Nyerere (1973:114) further notes that the churches must express God's love for humanity by 
involvement and leadership in this constructive protest and must become a force for social justice, 
working with other forces of social justice. The churches in Kenya should play a leading role in this 
protest, which should not be selective or convenient but should be done in season and out of season. It 
requires consistency, faithfulness and boldness and it is through the participation and involvement of 
the churches in this protest that the churches will identify with the problems and the challenges of 
Kenyans and thereby regain their moral authority and prophetic voice. 
 
7.4.3 Forgiveness 
There is a close nexus between healing, justice and forgiveness. There can be no healing without 
forgiveness and there cannot be forgiveness without justice. As there is no reparation that can 
compensate for death, physical and sexual offences. Justice helps the victims of these atrocities to 
overcome pain and anguish through the healing of their memories, facilitated by forgiveness. John De 
Gruchy (2002:50) argues that without forgiveness there is no real way to move into a new future, for it 
liberates the guilty and enables them to start again, for it is forgiveness that makes reconciliation 
possible, words captured better in the title of Tutu’s book, No future without forgiveness (Tutu 1999). 
Forgiveness only happens when the victim starts to heal, which is a process and according to 
Schreiter (2005:80) it is started by God, because he looks out for the victims and the marginalized and 
this process does not exonerate the wrongdoer but rather recognizes that sometimes wrongdoers do 
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not repent and as such a social space has to be opened up in order for repentance to happen and it is 
sometimes the action of the victim that creates that space. Hence, Schreiter (1998:66, 67, 102) rightly 
argues that the forgiveness he proposes is not the one of “forgive and forget”, which trivializes the 
painful events of the victim by urging them to forget their victimization, but the one that remembers in 
a healing way. De Gruchy (2002:172) also argues that forgiveness should not rule out anger or 
punishment because if the perpetrators are not punished, the rule of law is undermined.  
Building on Schreiter’s argument, the churches in Kenya, due to their vantage point, should 
work for the kind of forgiveness that brings about healing, that uncovers the wounds caused by conflict; 
not to cause more pain but to heal the wounds, however painful that may be. General calls have been 
made for the victims of the violence to accept what happened, forgive their offenders and move on. But 
how can they forgive offenders who are not remorseful and how can they move on when the 
perpetrators have not been apprehended? The consciousness that the offenders have gotten off scot 
free and that proper attention has not been given to the victims, is by itself a hurting wound which can 
only be healed when there are meaningful efforts towards apprehension of sponsors and perpetrators 
of the violence, who have been named in various reports like the TJRC and KNCHR reports; and when 
appropriate attention has been given to the victims. This is a campaign for justice and the churches in 
Kenya must faithfully understand it as part of their mission in Kenya and urgently participate in it. The 
churches should also truthfully and boldly name the areas that need forgiveness and also work for a 
conducive environment where forgiveness can take place, not just through convenient apologies but 
through restitution, punishment of offenders and efforts that work for the restoration of lost dignity of 
victims. Societal healing will only be fostered if meaningful structural adjustments and reforms are 
carried out because the best way to forgive structural offences is through structural reforms. 
In conclusion, the churches should identify and clearly name national wounds that need to be 
healed. Wounds caused by oppression and injustices must be healed with actions of freedom and 
justice. Wounds caused by hatred and rejection must be healed with actions of love and acceptance. 
The churches, being signs of the kingdom of God in Kenya, must work for healing without which their 
ministry of reconciliation is jeopardized. Churches in Kenya should understand that it is their mission to 
witness to truth, justice and forgiveness which are important in their ministry of reconciliation. 
7.5 MODEL OF PROPHETIC INTERRUPTION 
The Model of prophetic interruption is a concept borrowed from Katongole (2009:117). The rationale of 
this model is a deliberate and bold disruption of the status quo and the norms that threaten the 
 107 
 
common good, hence it is prophetic. Though Katongole uses the story of Mary who interrupted a dinner 
so that she could anoint Jesus (Matthew 26:13), the story of Phinehas (Numbers 25, Psalm 106:30-31) 
fits better for this model. When the Israelites were facing a plague because of their waywardness, a 
young Israelite brought a Midianite woman into the camp and Phinehas boldly confronted the two, 
which saw the end of the plague. Phinehas’ interruption is an example of prophetic interruption that 
stops destruction and saves the whole nation.  
There are various areas that the churches in Kenya need to prophetically interrupt for the sake 
of the country which include interruption of negative stories, interruption of ethnic dominance and 
interruption of the political wage bill. These interruptions require boldness, strategy and partnership. 
The churches cannot accomplish the interruption task without working with other players whose work is 
geared towards the common good in Kenya.  
 
7.5.1 Interruption of stories of negative ethnicity 
There are stories that are told and continually passed on from generation to generation, which continue 
to shape and form Kenyans in different ways. One of the areas that is shaped by these stories is identity. 
Katongole (2011:2) argues that,  
Who we are, and what we are capable of becoming depends very much on the stories 
we tell, the stories we listen to, and the stories we live. Stories not only shape our 
values, aims, and goals; they define the range of what is desirable and what is 
possible…stories are part of our ecology. They are embedded in us and form the very 
heart of our cultural, economic, religious, and political worlds. 
  
The 2007/8 post-election violence was so much about stories which informed opinions and actions of 
the offenders. The stories are full of hate and resentment and are punctuated with stereotypes, lies and 
demeaning language, as mentioned in chapter four. More so, the stories continue to advance the rift 
between different ethnic communities. Most notably, the stories of ethnicity and their relation with 
politics continue to dominate the communal imagination of Kenyans and as such they have been 
perceived as normal and acceptable. The problem lies not only in the stories themselves but also in the 
tellers of these stories. Parents as opinion shapers tell these stories to their children, who grow up with 
a distorted imagination of other people. There are also politicians who, because of the over-prominence 
given to them by Kenyans, tell stories that shape ethnic and political imagination in negative ways.  
It seems, with evidence of the nature of ethnicized politics in Kenya, that most Kenyans 
uncritically read stories from ethnic and political scripts developed by politicians which leads to a kind of 
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intellectual and political bondage, where there is no room for independent political and ethnic thinking. 
For example, a political enemy of a leading politician from a particular ethnic community becomes –
together with his or her community – the enemy of that community. These stories are very powerful, 
and have significantly shaped the imagination of Kenyans.  
Kenya is in need of storytellers who are able “to offer people better stories than the ones they 
live by” (Katongole 2011:61) and the churches have this capacity. The churches, because of their biblical 
mandate and authority, can interrupt these stories because they have a better story to tell – the story of 
love, forgiveness, unity and reconciliation embodied in the gospel story. Katongole (2011:62) notes that 
“All the realities of the Christian tradition – the scriptures, prayer, doctrine, worship, Baptism, the 
Eucharist, the sacraments – point to and enact a compelling story that should claim the whole of our 
lives.” Stories of hatred, divisiveness, resentment and prejudice can only be substituted with stories of 
love, unity, forgiveness and reconciliation. Starting with the family ministry of the churches, parents 
should be helped to re-imagine their world and consequently to pass it on to their children.  
The churches in Kenya should retell stories through new experiences which involve exploring 
new frontiers of multi-cultural experiences. The churches can establish cultural exchange programmes 
where people are exposed to the cultures of other communities and hear the stories of each other. 
Though the stories could be different from each other, there are common meeting points which each 
community can identify with. This multi-cultural exposure wears out tensions and misinformation 
received through negative stories. Another area of missional exploration is establishment of language 
centres where people are encouraged to learn vernacular languages of other communities which is an 
appropriate approach towards embracing diversity. The churches should also encourage inter-marriage 
between people of different ethnic communities. However, this has been going on but with escalation of 
ethnic tensions some Church leaders, parents and politicians have continued to discourage such 
marriages. The churches should also embark on a nationwide mission to preach and tell the story of 
love, unity, forgiveness and reconciliation which will eventually overcome stories that promote hatred, 
divisiveness, resentment and prejudice. The stories of disunity and separation have been told and 
churches should tell the stories that inspire unity among the people. Kenyans have a capacity to put 
aside their ethnic differences and unite for a common cause. For instance, sport has become a unifying 
factor, where the triumph of athletes and other sportsmen and women brings Kenyans together. It is 
interesting to note how tragedies have also in various ways brought Kenyans together; for instance 
when there was a famine in the Northern part of Kenya in 2011, corporate leaders and the Red Cross 
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initiated a nation-wide camping dubbed “Kenyans for Kenyans” through which enough money was 
raised to initiate a feeding program as well as long term programmes meant to mitigate hunger.33 Most 
recently in 2013 when terrorists attacked the country, oneness was exhibited through resilience, 
solidarity and support with all conversations on this issue punctuated with the phrase “We are one.” As 
a result, a great number of Kenyans donated blood for the victims and people raised about one hundred 
million shillings to support them. However, the challenge is that such stories of resilience and solidarity 
are often short-lived and eventually silenced by the stories of division that are still entrenched in Kenyan 
national culture. This reality calls for the churches to regularly tell better stories that resonate with the 
ambition of Kenyans to overcome things that divide them. It is the stories generated by the ministry of 
reconciliation that will gradually and eventually silence the stories of hatred and division that lead to 
conflict and violence. 
 
7.5.2 Interruption of ethnic dominance 
Ethnic dominance through politics was one of the major causes of the 2007/8 post-election violence and 
it continues to be the main cause of resentment and hatred among different ethnic communities in 
Kenya. The numerically strong communities continue to have undue advantage over the relatively small 
and underdeveloped communities, who closely link their developmental fate to this reality. Politicians 
continue to rely on the numerical strength of ethnic groups to forge political alliances based on the 
premise that one prominent politician carries with himself almost the whole of his community. This 
manipulation by politicians needs urgent interruption so that there can be a fair and level political 
playground for all. The politicians have continued to strengthen this manipulation because it is the only 
means through which they can obtain and sustain power and the churches should not help them in this 
venture by standing with them. The churches should disassociate themselves from such political 
approaches and their condemnation of this dominance should be loudly echoed. 
The ethnic dominance of particular communities is similar to the dominance of single party rule 
orchestrated by president Moi, which unduly facilitated his long stay in office. The churches as discussed 
in chapter three were in the forefront of interrupting one party rule, through the successful but risky 
struggle for constitutional reforms. The churches in Kenya can again lead the struggle against ethnic 
dominance through creative and strategic activism among the citizens and through legal frameworks 
which can help in levelling the political playing field. Such a venture can only be successful if it is done in 
                                                          
33 For more information about this initiative see 
https://www.kenyaredcross.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=379&Itemid=12  
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partnership with non-political players. The churches as a formidable social force should work to erase 
from the minds of the people the brainwashing that continually makes them prisoners of political 
manipulation and help them imagine a country where anyone on merit can ascend to political 
leadership. 
 
7.5.3 Interruption of Political Wage Bill 
Politics in Kenya has become predominantly a money issue, in two senses. Firstly, the outrageous 
remuneration of political officers in Kenya is one of the factors that make politics to be highly emotive 
and competitive, with politicians using all means at hand – like manipulation of ethnicity, voter buying 
and violence – to ascend to power because of the monetary reward it carries. Secondly and 
consequently, huge amounts of money are needed to support the means of accession to power 
indicated above, a reality that has technically locked out otherwise capable leaders who are not 
endowed with such resources. As a result, politics in Kenya has become an affair of the rich and that, in 
itself, is an act of oppressing the poor. The paradox is that the same poor people are used by these 
politicians to ascend to power through the vote and through violence, probably because of the blindness 
caused by political manipulation. It is not proper to blame victims for their victimization, hence there is a 
need for a voice that speaks for the victims and a hand that empowers them to realize that they are 
being manipulated by politicians – and to free themselves from that bondage. The churches in Kenya 
can be a source of light such as is needed to overcome the blindness mentioned above and a source of 
strength the victims need to free themselves.  
The churches in Kenya should first and foremost consistently unmask the outrageous wage bill 
of politicians as immoral and inconsistent with the economic realities of the country. They should also 
speak against it as an injustice that oppresses the majority of poor Kenyans. Secondly, the churches 
should follow constitutional provisions to interrupt the present system, so that it can reflect the 
economic reality of the country. When this is done, it will significantly change the course of politics in 
Kenya and as such minimize the possibilities of conflict and division.  
 
7.6 MODEL OF EMPOWERMENT 
The model of empowerment is based on the rationale of inspiration and motivation, equipping and 
training, mobilization and engagement inspired by the objectives of Church Empowerment 
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Incorporation.34 Though the churches in Kenya have failed in many ways, they still enjoy the trust of 
their members and a large section of the general public, which is one of the reasons why they still exist. 
The churches should effectively use this loyalty and trust to inspire and capture the aspirations of the 
members in regard to their imagination of a better country. The churches are also important centres for 
equipping and training as well as formation of a peacemaking and reconciling conscience. The pulpit 
ministry should be enhanced and contextualized so that, through the ministry of the Word, the 
members can be equipped to participate in the mission of God in their world. The pulpit is also an 
appropriate and effective place where new imaginations and new stories can be told. In addition to 
preaching, however, there is also a need for projects of youth and reconciliation, family education and 
human rights awareness, as approaches that can make the ministry of reconciliation in Kenya real and 
effective. 
 
7.6.1 Youth and Reconciliation 
In the foregoing chapters, I have identified a close relationship between youth, violence and 
unemployment in Kenya. From this correlation calls have been made for churches in Kenya to enhance 
their efforts among the youth, not only in their churches but also outside. The youth have been used as 
instruments and perpetrators of violence, so they can also be used as instruments of peacemaking and 
reconciliation. This should be done by first addressing the things that make them vulnerable to be 
manipulated into perpetrating crime and violence.  
Education is critical in the fight against poverty and vice (Cf. World Bank 1997: 14; Bhorat et al 
2001:174), hence it is a very important component of youth ministry. The fight against unemployment 
and poverty among the youth must therefore be launched on the platform of education for it to be 
successful. According to Bhorat et al (2001:174), “The role of education in reducing poverty is of 
paramount importance, because of its contribution to improving the earning potential of the poor, both 
in competition for jobs and earnings in a static labor market, and as a source of growth and employment 
in itself” (Bhorat et al 2001:174). As a result, “Apart from its hoped-for economic and political returns, 
education came to be internationally recognized as a basic human right, like food, shelter, and health” 
(Kwame & Gate 2010:393). However, as discussed in chapter 5, some human rights cannot be 
implemented through legislation as they depend on the financial capacity of a particular country.  
                                                          
34 For more information about Church Empowerment Incorporation see 
http://www.churchempower.com/index.php/component/content/article/1-church-empowerment-vision.html  
(Accessed 26th September 2013). 
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Formal education is expensive in many African countries, hence many disadvantaged children 
miss out on it. In its social responsibility and through its resource base, the Church in Africa can sponsor 
learning institutions targeting children and youth from poor backgrounds where they can get primary 
and secondary education as well as vocational training institutions where young people are equipped 
with technical skills at subsidized costs. This kind of educational base approach will help young people to 
be self-reliant by gaining skills that can prepare them for the job market as well as entrepreneurship. 
However, in Kenya for instance, many churches have such institutions but they are considered as 
income generating projects for the churches and therefore the quest for profit leaves little room for the 
Church to accomplish its ministry of empowering the disadvantaged.   
Alongside unemployment, many youth in Africa are faced with other predicaments prevalent 
among young people – like drugs and alcohol abuse. Although these predicaments are common among 
all the youth, they have a connectedness with violence and crime. Drugs and alcohol consumption habits 
are expensive to sustain and, as a result, many young people engage in criminal and violent activities. In 
response to such challenges, the Church through creation of awareness and support programmes like 
rehabilitation centres can be helpful to the affected youth and the result will have far reaching effects in 
the society. This goal can be accomplished through partnership with government and non-governmental 
organizations that also fight against these predicaments. When the Church views the youth who are in 
bondage to these predicaments in the first place as sinners in need of redemption – which is a common 
approach of many churches in Africa – the said youth only become targets of evangelism and remain 
victims of marginalization. The Church should instead reach out to such youth not only with the  
message of conversion but also through loving, embracing and caring approaches that seek to bring 
them freedom from their bondage. 
The church should develop approaches that attempt to fill the void of idleness among young 
people, which often makes them vulnerable to crime and violence. For instance, the Church can develop 
recreational programmes like sports and games that can help in building what Hubert Bucher (1976:361) 
calls a community of young people. It is in and through such youth communities that young people are 
developed and moulded and youth networks are established. Sport is one of the most efficient ways of 
forming communities through which young people are brought together and through them values like 
discipline, teamwork, trust and self-responsibility are developed. 
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7.6.2 Family Support Programmes 
Another way through which the Church can empower communities is by supporting family institutions 
through which family and patriotic values are inculcated. The centrality of family in its contribution to 
the well-being of the society cannot be undermined because it is families that make up a society. The 
Church being a centre in which families gather regularly has the mandate of supporting these families 
and one of the ways of doing this is through family-based education. To the parents, the Church should 
have education geared towards responsible parenting so that parents are empowered “to educate their 
children for peace because the Christian family is the domestic Church and the first school of peace and 
reconciliation” (SECAM 2000).  
The Church should also develop support systems that address family challenges like single 
parenting, a phenomenon that is becoming more and more common in Africa and which according to 
Sara McLanahan (1994:8) is controversial. There have been escalating numbers of single-parent families, 
especially through natural causes like death, through choice and through absentee parents. This leaves 
these families with special challenges which require much support. Research has proved (cf. McLanahan 
1994:2-3; Biblarz & Gottainer 2000:533; Sullivan 2008:157) that children brought up by single parents 
face varying challenges that children with both parents would not otherwise face. They are more 
exposed to risks like failure, school indiscipline and drop out, delinquency and other forms of anti-social 
behaviour. However, as McLanahan (1994:2) warns, single motherhood or absent fathers is not the root 
cause of such behaviour; it only increases the risk of these negative outcomes and as such it is one 
among many factors that lead to such behaviour. Single parents, especially single mothers, are also 
faced with many challenges, like condemnation, suspicion, stigmatization and difficulties of parenting (cf 
McLanahan 1994:8; Dowd 1997:XIV; Biblarz & Gottainer 2000:533). Based on these facts, there is a need 
to have support programmes for both single parents and their children. 
For the young people there should be programmes that seek to instil values through the family 
framework. In other words, the Church is a place where the parents are moulded to bring up their 
children in the right way by teaching them and inculcating in them family, social and patriotic values as 
well as being good examples to their children. The Church is also a place where children are moulded to 
respect and honour their parents (Exodus 20:12, Ephesians 6:2) who also together with the Church 
mould them to grow in the right way (cf. Proverbs 22:6; Ephesians 6:4). Adam Chepkwony (1996:38) 
argues that: 
The success of molding the youth depends on the cooperation of parents, the youth themselves 
and the Church. Parents, as the family and the foundation on which a child’s life is based, play a 
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paramount role in shaping the lives of their offspring… However, due to the rapid changes in the 
cultures, modernity and the breakdown of traditional family roles, the parents too need 
counseling.  
Chepkwony’s sentiments seem to suggest that youth ministry is a concerted and relational effort with 
the church at the centre. The Church should therefore be conscious of the needs of both the parents 
and their children. The Church has a mandate also to reach families outside it, which means the Church 
should have strategic and deliberate programmes meant to reach such families. An example of doing 
this is through establishing a network of single-mothers where they can share their experiences, learn 
from each other and support each other. The youth based approaches mentioned above are also a good 
example of building families. Such support approaches that seek to go outside the Church must be 
inclusivist and should not be focused exclusively on evangelism Dion Forster (2013) reminds us that 
“mission is not just ‘religious’ in nature. The parent, school teacher, economist, and even politician, can 
be part of God’s model of healing and transformation.”  
 
7.6.3 Human rights education 
Human rights education through the churches in Kenya can be said to be lacking. The churches in Kenya 
have approached the issue of human rights through dimensions of justice, but only implicitly. Discourses 
on human rights have not informed the discussions and teachings of churches and for this reason there 
must be deliberate measures by churches in Kenya to embark on human rights awareness initiatives. 
The churches’ commitment to human rights education should start within their own ranks before 
starting public programmes. The churches should incorporate human rights education in their teaching 
modules in churches and also in schools run and sponsored by churches. Human rights education should 
also appear in the curricula of theological schools and should be treated as a critical aspect of pastoral 
formation. 
John Murray (2012:102) states that “the Church’s witness to human rights must be not only 
pastoral and charitable but also prophetic… Churches are often well placed to play an advocacy role, to 
act as a voice for the voiceless…” Based on Murray’s assertion, the churches in Kenya can play an 
advocacy role through advocating and negotiating with necessary government organs which deal with 
education so that human rights education can be included in school curricula as well. Human rights 
advocacy can also be done through standing with victims of human rights abuses and giving them the 
professional and spiritual support they need to regain their dignity robbed by human rights violations. 
The churches cannot succeed in its human rights approaches if they do not work with players whose 
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interest is human rights promotion. Such partnership and cooperation produces concerted efforts that 
will bear more fruit and enhance the churches’ mission of reconciliation.  
The Church should see empowerment as a missional strategy towards reconciliation. A model of 
empowerment based on inspiration, motivation, equipping, training, mobilization and engagement 
through the above discussed approaches as well as other contextual models that the churches can 
discover, is vital in modelling a human rights way of life to Church members and also people in the reach 
of the churches so that they may become not only faithful Christians but also responsible citizens.  
 
7.7 Conclusion 
The understanding that churches have of mission determines the missional approaches and actions they 
adopt. When the churches in Kenya understand reconciliation, in Schreiter’s words, as a model of and 
for mission they will seek ways in which they can participate in reconciling Kenyans. Reconciliation is 
needed in Kenya to address the post-election-violence as well as other ways in which inter-personal, 
inter-ethnic and intra-society relationships have been destroyed. The models of mission discussed in this 
chapter can help churches in Kenya in their mission of reconciliation, but these models are by no means 
the only ways to serve reconciliation, neither are they exhaustive of the options available. The churches 
in Kenya should continually seek to discern the ways God is working in Kenya and how they can faithfully 
participate in that work. The churches should carry out ongoing research to find specific and strategic 
ways in which they can participate contextually in the mission of reconciliation.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
This research was prompted by my own personal battles arising from the events of the 2007/8 post-
election violence. Kenya has been experiencing perennial political violence after the advent of 
multiparty democracy. However, the 2007/8 post-election violence was unprecedented, mainly in two 
ways. Firstly, the violence was widespread, with many parts all over the country affected, and secondly 
the aftermath was more serious than at any other upsurge of violence, with numerous and heinous 
crimes against humanity committed. 
The churches in Kenya have played ambiguous roles in the public sphere and in areas that touch 
the violence in one way or the other. The churches have, on the one hand, actively participated in 
efforts of struggle, advocacy and reconciliation in Kenya that have significantly helped the country in 
various ways. On the other hand, the churches have been part of the problem, since Church leaders 
have participated in partisan politics and abetting violence through incitement and divisive 
engagements.  
The events of the violence have been documented by various individuals and institutions. To 
avoid straying in these resources, the report by KNCHR was chosen and through it the events of the 
violence were looked at. The concepts of politics, ethnicity, human rights and violence were chosen as 
key terms for missiological reflection for this study and through an integrated approach to their 
interconnectedness, a more adequate framework to identify and analyze the causes of violence was 
created. Each of the four terms was reflected on missiologically, giving attention to ways in which 
churches can give concrete expression to a lifestyle of participating in God’s mission.  
It has been noted that politics of dominance, ethnicised politics and economic marginalization, 
as well as social injustices are the three main political problems that contributed to the violence. Also, 
negative ethnicity has been embraced as an ideology and way of life in Kenya, which has given rise to 
distorted identities. As possible missiological responses to these ethnic challenges, a unity in diversity 
and promotion of humanity as first (and basic) identity were suggested. Closely connected to these 
political and ethnic factors there has been an anti-culture of human rights violations and 
dehumanization which require a hermeneutic of human rights and a cultivation of a culture of respect 
for human rights to be mitigated. These human rights violations are acts of violence with the politicians 
identified as the instigators and sponsors of the violence and youth as the instruments of the violence.  
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Through consulting some a biblical scholarship on violence, it was concluded that though there 
are violent texts in the Bible, they should not be read as an inspiration to or a justification of violence, 
but interpreted in the light of biblical texts that promote peace and reconciliation.  
The study concludes by offering a theoretical framework of reconciliation and proposes four 
models, which the churches in Kenya can apply so that they can actively and effectively participate in 
the mission of reconciliation. Firstly, the churches in Kenya need to develop a model of reflexivity, to re-
evaluate the influence of Christianity in the public sphere and to reflect on ways to de-ethnicise the 
churches. Secondly, there is model of healing, which can only be facilitated through truth, justice and 
forgiveness. Thirdly, there is model of prophetic interruption, which means they should interrupt stories 
of negative ethnicity, the outrageous wage bill in Kenya and the ethnic dominance of certain 
communities. Fourthly, there is model of empowerment, where through inspiration, motivation, 
equipping, training, mobilization and engagement the churches can establish programmes geared 
towards youth, family support and human rights education. 
This study has uncovered areas that require further research. Most notably there is a need for 
empirical research to identify why Christian values do not influence the decisions of the majority 
Christians in Kenya in a more decisive way when it comes to issues of ethnicity and politics. There is also 
a need for empirical research to establish how homogeneous denominations have continued to exist 
and grow for over a century while maintaining a mono-ethnic tag. Another possible research topic is to 
explore how the churches in Kenya can partner and cooperate with other forces for justice in society 
because the churches cannot walk and work alone in this cause. 
The proposals made in this study do not claim to present the only alternative for the churches in 
Kenya to follow. It is one contribution to a field that urgently needs further research on the best ways 
the churches in Kenya can discern to participate in God’s mission of reconciliation. The proposals are not 
presented as alternatives or better options but as complementary approaches to the realization of the 
kingdom of God in Kenya. The churches’ contribution should be a distinctive Christian resource to 
supplement and support “secular” efforts meant to rebuild human lives and societies. This study is not 
exhaustive but it hopes to serve as a Christian model for reconciliation in Kenya. 
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